740.0011 Pacific War/227: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 11—7:50 p.m.]
802. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. A friendly member of the Diet, well known to the Embassy, has sent me the following message through a reliable American on the ground that he himself is afraid to come to the Embassy in view of his well-known pro-American sympathies.
Begin Japanese message.
Informant, who appeared to be worried and nervous, said that very strong pressure is being brought to bear on Mr. Matsuoka to take strong action against the Netherlands East Indies and that this pressure is being exerted from two separate sources: (1) from the German Embassy, who are urging the Japanese to take advantage of the present situation to move in the South Seas on the ground that the United States is in no condition to engage in hostilities in both the Atlantic and Pacific, and (2) from certain extreme Japanese nationalists who feel that Japan should acquire the Netherlands East Indies before the end of the war in order to forestall German designs on the islands in the event of a possible German victory in Europe.
Informant states that German penetration in Japanese cultural and other societies is much greater than is generally believed and that these agencies are being used at the present time in order to whip up popular feeling against the Netherlands East Indies in order to force Mr. Matsuoka’s hand. Informant said that although he does not know the details of the Dutch reply now under study in Tokyo he understands that it is of such a nature as to provide fuel for nationalist propaganda. Informant further stated that in Japanese governmental circles it is believed that the United States has already moved an appreciable part of its Pacific fleet to the Atlantic. In informant’s opinion the Dutch would have been wiser to have played for time and to have been less uncompromising in their attitude. End Japanese message.
As I am in the dark as to the progress and present status of the American-Japanese conversations in Washington, and equally in the dark as to whether or to what extent the hope of a successful outcome of those conversations may be exercising a restraining influence on extremist tendencies in the Japanese Government, I cannot with any assurance appraise the dangers envisaged by informant. From [Page 265] the tactical point of view an attack on the Netherlands East Indies would seem to be fraught with the gravest dangers to Japan, especially while the campaign in China is still in progress. On the other hand it would be shortsighted to underrate the strength of extremist influence both in military and political circles here. The Foreign Minister is undoubtedly very much in the pocket of the Axis and largely amenable to Axis pressure. He, furthermore, commands a large and strong following in Japan. In his actions and utterances he has consistently shown an almost total disregard and discounting of the risks of forceful action by the United States to curb Japan’s expansionist ambitions.
If a decision to descend on the Netherlands East Indies were assuredly dependent upon the careful deliberation and exhaustive calculation of the Cabinet, I have little doubt that moderate and restraining influences would prevail or else that the issue would bring about the Cabinet’s fall. On the other hand, in order that we may be prepared for all eventualities, we should remember that the armed forces of Japan, as in the invasion of Manchuria, are capable of sudden and surprise action without the prior sanction of the government. I think it highly unlikely that Japan will for the present exercise anything more than high pressure diplomacy on the Netherlands East Indies. Nevertheless, all of the foregoing considerations should constantly be borne in mind in connection with the preparedness of the United States to deal with possible unexpected developments in the Far East.