793.94119/756
The Consul at Nanking (Paxton) to the
Secretary of State
No. 168
Nanking, May 31,
1941.
[Received July 8.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose, for the
information of the Department a copy of a memorandum13 covering several unofficial
conversations held by two American missionaries in Nanking14 with
certain Japanese officials on the subject of possible terms of
settlement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. Though this office had
indirect information from Japanese sources that the talks were
proceeding, no report of any details of the subjects covered has been
received until recently. Naturally, this office, in accordance with its
understanding of general policy, has not only refrained from making any
specific comments on the discussions but has also recommended extreme
caution to the Americans concerned in pursuing them.
No detailed summary is included in this despatch of the contents of the
memorandum, as one, prepared by Mr. Mills himself, forms a part of
it.15
Perhaps the most significant point made is that, according to responsible
Japanese here, the Japanese Central China Army Command is willing to
consent to the withdrawal of troops from this area but believes that the
North China command will not agree to withdraw its troops from certain
portions of that area for fear of military threats from the Russian
Army, Japanese distrust of which does not appear to have been
appreciably diminished by the recent agreement between Japan and the
Soviet Union. However, it is understood that other sources in contact
with the Japanese Military in Peiping have been informed that they would
be willing to leave China entirely (south of the Great Wall), if that
were the only obstacle to peace.
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It is interesting to note, in this general connection, that a Japanese of
considerable standing has recently stated in personal conversation that
“Sino-Japanese negotiations for a settlement have been in continuous
process ever since the commencement of the hostilities”.
Respectfully yours,
For the Consul General at Shanghai:
J. Hall Paxton
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Reverend W. P. Mills, of
Nanking
Summary and Comments
The paragraphs that follow give a résumé of the most important points
brought out in the interviews reported, together with certain
comments related thereto.
- 1.
- There is now evident on the part of the Japanese a real desire
for a settlement of the China conflict. To this end they are
prepared to make concessions which they would not have made a
year ago. However, in the meantime China has come to feel that
her own position is stronger than it was, and she is therefore
now insisting upon conditions, notably in regard to Manchuria,
which she would almost certainly not have insisted upon earlier
in the struggle. The Japanese readiness to make concessions is
thus offset by China’s increasing firmness, and the prospects of
peace are consequently at the moment remote.
- 2.
- There is also evident on the part of the Japanese a desire to
improve their relations with America. In this connection it is
recognized clearly that a settlement of the Sino-Japanese
conflict would at once tend, of itself, to bring about such
improvement. However, the Japanese are not as yet prepared to
effect a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict on any terms
than their own, as the price of improving relations with the
United States. Thus the basic opposition of views between
America and Japan continues, and little can be done to improve
relations until the Sino-Japanese conflict is settled.
- 3.
- In this connection, however, it should be noted that, at
whatever time it may become possible to consider a Sino-Japanese
peace, proposals such as those set forth in the appendix to this
memorandum16 seem likely to
prove fairly acceptable as a basis of discussion. Recent books
and magazine articles, containing similar proposals, tend to
support this statement. There seems to be a gradual
crystallization of opinion as to the main lines along which a
settlement of the Far Eastern
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situation should lie, a fact which should
be helpful when the time comes to make such a settlement.
- 4.
- There is still, in spite of the recent Russo-Japanese pact, a
deep suspicion on the part of the Japanese as to Russia’s real
attitude. This suspicion is given as the reason for the desire
to station troops in North China. In this connection any
intention of maintaining economic or political control in North
China is denied, though whether this denial is genuine or not
is, of course, open to question.
- 5.
- The attitude towards the Nanking regime, as revealed by the
interviews, is significant. We are told that Japan is committed
to the regime and must support it. At the same time one gets the
impression that the Japanese now recognize that they will be
obliged, in the end, to deal with Chungking for a settlement of
the conflict. This they apparently hope to achieve through
Nanking as an intermediary. In this connection it seems to be
assumed that Nanking will offer no objection to any terms that
satisfy both Chungking and Tokyo, if such can be agreed upon. As
to what will happen to the Nanking regime in the event of the
conclusion of peace with Chungking, nothing is said clearly.
Apparently it is expected that Nanking will somehow be absorbed
to a greater or less degree in the new Chinese government that
will come into being after the war. Whether this expectation
will prove well founded or not, only time can tell.
- 6.
- In one of the interviews it was stated quite positively that
Chungking has indicated its readiness to accept some form of
“cooperation” against Communism. If true, this is an important
fact, and its bearings need to be fully considered. However,
there seems to be no ground for Japanese hopes that this alleged
readiness for “cooperation” against Communism will lead
Chungking to agree to the stationing of any Japanese troops
south of the Great Wall. Whatever “cooperation” there might be,
will, it can be confidently asserted, have to take some other
form than this. Moreover, the fact that the possibility of a
“higher policy” was indicated, which would involve complete
withdrawal south of the Great Wall, supports this view.
- 7.
- Japanese attitudes towards China proper and towards Manchuria,
as brought out in the interviews, need to be clearly
distinguished. In regard to the former there is frequent
reiteration of the intention to abide by the Konoye
declaration,17 and to respect China’s sovereignty.
All occupation by Japanese troops of China proper is said to be
temporary only. Manchuria, on the other hand, is considered as
never having been a part of China proper, and the Japanese
regard themselves therefore as entitled to treat Manchuria in a
different way from the rest of the country. Moreover, since
their control of Manchuria has not been effectively disputed
during the last decade,
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the Japanese now feel their position in that area to be
secure. Indeed so strong is this feeling that it comes as a
shock to the Japanese to have any one suggest (as is done in the
proposals attached to this memorandum) that the Manchurian
question is not already “permanently” settled. The fact that
there was not the violent objection to this suggestion from the
three persons interviewed that one might naturally have
expected, is mildly encouraging; but, on the other hand, it
cannot be thought for a moment that the Japanese as a whole yet
envisage the possibility of their ever having to give up
Manchuria. Only a crushing military defeat, or the near collapse
of the Empire, would cause them seriously to consider such an
eventuality. China, on the contrary, as has been already
indicated, is equally determined on the recognition of her
political sovereignty in Manchuria. It is thus likely that the
most serious problem in the way of a Sino-Japanese peace, when
such comes to be considered, will be the status of
Manchuria.
- 8.
- The ultimate evacuation of Hainan Island would seem to be
required by the Konoye declaration of no territorial aggression,
but its temporary occupation is defended on the ground of the
present international situation. The status of Hainan and the
stationing of troops in North China may well prove to be the
acid tests of Japan’s sincerity in her professed intention to
respect China’s sovereignty.
- 9.
- The claim was made in one of the interviews that Japanese
capitalists even more than the military are blocking a
settlement with China at this time. This assertion is denied by
some, who regard the claim as purely “face saving” for the
military. The writer, however, is inclined to give the statement
some credence, especially when one considers how strong Japanese
economic interests have become in China during the last four
years.
- 10.
- No enthusiasm for the Axis Pact was shown in any of the
interviews. In fact there was one outspoken condemnation of it,
and that, surprisingly enough, by the military officer taking
part in the conversations. On the other hand a desire to avoid
conflict with America was manifest, though the danger of war was
frankly faced. It was felt that this danger lay chiefly in the
gradual deterioration of the situation, a deterioration which
would almost certainly occur unless positive measures were taken
to prevent such a result. In this connection it was made clear
that American entry into the European war, if that should come
about, would not necessarily bring Japan and the United States
into conflict, though naturally it would increase the chances of
their becoming so involved. However, American participation in
the European war, if that should occur, plus increasing American
aid to China, could easily create a situation where conflict
would be inevitable.
- 11.
- It was emphasized in the interviews that Japan’s policy of
southward expansion is a peaceful one. This is doubtless true,
if the expansion Japan desires can be secured without the use of
force. Moreover, since the strengthening of the defenses of
Singapore, of the Philippines, and of the Dutch East Indies,
Japan’s southward policy is certainly likely to be more cautious
than it was before, and in this sense peaceful. However, it is
not to be doubted that Japan will, unless checked, expand
southward in whatever way she thinks best for her own interests.
Hence the maintenance of the defenses of the places above
mentioned in the highest state of readiness and efficiency is
essential. To write thus is not to accuse the parties
interviewed of conscious insincerity. It is merely to be
realistic. For nothing in the history of the last ten years has
shown that Japan can withstand the temptation to expand by
force, if she believes that force will obtain for her what she
desires. In this sense Japan’s membership in the Axis is a
natural alliance, even though many of her wiser heads decry
it.
- 12.
- As was indicated in the last interview reported, the situation
between Japan and America at the moment, from the Japanese point
of view, can be summarized as follows: both countries are
watching each other cautiously, neither being quite sure of its
real strength; if either were sure, war between them might come
very quickly.
The writer does not believe that America is as opportunistic or as
devoid of principle in international relations as this summary
suggests. Neither does he believe that all Japanese would approve
for their own country such a course as the statement implies—the
heartless waging of war for purely national and selfish ends.
Nevertheless, the writer does believe that there is enough truth in
the statement quoted above to represent accurately the situation in
the Orient today so far as Japan is concerned. Peace rests, so far
as it depends on those who control Japanese policy, only on the thin
edge of the balance as to whether it—peace—pays better than war.
American policy in regard to the Orient today must therefore start
from a clear realization of this fact, and all of her efforts,
whether in a material or a diplomatic sense, must be directed
towards convincing the Japanese that peace will serve their
interests better than war. Such efforts will be seconded by the
saner section of Japanese public opinion, and thus seconded may
suffice to carry the day; but if they are to do so, they must be
efforts steadily and unceasingly made.
Thus, on the diplomatic side, no avenue of effecting a settlement of
the Sino-Japanese war that seems hopeful, nor any plan that promises
even by a little to improve Japanese-American relations, should be
left unexplored. At the same time, on the material side, there
should be no slackening of our aid to China, but rather a constant
increase in the help given. Furthermore, economic pressure against
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Japan should be
steadily extended, in order that her resources, whether for the war
against China, or for a possible war against the United States,
should be correspondingly curtailed. And finally, it should be made
clear to Japan that any effort on her part at further expansion by
force would meet with instant opposition from us. Japan must be
brought to understand that we mean it when we say, “Thus far, and no
further!”
In brief, as the writer sees it, the policy which America should have
towards Japan at this time is this. Conciliation where conciliation
is possible, but always and everywhere firmness. Vacillation will
imperil both our own interests and China’s, as well as those of
Britain and Holland. Firmness, plus conciliation, where such can be
shown without sacrifice of principle, may carry us through, without
an open break with Japan, to the end of the present struggles in
Europe and Asia, and give us at that time the opportunity of taking
part in the construction of a genuinely new order throughout the
world. But such future opportunity will be the fruit only of present
firmness.
(Summarized by
W. P. Mills
)
