711.94/2125: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 27—1:40 p.m.]
741–742. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Department’s 297, May 24, 11 p.m. Pending receipt of the relevant documents I submit the following survey of the situation in Japan in the hope that it may serve provisionally to indicate the trend of our thoughts bearing in general terms on the questions raised in the Department’s telegram under reference.
[Page 229]1. From the beginning of the China conflict until the end of 1938 period, during which events in Europe were taking shape in the direction of war, the policy of Japan, reflecting a public opinion almost unanimous except for the relatively small pro-democracy and pro-Axis elements, was to avoid entering or closely associating with either the democratic or the totalitarian camps. In the first half of 1939, the Japanese Government gave prolonged consideration to a proposed alliance with Germany, the object of which was to be the Soviet Union, then considered to be one of the democratic powers. During that period we actively propagated among Japanese leaders the thought that, if war should break out between the democratic and totalitarian powers, the resources and probable eventual participation of the United States on the side of the democracies would inevitably lead to the defeat of Germany and her allies. I can state on unquestionable authority that this more than any other was the argument which, as Admiral Yonai1 put it to me, enabled the Government to “suppress those elements which advocate an alliance with Germany.”
The policy of non-involvement continued without interruption until the repercussions here of the German victories in Europe in the Spring and Summer of last year, added to the apprehension over relations with the United States, brought about the submergence of those political personages who had on the one hand resisted an alliance with Germany and had on the other hand sought an adjustment of relations with the United States on the wholly impossible basis of Japan’s retaining all her major objectives on the Continent. That there had been taking place a swing back of the pendulum from the point where it was believed that an inevitable and imminent German victory would give Japan “golden opportunity” to achieve the wildest expansionist ambitions is made evident in several ways, notably by the reaction to recent German successes which is compounded as much of growing concern over the possibility of a German victory as of reviving confidence in such an outcome. In short, we believe it is being increasingly realized here that so long as Japan’s expansionist objectives in the Far East remain unmodified, there would be little to choose between an Allied victory and a German victory, except for the fact that the latter would be a more remote danger in point of time. Further evidence is offered in the gradual reconstruction of the Cabinet by the removal of pro-Axis members, except for Mr. Matsuoka, and their replacement with others of conservative leanings; and by the emasculation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.
2. In a country so politically backward as Japan there is no set of principles which runs homogeneously throughout the fabric of [Page 230] the nation, while medieval ideas which disappeared in the Occident centuries ago vie with political concepts—from Fascism to advanced Liberalism—now current in the West. The recurrent rise and decline of each of these various schools of thought have been determined largely by the impact of conditions and events outside Japan. Japan’s politics are moulded therefore by facts and events and not by immutable principles. The German military successes of last year brought about the elimination from power for the time being of those with some pretentions to moral principles and the entire orientation of national policy, and we believe that the impact of (a) American rearmament and the growing determination of the American people to spare no sacrifice necessary to defend their form of life and (b) the dangers inherent in Japan’s China policy whichever side might be the winner in the European war have set in motion another process of changing policy. How such change will take shape we cannot predict, but we would emphasize that whatever it may be it cannot be more resistant than its predecessors to the arguments of facts and events.
3. Public attention at the moment is concentrated largely on the debate between two schools of thought represented by Mr. Matsuoka and the Japanese Ambassador in China, the latter school supporting the Army in China with regard to the question of how best the China conflict can be liquidated. The former school wish to come to terms with China probably for reasons suggested in our 689, May 16, 6 p.m.,2 while the latter, alarmed over the waning enthusiasm at home over the conflict and the growing concern over possible involvement in the European war, demand pursuance of expansionist objectives in China which have already been laid down, the attainment of which [they?] might insist is just around the corner. While advocating different methods, both sides are offering evidence and taking cognizance of the feeling in a substantial portion of the population that settlement of the China conflict is a pressing matter. Of course one immediately treads on speculative ground in examining the possibility of Japan’s fulfilling what must obviously be China’s condition sine qua non for peace, namely, withdrawal of Japan’s forces from China. With the army stridently warning the public against nourishing hopes of an early victory, the fact that the question of ending the conflict looms so large in the public mind should not be neglected. Whether fears of war with the United States, economic disturbances and other factors are sufficiently strong to overcome opposition to the evacuation of China we cannot say, but it would seem to us that if negotiations between the two countries could bring about a settlement on paper, [Page 231] the burden would be on Japan of giving validity to that settlement by prior fulfillment of this particular condition.
4. As reported in recent telegrams, there are grounds for believing that certain important personages here are informed of developments referred to by the Department to the exclusion of other officials who might normally be expected to know of these developments.
5. To sum up, Japan’s foreign policy and diplomacy are essentially susceptible to world developments and events. I do not feel at the present moment that we are in a position to report important gains in influence either by the extremists or by the moderates in Japan although we believe the momentary trend to be in favor of the latter. Future trends will inevitably be influenced by the trend of the European war as well as by trends in American policy and action. The outcome in Japan is therefore almost wholly unpredictable but I would express the opinion that under present conditions Japan is highly malleable.
6. Upon receipt of the documents mentioned in paragraph numbered 1, I shall endeavor to reply intelligently to the Department’s specific questions.
- Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai, Japanese Navy Minister, 1937–39; Prime Minister, 1940.↩
- Vol. v, p. 504.↩