711.94/213314/18
Father Drought to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)92
Explanation in Annex
III. China Affair.
The Government of the United States considers the basic terms as offered for the peaceful settlement of the China Affair as just and equitable; and extends to the Government of Japan congratulations for the successful application of the Good Neighbor principle which both Governments profess as controlling the policies of their actions respecting neighboring nations and governments.
The Government of the United States accepts, on behalf of President Roosevelt, the request as contained in point III of the Understanding, “Cooperative defense against communism”.
[Page 222]The Government of the United States entertains no doubt whatever that the Government of Japan will negotiate this term in such a manner as to realize complete harmony with the other basic terms of national sovereignty and withdrawal of troops. Yet, since such defense may involve military action and since such action against communism in China has been interpreted frequently by American public opinion as a war measure; and since any such misconception of the term should be prevented as a source of future misunderstanding, the Government of the United States signifies, that, in interpreting this term it understands etc. etc. confer State Department explanation.
It is understood that the basic terms for negotiating peace in China shall be announced at the discretion of the Government of Japan.
In III of the Understanding, the references to the legal instruments have been omitted. It is felt that, as stated, the issue of recognition or non-recognition of the Wang Ching Wei and Manchoukuo Governments should not be raised at this time. If these references were retained in the Understanding, the United States Government would feel bound to state its legal position and the Government of Japan would feel bound equally to state its own position. Omission of any reference whatever will avoid confusion.
Southwestern Pacific
United States statement on diplomatic assistance.
Comment.
- (1) A word of praise for the China Terms will encourage the Japanese to merit that praise.
- (2) There would be no need for our Government to indicate desired changes in the Japanese explanations re: China Affair if the Japanese Embassy were to submit a corrected version along the lines indicated. Shall I ask them to do this? In this way those points of difference would not need to be referred back to Tokio.
- (3) Instead of submitting a series of memos, would it not be more effective to submit a complete draft of understanding and annexed explanations incorporating whatever modifications the United States Government wishes to introduce?
- (4) We might indicate in our explanation that the statement on Pacific stabilization is in complete conformity with the expressed views of the Premier and Foreign Minister of Japan.
- (5) From the Japanese viewpoint it would be most advantageous to make some general announcement before May 27th. If the indication of an understanding comes after President Roosevelt’s speech the general public may feel that the Japanese have been motivated thereto by fear.
- (6) Admiral Nomura feels very keenly that the addition re: “inconsistency” should be entirely omitted because his Emperor could not be presumed to sanction anything that would be inconsistent with existing commitments. Moreover, the statement may boomerang as indicated [indicating?] to the Japanese that there [their] obligation under the Axis is not weakened and practically nullified by this understanding.
- (7) In the section on the attitude of both Governments toward the European War, the Japanese suggest that instead of omitting the first paragraph entirely that it be changed to read somewhat as follows: both Governments desire the restoration of world peace and are opposed to the unprovoked extension of the European War.
- (8) For each change in the draft made by the United States Government, it would be helpful to state, when possible, an agreeable, yet true, reason for the change. Such a procedure would produce a “spiritual” benefit.
- (9) When the Understanding has been initialed, it would be deeply appreciated by the Japanese if Nomura, Iwakuro and Wikawa could be received by President Roosevelt.
- (10) Would the United States Government object if, after the Understanding is signed, the Japanese were to engage press agents in this country?
- N. B. (11) Though completely mistaken, the opposition group in Japan are insisting that the present negotiations for an Understanding with the United States are part of a tactical manoeuver designed by the Americans to trap the Japanese into a temporary appeasement period during which both the British and ourselves would increase our military preparations against Japan. As there is a meeting on Monday (Sunday93 here) of the Super-cabinet, it would be most helpful if the Japanese Ambassador could send today some word to his Government affirming the substantial agreement of Mr. Hull with the terms of the Understanding and indicating that the changes contemplated are not substantial.