711.94/5–1541
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)53
A withdrawal, beginning now and taking place progressively, of Japan’s armed forces from China (south of the Great Wall), effected under the terms of an agreement or agreements (as distinguished from exigencies of military, economic and political necessity), would open the way to one or more developments, as follows:
The Japanese army and its equipment could be reorganized and rehabilitated—for new uses.
That army and the ships and the resources which have been supporting it could be used for movements southward or northward or eastward—or even again against China. Just as Japan has already attacked and invaded China, so Japan might again at any opportune and convenient moment, so long as her armed forces are intact and her militant militaristic element is in control, again attack and invade China.
China might easily become more ripe for an invasion with success than she was in 1937. It is generally understood that during several years preceding 1937 China, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek et cetera, was making substantial progress toward becoming a strong country; and that one effect of Japan’s invasion beneficial to China has been that, having to fight or to become enslaved and having chosen to fight, the Chinese have gone far in the direction of national unity. At the same time, there remain in China “the makings” of renewed civil strife, and China has been weakened economically and socially by four years of armed resistance under adverse conditions to the Japanese invader. The Chinese, now substantially united under pressure from without, might readily fly into factions were that pressure suddenly removed. Should that happen, a magnificent opportunity would be presented to the Japanese to return to the conflict, invade China, and succeed in bringing to a victorious end that chapter in their program of expansion which relates to the conquest of China.
No contribution by any person or any country toward effectuating removal of the Japanese armed forces from China under conditions and on terms which leave that army undefeated and intact and which leave the militant militaristic element in Japan in control undiscredited [Page 193] (and in fact strengthened) will be beneficial to China, a kindness to Japan, helpful toward peace in the Far East, or of assistance to the cause of making the world safe for peace-loving peoples—including the United States.
- Submitted to Mr. Welles with covering notation: “Herewith brief observations of some of the possible effects of a possible rendering of assistance to the Japanese toward withdrawal by Japan under existing conditions of Japan’s armed forces from China.”↩