Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/5–941

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine

[Washington,] May 9, 1941.

Under the procedure contemplated in the Japanese draft,³⁶ the President would suggest to the Chinese that they take the initiative in proposing peace negotiations with Japan. Such a procedure, if followed, would, of course, by placing China in the position of suing for peace, stamp Japan as the victor in the conflict and place Japan in a position of tactical advantage in negotiations with China.

The Japanese proposal then provides that, with the “acceptance by the Chiang Kai-shek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof”.

It is not clear from this wording what the Japanese envisage as likely to be the sequence of developments, as it is not clear how there is likely to be a coalescence of the Wang Ching-wei regime with the Chungking Government except as an outcome of peace negotiations between the Chungking Government and Japan. In as much as Japan has already concluded a “treaty” with the Wang Ching-wei regime, it is not clear what further negotiations Japan would have to conduct with that regime except for the purpose of disposing gracefully of that regime in such a way as to avoid the appearance of a breach of faith on Japan’s part with a regime that Japan has pledged itself to support. The proposed Japanese negotiations with the Chinese would thus presumably include arrangements whereby Wang Ching-wei and his associates would be absorbed into the Chinese Government on an equitable basis.

If this is all that is meant by the provision under reference, it is believed that we should not raise any objection. Unless there is to be reconciliation of the principal political elements in China, the prospect of establishing a solid basis for future stability would not seem to be very hopeful.

On the other hand, Japan may hope by conducting negotiations independently with Chungking and Nanking to use the complacency of the Nanking group as a leverage to force terms favorable to Japan upon the Chungking Government.

It is suggested that the provisions contained in our revision of the Japanese draft would allow for a procedure which would tend to be much safer from the point of view of ensuring adherence by Japan to the terms and conditions provided for in the Japanese proposal.

A procedure which suggests itself is:

(1) That we tell the Japanese that before we enter into discussions with them we consider that it will be necessary for us to inform the Chinese (as well as the British) in strict confidence of our intention to enter into negotiations and of the general scope of the subject of the negotiations;

(2) That we tell the Japanese that, if the Chinese should reply that they would not be disposed to accept a suggestion from the President that they negotiate on the basis of the proposed terms, we would find ourselves unable to proceed with the discussions;

(3) That, if the two foregoing stipulations should be agreeable to the Japanese, the President might proceed formally to offer a suggestion to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that they enter into negotiations;

(4) That we might also suggest that the Chinese and the Japanese Governments enter into immediate arrangements for an armistice under which both sides would agree to undertake no further offensive military operations, including bombing, in order to ensure that the negotiations may be conducted in an amicable atmosphere;

(5) That we suggest that the proposal for negotiations between the Chinese and the Japanese should take the form of a joint initiative between China and Japan (this suggestion envisages an arrangement whereby this Government would act as a “post office” through which the acceptance by each Government of the President’s suggestion and proposals by the Chinese and Japanese Governments for the time and place of negotiations would be communicated to the other Government); and

(6) That we stipulate to the Japanese that the “proposed” declaration of policy and intention should become effective only after the conclusion of a peace settlement between Japan and China.

It is believed that the effect of the stipulation in the foregoing paragraph would be to cause the Japanese to accelerate negotiations and thus influence them in the direction of moderation.

It is believed also that the foregoing procedure as a whole would be fair both to the Japanese and the Chinese. If the Japanese should object to any or all of its features, the ensuing discussion might afford us an opportunity of forcing some conclusion as to whether or not they have some ulterior objective in view.

36. April 9, ibid., p. 398.