740.0011 European War 1939/12336: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 22—11:30 p.m.]
208. When I took occasion to remark today to the Secretary General of the Foreign Office that he had just added a new chapter to history he belittled the effect of the new treaty with Germany saying that it actually changed nothing at all and proceeding with an air of self-justification to offer an exposition along these lines:
Turkey was isolated with no immediate prospect either of adequately supplying her own minimum equipment needs or of obtaining military support from Great Britain in case of need; at the moment when the Germans had overrun the Balkan region and were most fully concentrated in immediate proximity to her they had repeated their assurances that they had no designs against her (as they said shortly [would] be demonstrated by the substantial withdrawal of their forces) and had inquired whether this country was similarly disposed and would be willing to join in certifying by some sort of treaty the common desire for the maintenance of normal friendly relations. Having consulted the British and found them acquiescent the Turks had signified their willingness to discuss the matter on the understanding that any agreement reached should fully safeguard their alliance with the British; the Germans had maintained that while they had no objection to the Turks making any unilateral statement they chose to that effect, the incorporation of any safeguarding clause in the treaty itself would not be acceptable; the Turks had insisted and had proposed a whole series of drafts of such a clause even any agreement [sic] had been reached as to what should constitute the subject matter of the agreement itself; and only at the last moment [Page 869] had the Germans consented to incorporate the clause in a treaty of friendship.
As for the substance of the treaty Numan maintained it was of considerable advantage both to Turkey herself and to her ally. She had not entertained (nor had Great Britain desired that she should) the remotest intention either of attacking the German positions in the Balkans or of permitting the use of her territory by other powers for that purpose; in exchange for a public declaration to that effect she had obtained the assurance that Germany (whether alone or in combination with Russia) would not attack Turkish territory. This had likewise a great value for the British in that it assured them that Turkey’s geographical situation could not be utilized for the purpose of turning the flank of their positions in the East.
As against these solid advantages the Germans could claim to have gained nothing more substantial than a propaganda victory which he admitted was a striking one but whose enduring effects he minimized. He felt (and stated that the British Government has expressed the same feeling) that on balance the treaty gave Turkey and Great Britain more than it cost.
He raised in order to answer it the question what reason the Germans had had for wanting the treaty. There was a possibility that they would make war on Russia—he himself did not believe that probable but it was unquestionably a contingency which the Germans had had in mind and with regard to which they had felt it necessary to take the precaution of assuring their Balkan flank against any possibility of attack by or through Turkey and his Government had been in a position to give that assurance without detriment to its own interests or those of its ally.
2. Referring to the fact that both the Turkish Foreign Minister and the German Ambassador in their statements to the local press had spoken of being in accord in desiring that the press of each country should maintain a friendly tone I recalled that the press despatches from Germany and Italy presented this as a matter of formal agreement between the two Governments. He assured me it represented merely a concordance of views and involved no mutual obligation.
He took occasion to add that there were no unpublished agreements or other understandings entered into in connection with the treaty.
3. I asked about the reports from the same source that there had also been some sort of economic understanding. He stated that all that is in contemplation is a new ad hoc barter arrangement to replace the current one of a series of such arrangements which is due to expire in about 2 months; clearing agreements had proved unsatisfactory from the Turkish standpoint and no more general type of commercial agreement is in prospect at this time.
[Page 870]4. I also inquired about the reported signature of an agreement concerning the operation of the section of the railway which crosses the Turko-Greek frontier several times on the way from Thrace to Bulgaria. He said that immediately upon being put into occupation of that portion of Greek territory the Bulgarians had informed the Turkish railway administration that by authorization of the Germans they were now administering the formerly Greek sections; the Germans had on inquiry flatly denied this and had proposed that they and the Turks jointly repair and operate the line from Uzunkopru to Svilingrade; but the Turks had successfully insisted upon their sole operation on a temporary basis without prejudice to any question of territorial sovereignty and on a reciprocal understanding that the line cannot be used for the transportation of troops or war materials.