Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, General, The Soviet Union, Volume I

740.0011 European War 1939/17990

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs

[Washington,] November 1, 1941.

Following Mr. Atherton’s instructions yesterday, I requested Sir Anthony Rumbold⁶² to call at the Department this morning in connection with a conversation which the British Ambassador had had with the Secretary yesterday.⁶³

I told Sir Anthony that I understood that during the course of their conversation on various matters yesterday the Ambassador had inquired of the Secretary what the attitude of this Government was toward the Soviet request to the British Government that the latter declare war on Finland, Rumania and Hungary, and that the Secretary had replied that this was not a matter in which this Government could give any advice. The Secretary had, however, shown the Ambassador a document which the Secretary said he understood appeared to contain some points in regard to this matter which might be of interest to the Ambassador. The Secretary went on to say that all the points would undoubtedly readily occur to the Ambassador and that he was bringing them to his attention only with the idea of possibly saving the Ambassador unnecessary thought on the subject.

I told Sir Anthony that we were not clear to what extent the Ambassador had had time to go over the document shown him by the Secretary and it was our desire now to let him look over the document and make such notes therefrom as he desired. Sir Anthony looked over the document and did, in fact, make notes therefrom. He remarked that, as the Secretary had suggested, all the points therein would undoubtedly have occurred to the British Government when the subject was considered. I emphasized to him that the document should not be interpreted in any way as the considered opinion of this Government with respect to this subject. He said that he clearly understood that. The document shown Sir Anthony is attached.

L. R[andolph] H[iggs]

[Annex—Extracts]

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)

[Washington,] October 30, 1941.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Finland. The Finns are now divided in their political opinions but a British declaration of war would unify the nation versus the British and would force the nation into German arms which is not now the case. This would immediately intensify Finland’s war efforts and increase the peril of supplies to Russia and the Archangel route. This would likewise intensify Finland’s effort against Leningrad.

Such a declaration of war would undoubtedly have repercussions in Sweden unfavorable to the democracies.

Our restraining influence in Finland would be destroyed.

If the Soviets desire by this declaration of war that British troops should attack Finland, Great Britain might well announce her effort as an attack on those German forces occupying Petsamo and Northern Finland without any declaration of war.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A declaration of war would not at this time facilitate British military effort, it would merely be a gesture to placate Russia and could be used by Germany as a favorable argument in mobilizing all of Eastern Europe against the democracies and the implied threat to the future of the small countries of Eastern Europe through Soviet ambitions at the peace table.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

R[ay] A[therton]

62. Second Secretary of the British Embassy.
63. Memorandum of conversation not printed.