740.0011 European War 1939/16162: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:34 p.m.]
519. Department’s 220, October 25. I called on President Ryti this morning by appointment and handed him memorandum setting forth substance with reallocations of some portions of your telegram under reference. My memorandum commences by reference to my conversation with President October 23 and your comment that this provided first intimation received of possibility that Finnish military operations might cease. Second paragraph of memorandum refers to effect of Finnish offensive operations Russo-German war and on policies supported by United States. Third paragraph of memorandum discusses conversation of August 18 between Under Secretary and Finnish [Page 83] Minister, closely paraphrasing all except first clause of second paragraph in Department’s telegram under reference. Fourth paragraph of memorandum says American Government has received no reply from Finnish Government regarding proposals of August 18. Fifth paragraph of memorandum paraphrases last sentence of second paragraph in Department’s telegram. Sixth paragraph of memorandum paraphrases final paragraph of Department’s telegram omitting first clause ending at “conversation of August 18”. Memorandum concludes in two final paragraphs stating that though our Government understands that presence in Finland of large masses of German troops threatens Finland’s freedom of action I am instructed to state specifically to Finnish Government substance of last two sentences in first paragraph of Department’s telegram.
President read my memorandum carefully and then said he would not comment upon it for present except to say which he did with great vehemence that Finland was not vassal either of United States, of Britain, or of Germany and was pursuing its own policy exclusively.
President told me that Procopé’s report of conversation of October 3 with you had been entirely different from my account of same conversation based upon your telegram 201, October 4. I asked President whether he recalled having received from Procopé report of latter’s conversation of August 18 with Under Secretary Welles and if so whether it accorded with account of this conversation embodied in memorandum handed to President this morning. President said he did not recall receiving that impression but would investigate and asked me to make no commitment on his behalf in my report to you on this point pending result of such investigation. He added that in pressure of work he could not be sure as to precise nature of Procopé’s report of conversation of August 18.
President said Finland was best judge of needs of its own self-defense but that if he were to judge need of United States in respect of its own self-defense he would say our association with Communist Russia involved greater danger through Communism in United States as well as in Britain than any threat emanating from Germany.
President told me he had lately gone through the published and unpublished diplomatic correspondence of Winter War with U. S. S. R. with particular reference to aid promised or given by British Government to Finland at that time and had come to conclusion that notwithstanding British protestations of friendship all action then taken by British had been only for British interests. He said that although Germans then interfered with shipments of arms to Finland from Italy they had at least refrained from protesting devotion to ideals in behalf of small nations. Germans had sent food supplies to Finland unlike British Ministry of Economic Warfare which had endeavored [Page 84] to keep Finland on starvation rations by its blockade. Finns had always been friendly to Britain but did not propose to die for British interests though they were prepared unanimously to sacrifice their lives if necessary for what they conceive to be Finnish interests. President alluded again to Russian attack on this country last June and to long delay which had followed this aggression before Finnish advance began. Nothing would now alter fixed resolve of Finnish people to gain security for themselves. It was apparent that people in United States did not understand necessity for this resolve to protect Finland against Bolshevik danger.
President then turned to general military situation, reiterating view that with expected fall of Leningrad situation on Finnish front would largely clear and he hoped this would be matter of few weeks only. He likewise expected fall of Moscow in relatively short time and German success further south was completing defeat of Bolshevik regime.
Following his first visible vehemence on reading my memorandum as above reported President resumed his usual calm and measured manner but gave me impression that our latest representation would not change inflexible purpose to pursue aims of Finnish policy as heretofore indicated obviously including military occupation of territory belonging to Soviet Union pending final peace settlement. I said to President that I felt our representations of October 6 and today required formal statement of Finnish position which he said would be forthcoming and would probably be based upon Finnish Government’s answer of October 6 to British aide-mémoire of September 22 with additional arguments of which he said there was abundance.
I do not feel Finnish Government will act in accordance with our desires in reference to withdrawal of its military forces from Soviet territory61 and, judging from President’s attitude today, I think he is inflexible in his intention to hold certain limited strategic objectives there. As to holding Finnish Government responsible for alleged or presumed attacks from Finnish controlled territory on shipments of war material in Arctic area this threat was certainly not lost upon President though he made no direct reference to it.