Office of the Historian

740.0011 European War 1939/11809: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 7, 1941—1 p.m.
[Received 2:02 p.m.]

1102. In view of the probability that the Soviet Government is now facing a choice between complete political and economic submission to Germany or a threatened military invasion, the Embassy has prepared and transmitted by pouch which left yesterday a despatch entitled “Discontent Among the Soviet Peasantry and its Effect Upon Soviet Foreign Policy.”58 The following conclusions are reached in the despatch.

1.
Because of the high proportion of peasants among the total Soviet population, and the essentially peasant character of the urban workers who have been recruited from the villages during the past 15 years, the morale of the peasantry would be an important, if not determining factor in the military strength of the Soviet Union should an invasion occur.
2.
Due to the oppressive policy of the Kremlin toward the peasantry which began with the introduction of enforced collectivization and which has continued to express itself in numerous burdensome decrees [Page 621] during the past year, the peasant population is believed to be bitterly hostile to the central government. Reports from the Ukraine, as well as from Russia proper, indicate that a foreign army would be welcomed as liberators by a large proportion of the rural population.
3.
Though the morale of the Red army may be satisfactory at the present time, the peasant origin of the rank and file, whether recruited from the cities or from the villages, makes them susceptible to the disaffection of the rural population. In consequence, the Red army’s morale cannot be regarded as wholly reliable.
4.
Though the inherent loyalty of the Russian peasant to his fatherland, as opposed to the Stalinist regime, might eventually result in serious and widespread uprisings against a foreign invader, it is highly probable that the Stalinist regime could not survive any invasion.
5.
In view of the foregoing, of which Stalin is doubtless aware, I am of the opinion that he must give serious consideration to the state of mind of the masses in resolving the fundamental problem of foreign policy with which he is now confronted.
Steinhardt
  1. Not printed.↩