760D.61/1597½
Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary: On October 3 you informed the Finnish Minister that we were very glad to see Finland regain its territory from the Soviet Union but that we were concerned that after doing so Finland was projecting itself into the general war and on the side of Germany. This position would appear to be generally unassailable and it would [Page 105] perhaps be better not to become involved in any discussion with the Finns of subsidiary matters, such as would be entailed in an exchange of views regarding, for instance, the number of German troops in Finland on June 22, 1941, the date of the beginning of the German attack upon the Soviet Union. If you should deem it desirable, however, to discuss other matters with the Minister than the points made by you to him on October 3, you may find it appropriate to discuss briefly and informally the Finnish reply to us dated November 11, 1941 and in this connection, the following points may be found useful: (If the Minister inquires when or whether we intend to reply to the Finnish communication, this Division believes it would be advisable to avoid a direct reply by saying that we are studying the question.)
One. The Finnish note makes the point that in order to safeguard Finland against further attacks from the Soviet Union, Finland must occupy certain strategic Soviet territory. This same contention was advanced by the Soviet Union in 1939 vis-à-vis Finnish territory. We protested in no uncertain terms against this Soviet policy and the means employed to put it into effect. It must be clear to Finland from its own experiences that such a policy as that previously followed by the Soviet Union and now advocated by Finland only sows the seeds of future wars.
Two. Finland has made much of certain strategic railroads, airfields, et cetera, built by the Soviets within their territory. In Finnish eyes these installations were conceived only for attack on Finland. No consideration seems to have been given to the probability that the installations were built primarily to defend Soviet territory against attacks from Finnish territory.
Three. On the basis of events prior to June 22, 1941, Finland has stated that its recent course of action is entirely justified. Any justification which Finnish policy may have had in this connection does not make it any more wise from the point of view of Finland’s future security.
Four. The Finnish Government appears to feel that Finland’s future security can best be protected by the occupation of the aforementioned Soviet territory. We are convinced that Germany will be finally and completely defeated; and are unable to see how any strategic frontier defended solely by Finnish resources in man power and material alone can give Finland security, if Finland is still at war with the Soviet Union at that time and Finnish troops are in occupation of Soviet territory.
Five. With respect to East Karelia and the Finnish contention that this territory rightly should be incorporated into Finland proper, and that this is a justification for Finland’s occupation of this territory by force, the most casual study of history will show that such population [Page 106] problems as this have never been solved by forceful conquest of the territories involved.
The Finnish Government has raised the question of the applicability of the so-called Atlantic Charter to the foregoing question. This is the first instance which has come to our attention in which the Finnish Government has expressed any support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. If the Finnish Government feels that it can support the principles of the Atlantic Charter, we should be very glad to have it make a public declaration to that effect.
Six. The Finnish reply states that Finnish troops cannot threaten the United States. We gladly agree with this statement. However, it must be realized that the consequences of the operations of Finnish troops can and recently have constituted a threat to the security of the United States. This point has been made clear in several of your recent public statements.
Seven. The note also expresses the hope that “the great American nation will recognize the right also of a small nation to live and defend itself”. We unquestionably recognize such a right. We also recognize that the same right appertains to large nations. Accordingly, from a realistic point of view, the Finnish Government must realize that if what it deems its own security and what the United States or some other country deems its own security are in conflict, each country must, in the final analysis, take and is justified in taking those measures which it deems necessary to protect its security.