740.0011 European War 1939/16541: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 13—12:18 a.m.]
576. My telegram No. 572, today, and Department’s 223, October 30. It is apparent that Finnish answer, though perhaps not unduly delayed in view of the gravity of question involved, is not responsive to at least that part of our representation of October 27 which referred to possible attacks from Finnish controlled territory on shipments of war material in Arctic waters. It is apparent also that Finnish position is based essentially on proposition that current hostilities against the Soviet Union were inevitable and at same time that military cooperation with Germans is accidental.
This proposition lies at basis of Finnish thought to deliberate exclusion of broader considerations. It overlooks fact that Finns have carried over into present situation, which arose last June, mental attitude brought about by unquestioned Soviet aggression in 1939 and continued aggression in the form of attempted internal subversion of Finland following Moscow peace of 1940. Finns will not admit what is also apparent to an observer, and with their patriotic emotion, that their present policy goes beyond legitimate self-defense. They invoke, in support of their views, military preparations made by Russians in areas adjacent to Finnish frontier for operations characterized by Finns as purely offensive against Finland and rest of Scandinavia. That such Russian preparations may also be for defensive purpose is [Page 99] not admitted by Finns who likewise ignore implications of German-Finnish transit agreement of September 1940, and subsequent entry of substantial German forces into Finland.
However sincerely Finns hold beliefs mentioned, and I personally do not doubt these beliefs are sincerely held, they manifestly refuse to connect these issues with broader aspects of Anglo-Russian war against Germans. Finns take refuge from these larger aspects in the arbitrary concept that their settlement with Soviet Union is unrelated to any other pending political problem and consequently Finns consider themselves deeply injured and victims of gross injustice on the part of Britain and the United States because of our insistence that there is direct relation between Finnish-Soviet hostilities and war of great powers.
I do not think it will be possible until the tide turns in the general war, until suffering of Finnish people shall have been even more intensified and until effects of collaboration with Germans become more evident, to change profound convictions mentioned in mind of Finnish Government and people. It is likely on contrary that sense of injustice in Anglo-American policy towards Finland will deepen here and that accordingly my status at this post will henceforth be that of representative of admittedly unfriendly Government. Since local press has emphasized alleged cleavage between our official attitude and view taken by public in the United States of issues involved, this impression here will further embarrass our official activity.
Whatever conclusions Department may draw from circumstances above set forth, crisis referred to in Department’s telegram No. 220, October 25, can now be said to exist.