340.1115A/610: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 16—7:40 a.m.]
1228. Your 860, May 14, 6 p.m.50 It is extremely unlikely that we are going to be able to evacuate Americans via Bordeaux. The plane service to Paris has been suspended. There is one ferry service still in operation, but sailings have been reduced to three small vessels a week, and these are likely to be pulled off any moment. Havre is being [Page 92] bombed, and we have just learned that the ferry which left Southampton last night is 4½ hours overdue. We are also faced with a difficult situation regarding French visas. The French Consulate has been ordered to give no visas without approval from Paris in each case. This may mean a delay of 10 days or so on each application. Even if we are able to get people to the French coast, it is going to be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for them to get to Bordeaux. The Paris Embassy reports that they can give no assurance that passengers arriving at Havre can get even to Paris and that, if they reach Paris, they can get to Bordeaux. Paris is strongly opposed to any plan for evacuating Americans now in England by way of Bordeaux, unless they can be taken to Bordeaux by water. That does not appear to be at all possible. Even if we could, by hook or crook, manage to get our people to Bordeaux, I question the wisdom of this procedure. This is a dangerous and expensive journey to require Americans in the British Isles to make. The ferries, of course, fly a belligerent flag; they traverse the most dangerous stretch of water now being used by any passenger service in the world; and they land at a port which is being bombed. I believe that it would be bad to tell our people to leave England until and unless we are able to offer them some means of leaving England. For that reason I would appreciate immediate instructions (1) as to whether, in view of the danger and of the attitude of the Paris Embassy, we should still attempt to send people to Bordeaux, and (2) what alternative plan we have to offer if, as appears likely, our people are unable to get across the Channel. This matter is becoming imperative here. We do not dare to give out a warning until we have something more definite to offer than the instructions thus far received.