Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, General, Volume I

861.6363/393

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)

[Washington,] November 2, 1940.

Mr. A. D. Marris, First Secretary of the British Embassy, came in to see me this morning for the purpose of giving me the attached memorandum³⁸ which he said outlined the present British policy with regard to oil. Mr. Marris remarked that the British Government was beginning to feel some concern at the amount of oil which was going forward to the Soviet Union. The Embassy was of the opinion that if oil shipments should continue to the Soviet Union at the present pace, it would be wise for some steps to be taken to curtail shipments. The British concern with respect to lubricating oil was even greater than with regard to gasoline. It was hoped that the American Government could find some way of preventing large quantities of lubricating oil from going to Vladivostok.

Mr. Marris also stated that the British Government also hoped that some way could be found to prevent machinery and equipment from getting into the hands of the Soviet Government which would tend to increase Soviet oil production. His Government believed in a long range view of the matter. Equipment which might result in increased Soviet oil production two or three years from now might play an important role in strengthening Germany and German-controlled continental Europe against Great Britain.

Mr. Marris said that the memorandum and his oral statements were of a preliminary character. The Embassy would approach the Department again perhaps in the future in case continued Soviet purchases of oil and oil products should give it cause for still more grave concern. In the meantime it was hoped that the American Government would be considering ways and means of preventing important increases of exports of oil and oil products to the Soviet Union.

I thanked Mr. Marris for the information furnished and said that he could be sure that his statements would be given appropriate consideration in the Department. I added that the problems connected with our trade with the Soviet Union were by no means simple. The attitude displayed in this regard by the British Government reflected some of the complications of the situation. On the one hand, British officials were approaching us from time to time suggesting that we take steps to improve our relations with the Soviet Union³⁹ and that we make use of improved relations for the purpose of endeavoring to persuade the Soviet Government from taking certain steps in Europe and Asia which might be prejudicial to Great Britain and the democratic powers. On the other hand, we were receiving at intervals intimations from the British Government to the effect that it would be helpful if we could prevent certain commodities from being exported to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was, of course, using the desire shown by the British Government and the American Government to improve relations as a lever to obtain special consideration in trade matters. It would be difficult to make much progress in improving relations with the Soviet Union if we should continue not only to adhere to present restrictions on exports to that country but would take steps to curtail other exports. I said that the suggestions contained in the memorandum, which he had made to me orally, seemed to me to be somewhat in contradiction to the policies which Sir Stafford Cripps was preaching and following in Moscow and which apparently had the support of the British Government.

38. Not printed.
39. For correspondence on efforts to alleviate the difficulties affecting relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, see vol. iii, pp. 244 ff.