761.62/800: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:20 p.m.]
1539. In view of the widespread speculation concerning the purposes and probable results of the visit of Molotov to Berlin, I note an increasing tendency in the Diplomatic Corps in Moscow to view the visit more in the light of a gesture reaffirming the solidarity of existing Soviet-German relations and as a prelude to closer collaboration in the future, than as the actual [result of?] negotiations already completed and to be consummated in Berlin in the form of a definite and far-reaching agreement between the two countries. It should be borne in mind that the visit is taking place following the first friction in the relations between the two countries since the conclusion of the-Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact in August 1939. This friction, as previously reported, resulted from the German-Italian guaranty of Rumania, Finnish troop transit agreement and the tripartite pact all of which according to the new ministry [sic], were effected by Germany without prior consultation with the Soviet Union.
Under the circumstances, and especially in view of the recent British attempts to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and Germany which have received great publicity abroad, it is natural that Germany should desire a public reaffirmation of Soviet loyalty to its existing agreements with Germany, particularly as the outcome of the election in the United States has heartened all of the actual or potential adversaries of Germany. The visit of Molotov from the German point of view thus serves the purpose of proclaiming to the world that if Britain can count on the continued and increasing support of the United States, Germany can count on that of Soviet Russia.
The foregoing view of the fundamental purpose of Molotov’s visit at a time selected by Germany as essentially a gesture to reaffirm the stability of existing Soviet-German relations and to lay the foundation for closer collaboration in the future between the two countries, does not in any sense indicate that the discussions in Berlin [Page 581] will not be of the utmost importance and productive of far-reaching agreements in the future. The opinion, however, that Molotov’s visit to Berlin was not for the purpose of concluding there a definite political agreement is supported by the information reported in my No. 1518, November 11, 4 p.m., which indicates that no agreement had been arrived at prior to Molotov’s departure from Moscow. If this information is correct I doubt that Molotov has sufficient plenipotentiary powers to conclude a definite agreement or secret understanding. The personal direction of Stalin in all fields and especially in that of foreign affairs is so absolute that I doubt he would permit even Molotov, despite his high offices as Prime Minister of Russia and member of the Political Bureau to bind the Soviet Union to any definite agreement as the result of negotiations in which Stalin himself had not personally participated.
Furthermore while the known Soviet territorial aspirations cited in Berlin’s No. 4670 of November 12 undoubtedly were fully discussed in the course of the Berlin talks, the price which Germany may have demanded for an agreement to recognize these territorial aspirations must be considered in its relation to the main line of Soviet foreign policy. Should this price require abandonment by the Soviet Union of its present position of technical neutrality and a definite alignment with the Axis Powers, there would in my opinion be little chance of acceptance by the Soviet Government of these terms. However, should the German Government be content with increased Soviet economic assistance to Germany and the conclusion of some form of Soviet-Japanese agreement in exchange for German connivance at Soviet acquisition of one or more of the desired areas, such an arrangement would present less difficulty from the Soviet point of view and is I believe the maximum which may be expected to result from the Berlin talks.
Repeated to Berlin.