Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, General, Volume I

761.67/327: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State

Ankara, November 13, 1940—11 a.m.
[Received 5:55 p.m.]

201. As a sidelight and possible explanation of recent Turkish insistence upon an almost incredible rehabilitation of Turco-Russian relations (see my telegram No 189, November 4, 4 p.m.) I submit the following outline of views expressed to me by an exceptionally well-informed colleague.⁴³

1. Starting from the premise that Stalin’s persistent purpose is world revolution and that that objective can best be attained by the mutual destruction of the capitalistic powers, my informant assumed that Molotov had made the agreement of August 1939 for the purpose of precipitating the conflict and in the conviction that communism could only gain by the defeat of Great Britain and would not suffer from the confidently expected German victory, which would involve problems of reorganization in Europe so far beyond the possibility of solution by Germany that any conquered territories would be open for Communist influence. This policy seemed to warrant the close association with Germany and the breaking off of negotiations with England and France and incidentally with Turkey as their ally.

2. The wholly opportunist application of this policy had been profoundly modified by two developments: (first) the Kremlin had now come to believe that England would win in the end; and, (second) it was convinced by the three-power treaty, which it considered to be directed against Russia, that Germany was still actively hostile. He pointed out that the consignment of Europe to the control of the Axis and of “Greater Asia” to that of Japan could not but leave Russia anxious and distrustful. Nobody knew what the novel phrase in quotations meant: it must include Siberia and it might include European Russia and perhaps Turkey and other Near and Middle Eastern countries.

3. In the light of these beliefs the Soviet leaders had to consider two more immediate factors. In the first place the demonstration of the smashing power of the German Army presented the possibility of Germany’s inflicting quick and tremendous damage on Russia even if she were herself doomed to ultimate defeat by the British. In the second place, they have no confidence in the loyalty of their own armies (made up even to a preponderant extent in the officer grade out of the peasant class which prays for deliverance from Bolshevik control even at the cost of foreign domination) and would not dare risk hostilities of a kind or scope that would threaten the Moscow regime.

4. They therefore found it imperative to reorientate their practical application of their fundamental policy. For the time being they may be expected to hedge, avoiding any possibility of conflict with Germany although prepared to shift to the support of Britain (at least to the extent included within the status of nonbelligerency) if there should arise any conjuncture in which it would seem advisable to assist in maintaining her as a counterweight to the danger of an eventual German attack upon Russia. They do not yet dare or [consider it?] opportune to respond directly to British blandishments⁴⁴ but have recently gone to some pains to restore their former intimate relations with the Turks in order that in case of need the latter may serve as catalytic agents to facilitate an understanding. He thinks that there is therefore on the Russian side a calculated effort to recreate at least a plausible semblance of the old relationship and that on the Turkish side there is a corresponding desire (which has almost transformed itself into a belief) that everything should be for the best between them.

5. He tells me that he finds among the Turkish officials a belief that Russia would come to their aid to prevent a German or Italian seizure of the Straits but that for his part he would expect the Soviet Government to be disposed to stand aloof and count on the British ultimately dealing with that situation in their own interest. He feels sure Russia would not risk an out-and-out conflict under present circumstances.

6. He further tells me that at the present time Russian deliveries on petroleum and other materials to Germany have dwindled to almost negligible quantities and that in case of tension developing the Soviet might be bold enough to find excuses for withholding them altogether.

MacMurray

43. The Ambassador of Afghanistan. Faiz Mohammed Khan.
44. For correspondence concerning Soviet relations with the United Kingdom and France, see pp. 589 ff.