740.0011 European War 1939/5600: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:40 p.m.]
156. 1. As the satisfaction of Russian, Bulgarian and Hungarian territorial claims against Rumania recedes into the past without producing incidental complications in the Balkans, Turkish opinion generally feels immense relief that the sword of Damocles has fallen without doing any more vital hurt. There is a certain amount of genuine sympathy for the allied country that has suffered dismemberment but this feeling is qualified by the conviction that Rumania brought that fate upon herself by her blind refusal to face the necessity of finding a basis of accord with Bulgaria (as consistently urged by Turkey and the other members of the Balkan Entente) and by the pursuit of a catch-penny policy which in the end outsmarted itself. It seems to be accepted here that the Rumanian debacle puts an end to any effective entente among the Balkan States and remits them to the pursuit of individual policies involving cooperation ad hoc among those that find a common bond of interest under particular circumstances (in this connection see my No. 143, August 30, 4 p.m.20).
2. In the course of a recent conversation the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me to understand that from the Turkish point of view the best that one can hope for Rumania is the establishment of some government (of whatever form or color whether pro- or anti-Nazi) that can in fact govern and maintain order and national coherence; [Page 515] failing which Rumania must not only suffer extinction but become an apple of discord in southeastern Europe.
3. The Minister is inclined to be optimistic about the recent intermittent series of Italian threats against Greece. Apart from a casual reference to the desire of the senior partner of the Axis for peace and undisturbed continuance of supplies from the Balkans he expressed the opinion that Italy, herself, has no reason to fight for anything she can get from Greece: if she should end up on the winning side she would get what she wants for nothing; otherwise she would lose whatever she had taken; it therefore seemed probable that Italy had been trying merely to bully Greece into making concessions as Rumania had been scared into ceding Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. Greece, however, had at last set herself to making military preparations which in spite of the lack of modern equipment would doubtless suffice to make the Italians feel that the game would not be worth the candle. In reply to a question as to Turkey’s attitude in the event that Italy should nevertheless attack Greece he first recalled that this country would be under no legal obligation except to maintain a benevolent neutrality but then went on to say that in that event the Turkish Government would have to make an immediate decision as to the course it should pursue in its own interests under the circumstances presented. (From indications received from other sources I am inclined to believe that the British would not press this Government to support them in their guarantee to Greece.)
4. As to the rumored possibility of Bulgaria’s pressing her claims to an outlet on the Aegean Sea he professed complete confidence in the assurances given him by Bulgarian statesmen that they would not resort to hostilities in order to realize that aspiration, especially as they knew that both Greece and this country would resist; he had himself let them know that Turkey would fight to prevent the extension of Bulgarian territory to the Mediterranean.
5. With regard to relations with the Soviet Union he said that while there was some slight tendency toward improvement (see my No. 155, September 19, 5 p.m.21) there was no reason to modify the opinion that Russia has various political objectives (among which he agreed should be included the control of the Straits) each of which she is prepared to attain whenever the opportunity is presented to do so without substantial cost or risk. He felt confident that the readiness of this country to put up a stiff fight for its rights would obviate any Russian attempt to encroach upon them. On the question whether the Soviets might be expected to remain faithful to their collaboration with Germany he remarked that as in the cases of Poland and Rumania they would no doubt act for their own profit whether with one side or the other as circumstances might dictate.
[Page 516]6. Recent developments in Turkish official opinion particularly in the light of my latest talk with the Minister for Foreign Affairs suggest to me the following which may be helpful in estimating the attitude of this Government:
- (a)
- The Turks quite realistically and frankly recognize that whatever happens in this part of the world is incidental and eventually conditional upon the outcome of the military struggle between Britain and Germany.
- (b)
- They retain not only their political sympathy with the British but also a confidence in them that revolts against recognizing any loss of military of [or?] political prestige.
- (c)
- They are completely cynical as to the intentions and possible actions of the Axis Powers and Russia.
- (d)
- They are perhaps over-optimistically prone to regard the attitude of those powers in questions which arise in this area as being mere bluff which can be called by a demonstration of readiness to resist with a force capable of a considerable nuisance value.
- (e)
- On the basis of their historical tradition and experience of their war of independence but with no radical modernization of ideas or of equipment (save as they have shopped about among arms dealers for a few items of this and that) they are, I am afraid, inclined to overrate their own actual military force and the impression of formidability which it creates.
- (f)
- Against these somewhat hazardous illusions there is the counterweight of their very commonsense realization that the new Turkey they are trying so enthusiastically to build not only needs peace for its development but would if involved in hostilities risk the loss of everything that it has achieved.
7. In supplement to these observations I should note that I understand there is coming to be felt in certain influential circles some apprehension lest Germany as an alternative to the invasion of the British Isles should throw its weight into the support of the Italian attack on Egypt with the possible result of crippling or even driving out the British Mediterranean Fleet by depriving it of the use of the Suez Canal and the base at Alexandria.