893.102 Tientsin/375: Telegram
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, July 20, 1939—6
p.m.
[Received July 20—2:08 p.m.]
[Received July 20—2:08 p.m.]
345. Our 342, July 19, midnight,9 and previous on Anglo-Japanese conversations.
- 1.
- In a talk with me this morning the British Ambassador reviewed his two conversations with the Foreign Minister. He expressed pessimism over the final outcome. He said that he had reached bedrock and could make no further concessions. He thought it barely possible that he might receive instructions to yield further but that was not likely and unless the Japanese showed themselves prepared to make concession in their turn the conversations would break down.
- 2.
- He emphasized that there are two features of the Japanese formula (see annex 2 our 333, July 15, 8 p.m.9) which are wholly inacceptable to the British Government, namely, (a) the British have no objection to noting that the Japanese forces might have to take steps to “safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order” in occupied areas. The British insist however that the formula to be [Page 224] agreed upon take cognizance of the right of the British to object to any step which would be irreconcilable with any objective as above defined. As he put it to me, “we British do not intend to give the Japanese carte blanche to do anything they please”; (b) the admission by implication in the Japanese formula that the British Ambassador has in the past authorized action calculated “to benefit the enemy” would be in the Ambassador’s view quite untrue and therefore one which the British Government would not possibly make.
- 3.
- The Ambassador’s thought is that every practicable means should be exhausted to prevent a break down of the negotiations and with that in view he asked whether I could call on Mr. Arita and urge that the Japanese Government refrain from pressing the British Government to make concessions which neither that government nor any other responsible government could make. He has also spoken to the French Ambassador who agreed to ask for instructions.
- 4.
- My opinion with regard to point (a) of paragraph 2 is that the British Government would not lose, by reason of failure of the formula to specify its right to object to any improper Japanese measure, its right to make such objection. There appears to be therefore that there is room for compromise on this point along the lines of the Foreign Minister’s suggestion as set forth in the last clause of the second paragraph of our 342. In my opinion, the British Ambassador’s position with regard to point (b) is well taken.
- 5.
- If the Department views with favor my making an approach as suggested to the Foreign Minister, I would recommend that it be made informally largely for the reason that it would not involve our Government. If the Department approves I would say to the Foreign Minister that I am approaching him informally and on my own initiative but with the prior knowledge of my Government. I would not stress point (a) above which might be susceptible of compromise.
Repeated to Peiping for relay to Chungking and Tientsin.
Dooman