893.102 Tientsin/336½
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew), Temporarily in the United States8
Hancock, New Hampshire, July 6,
1939.
- 1.
- I fully concur in Mr. Dooman’s analysis and opinion that the present would not be an opportune time to present such a note.
- 2.
- To present another note at this juncture would probably have an effect the reverse of that desired.
- 3.
- The Japanese are not likely to feel that our Government is indifferent to the issue presented by the Tientsin situation. They know very well our attitude and position which have been made abundantly clear in previous notes and public statements.
- 4.
- Unless we are prepared and willing to proceed to forceful measures, we have more to gain and less to lose by resting our case for the present on the goodwill of the Japanese Government. We should await an appropriate time for the adjustment by friendly negotiations of all outstanding problems. That time is not yet.
- 5.
- In the absence of a determination to proceed to forceful measures, the presentation of this note at the present juncture would risk impairing or ruining the chief asset which we now possess—namely Japanese respect and goodwill.
- 6.
- This can be explained only by a full understanding of the present sensitiveness of Japanese psychology. Mr. Dooman is entirely right in his appraisal of that psychology.
- 7.
- Such a note at this time would tend to agitate the military extremists against us, would risk the application to American nationals and interests of the same measures that are now being applied to British nationals and interests, and would tend to mislead the British into believing that we are now going to support them, thereby making them more recalcitrant and creating an implication of responsibility which it would be difficult for us to fulfill.
- 8.
- With regard to the Secretary’s proposed third course, namely the endeavor to keep alive to the Japanese and our own people our continued belief in certain fundamental principles, this belief has already been amply registered in previous notes and public statements. Our record is complete.
- 9.
- My recommendation is that Mr. Dooman be authorized in his discretion to convey our concern, along the lines of the Department’s excellent draft note, in informal representations to the Foreign Minister. [Page 221] These representations would be made of record in the Department and would serve to register our position up to date. This procedure would avoid the dangers which Mr. Dooman and I foresee.
J[oseph] C. G[rew]
- This memorandum bears the following explanation by Ambassador Grew: “Telephone statement to Mr. Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, answering his letter of July 4 concerning the Department’s proposed note to the Japanese Government and Mr. Dooman’s telegram No. 309 of July 3.”↩