893.102 Tientsin/359
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) of a Conversation With the British Ambassador (Lindsay)
The British Ambassador called to see me at his request this afternoon.
He told me that he was instructed by his Government to make known to this Government the strictly confidential basis for a solution of the Tientsin incident which the British Ambassador in Tokyo had presented to the Japanese Foreign Minister. The Ambassador asked if this Government had any word of this. I said that so far as I was aware we had no report on the subject. The Ambassador then handed me a memorandum84 containing the basis of solution proposed by Sir Robert Craigie as reported by him to his Government. After reading this I asked the Ambassador if the British Government had any further report or information with regard to any progress that might have been made. The Ambassador said that he had had no further word on this question.
The Ambassador asked me whether this Government was preparing to take any further action with regard to the Tientsin incident or the general situation in China.
I replied that I knew that the Secretary of State had spoken with the Ambassador on June 19, the day I was away from the Department, and I imagined that the Ambassador had been told at that time that this Government was giving very careful and continuous consideration to each and every step which this Government could take in order to clarify its own position with regard to the basic and fundamental questions which had arisen as a result of the policies pursued by Japan in China and which affected the legitimate rights and interests of the United States. I said that of course the statement given to the press by the Secretary of State on Monday85 answered in part the Ambassador’s question, and that he knew of the very vigorous representations which this Government had recently made to the Japanese Government [Page 195] with regard to bombings and other acts on the part of the Japanese military authorities which had resulted in damage to American nationals and their interests in China. Finally, I said, the statement made yesterday by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Squadron86 would, in my judgment, have very definite repercussions and results upon Japanese public opinion as well as upon Chinese public opinion. I said that if we determined to take any further steps I would be glad to let the Ambassador know.
For the first time the Ambassador spoke with ill-concealed impatience and even indignation of the foreign policy pursued by his own government. Until recent months in his conversations with me he had always supported very enthusiastically Mr. Chamberlain’s foreign policy. During the last two or three months he has made no reference to it other than to carry out his instructions as they were given to him. Today he spoke with considerable vehemence of the situation in which England found herself and said that there came a time in the affairs of any country when, if it had any self-respect, it had to fight even if it had to fight alone. He said this with immediate reference to the Far Eastern situation.
- Infra.↩
- See telegram No. 167, June 19, 6 p.m., to the Chargé in Japan, p. 185.↩
- See telegram No. 520, June 22, 3 p.m., from the Consul General at Shanghai, vol. iii, p. 786.↩