761.94/1183

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With the British Ambassador (Lothian)

The Ambassador said that his Government was very much concerned about the Japanese and Far Eastern situation. He proceeded to say that Japan might make terms with Russia, or she might under the claim of retaliation in some way do injury to British interests and rights; and that it was felt by his Government that no opportunity should be overlooked to compose the situation in Asia, making terms with Japan. I replied that in my judgment this Government was not overlooking any of the phases of the situation. I stated that in the first place Japan might Be a little slow to go in with Russia at a time when all the nations of the world except Germany were so embittered against her on account of the attack on Finland; that in the second place, while there is always a possibility that Japan and Russia might enter into a temporary alliance for each other’s mutual advantage in Europe and Asia,—agreeing to a truce as to long-view differences—yet it is very doubtful if such temporary alliance will take place, although we should never overlook possibilities in such circumstances. I said further that this Government has by word and act striven in every possible way to induce Japan to agree to a reasonable settlement in the Far East and to adhere, as we have, to the basic policy of equality of industrial and commercial rights and opportunities, as well as nondiscrimination in every sense. Furthermore, we had maintained and emphasized our contentions in a letter of this Government to the Government of Japan on December 30th last.15

In conclusion, I emphasized our view that Japan has no serious disposition to enter into a settlement based on the fundamentals of American rights and interests in the Far East, but is intent only on [Page 99] a policy of “Manchukuoizing” China. I added that Japan is only willing to make a victor’s or strict Japanese peace, which is determined from the standpoint of the military group. Such a policy could not be considered by my Government, which could only maintain with strong emphasis the basic policies and principles for which it has contended from the beginning.

The Ambassador did not press the matter any further.

C[ordell] H[ull]
  1. Note No. 1153 from the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 820.