761.94/1176
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State7
The Department has been informed by the American Ambassador at Tokyo8 that it is the view of the British, French and Polish Ambassadors that, unless early steps are taken to improve relations between Japan on the one hand and Great Britain, France and the United States on the other, extremists in Japan may gain control of Japan’s foreign policy and effect a general political rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union.
There would appear to be two primary questions involved, namely, (1) whether a fundamental and far-reaching rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union is likely to occur and (2) whether the effects of such a rapprochement would be so seriously adverse to the interests in the Far East of the United States, Great Britain and France that there would be warrant for making significant concessions to Japan in an attempt to prevent the consummation of such a rapprochement.
After serious study and consideration, this Government is of the opinion that it may be practicable for Japan and the Soviet Union to arrive at agreements relating to questions such as fisheries, the Sakhalin concessions, and the delimiting of frontiers. These matters are, however, relatively unimportant. It is also conceded that a new commercial arrangement between the two countries might be arrived at, although it would seem that such an arrangement would lack any significant economic advantages to either country in view of the economic conditions existing in both countries at the present time. A so-called non-aggression pact and even some kind of a vague political accord might be arrived at. This Government does not disregard these as possibilities. If, however, such an accord were to be reached, and even if it were accompanied by other agreements relating to fisheries, the Sakhalin concessions, the delimiting of frontiers, and commerce, it is the opinion of this Government that such a rapprochement would not bring to Japan or to the Soviet Union material advantages of a substantial and lasting character but would only have a psychological effect of an ephemeral character.
There are certain fundamentals which exist today in the Far Eastern situation: [Page 93]
- (1)
- Japan has a deep-rooted mistrust of the Soviet Union, a mistrust which has presumably been strengthened as a result of recent activities of the Soviet Union in Europe, and that mistrust will not be eliminated by the Soviet Union’s participation in a rapprochement;
- (2)
- Japan is maintaining large forces in Manchuria and it is not believed that Japan would feel warranted in materially reducing the number;
- (3)
- Japan is maintaining several hundred thousand troops in China south of the Great Wall; that number cannot be materially reduced so long as China continues to resist; there is no indication that Chinese resistance will end in the near future; and, even though the National Government were to capitulate (of which there is no indication), widespread guerrilla and bandit activities would continue for a considerable period on a scale sufficient to preclude material reduction of Japanese forces;
- (4)
- Japan is pursuing a program of elimination of Western interests in the Far East and will continue to pursue that program, regardless of whether a rapprochement with the Soviet Union takes place, as long as the following by Japan of that program appears to the Japanese feasible; and
- (5)
- Japan has in the past undertaken forward movements in aggression at those times when she felt that the movements could be undertaken without becoming involved in war with a Western power; it does not seem probable that Japan will reverse that policy and take aggressive military action against the possessions in the Far East of Western powers until and unless Japan becomes convinced that the Allies will lose the present war; and
- (6)
- It is difficult to conceive how it could be to the basic interests of the Soviet Union to contribute to the success of Japan’s Imperialistic program in the Far East. For this reason, it is greatly doubted whether, should the Soviet Union, for instance, promise Japan to stop the sending of Soviet supplies to China, the Soviet Union would respect any such promise.
It is the opinion of this Government that these fundamentals will continue to exist whether or not Japan effects a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
This Government has given consideration to the question of what concessions would have to be made to Japan to dissuade Japan from entering into close political relations with the Soviet Union should it be deemed that such a possibility was imminent. It is this Government’s opinion that in such an event Japan would require from one or more of the powers concerned recognition of the right of Japan to a free hand in portions of China, which would necessarily involve (1) the abandonment by those powers to a large degree of their rights and interests in China and (2) cessation of acts on the part of those powers which might be interpreted by Japan as lending support to the National Government of China. These concessions would, however, if made, result, in our opinion, in serious injury to the prestige [Page 94] of the governments concerned among the peoples of the democratic nations of the Western world and among the peoples of the Asiatic countries, would be of assistance to Japan in her policy of unlimited expansion, and would not eliminate the danger of Japan’s committing aggression against the possessions and position in Asia of Western nations.
It is this Government’s view that we should not compromise in our principles or surrender any of our material interests in an attempt to dissuade Japan from reaching an accord with the Soviet Union. Japan is employing the idea of such an accord as a threat to wrest from the democracies concessions such as those outlined above. The fact that Japan is giving so much publicity to the question of the accord indicates that she is seriously feeling the effects of her present situation and is seriously perturbed. A yielding to Japan at the present time would render illusory the hope that the course of events would lead to a result which we have striven to bring about, namely, a realization on the part of Japan that she cannot with impunity disregard treaties and international law. Furthermore, if Japan is actually intending to effect a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, it means that control of the Government is in the hands of extremists. In such circumstance it could reasonably be expected that an accord effected by the Government of the Soviet Union on the one hand and Japanese extremists on the other could endure only for a short period of time.
In view of all the considerations outlined above, this Government continues to believe that the principles of policy to which it adheres in regard to the Far Eastern situation are fundamentally sound and that they should not be deviated from. This Government would of course view with sincere regret the taking of any step by the Japanese Government which would reflect a decision on the part of that Government to follow further courses of action and principles of policy antithetical to those which we are convinced furnish the only sound basis for healthy relations among nations. In determining upon courses of action, this Government is endeavoring to give the fullest possible consideration to all available information and to be fully considerate of the rights and interests of all countries concerned in the Far Eastern situation. We are proceeding and expect to proceed with patience and caution.
Addendum9
In addition to the six factors mentioned in the memorandum above, as communicated to the British and French Ambassadors, it would seem that a further factor might be regarded as fundamental: namely, that there is under present conditions little that either Japan or Russia [Page 95] could give or offer in the way of commercial or political concessions or assistance which would be of substantial benefit to the other party.