793.94/15603
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 15, 1940.]
Sir: I have the honor to state that on December 26, 1939, I held an informal conversation with M. Henri Cosme, the French Ambassador. The following is a summary.
[Page 718]We agreed that the Chinese authorities are optimistic as to the outcome of the hostilities with Japan to a degree hard for foreigner observers to justify. I suggested that perhaps this optimism was based on a belief that Japan was at the point of exhaustion. M. Cosme inclined more to the view that it was occasioned by (1) the victory over the Japanese at Changsha during the summer, (2) support given by the United States, as by the denunciation of the Treaty of 1911, or expected from the United States in the future, and (3) support given by the Soviet Union.
The Ambassador remarked that the Chinese seemed to believe that by advancing to and capturing Nanning in Kwangsi Province at the end of November, the Japanese had laid themselves open to such a reverse as occurred at Changsha; he thought the Chinese were confident that they would repeat the Changsha performance. He himself felt that the Chinese had exhibited an amazing weakness in permitting the Japanese to capture Nanning, and according to rumor, Lungchow, twelve miles from the Indo-China frontier, so easily. In regard to assistance from the Soviet Union, he said he had authentic information that in the months September to November, inclusive, thirty-three thousand tons of war materials had arrived in Chengtu in Russian trucks and that between two hundred and two hundred and fifty trucks arrived daily; he said that a strong Russian air force was being organized in northwest China; that there were fifty air establishments in the vicinity of Chengtu, capital of Szechuan; and that there were at least one thousand Russian technicians in the Chungking–Chengtu area, assisting the Chinese as advisers and in other capacities. I felt dubious of the accuracy of these figures, but having no proof I did not question them.
The Ambassador said that he had long ago warned the Chinese Government that if the Chinese allowed Japanese forces to reach the vicinity of the Indo-China border certain aspects of Chinese-French relations, such as the transportation of materials through Indo-China, necessarily could not be the same as before, and he had urged that they prevent Japanese forces from so doing. He pointed out that all road and rail communications into China as far as the Burma Highway were now threatened by the Japanese and that transportation over the latter route probably did not exceed 1,500 tons per month.
In the light of this situation we debated whether the recovery of the Nanning motor route was not vitally essential to the success of China’s resistance to Japan. M. Cosme observed that if all import routes from the south were cut off, China would be dependent on the route through Chinese Turkestan and Russia for foreign supplies, and for exports with which to obtain foreign exchange. In view of the seeming seriousness of the situation the apparent lack of anxiety of the [Page 719] Chinese authorities over the results of the struggle for the Nanning route was hard to understand.
I suggested as a possible explanation of this attitude a belief on the part of the Chinese that China had no vital spot, and that even if all contact with foreign nations were to be prevented, China still could oppose effective resistance to Japanese domination for an indefinite period. I added that if China’s foreign communications were limited to the route through Russia or were completely cut, France, Great Britain and the United States would find it impossible to influence the outcome of the struggle and hence the fate of their own interests in China, except through some form of direct pressure on Japan. Unless such direct pressure were applied the Chinese would necessarily have to work out their destiny without regard to the assistance, wishes or interests of these three nations. From the Chinese standpoint it might be considered that the recovery of the southern transportation routes was a vital matter for Occidental relations with China, but not necessarily a vital issue in the outcome of China’s resistance to Japanese domination.
Respectfully yours,