761.6211/235
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 3.]
Sir: Although Tokyo was no more than a secondary focal point in the series of events beginning with the announcements of August 21, 1939 by the German and Soviet Governments of their intention to conclude between themselves a treaty of non-aggression, it would need a more facile hand than mine to do justice to the dramatic elements in the effects of those events on Japan—the awakening of the Japanese people to the dangers to which they had been exposed by the strengthening of special relations with Germany, and the steps immediately taken by Japan to put her house in order. We endeavored in an extended sequence of telegrams to keep the Department informed of events as they occurred and, wherever we could, to anticipate events before they happened. In some cases these telegrams were necessarily fragmentary in character, and I propose therefore to present in this despatch a connected narrative of recent events. With the appointment on August 30 of a new Cabinet77 a breathing space is afforded to review these telegrams in the light of actual developments, but there appears to be need for no important revision of information already communicated to the Department.
The position of the Japanese Government with regard to the proposed alliance with Germany at the time of the announcement on August 21 of the German and Soviet Governments had not been completely clarified. It may be useful to summarize the negotiations between the Japanese and German Governments which had been in progress for many months, for, although we had informed the Department in our telegrams and despatches of the general trend of those negotiations, it has not been until the last few days that a precise account has been obtainable. I am not in a position to divulge the source, but I wish to assure the Department that the person from whom the information was obtained is not only entirely reliable but was in a position to inform himself of the negotiations in detail.
The proposal for the conclusion of a general offensive and defensive alliance between Japan and Germany was put forward by the German Government toward the end of last year and was one of the problems inherited by the Hiranuma Cabinet from the Konoe Cabinet. As is common knowledge, the Japanese Army supported the proposal, primarily on the ground that, if Japan were allied with Germany, she would be in a position to intensify the pressure against the position in the Far East of Great Britain and France and of their potential ally, [Page 65] Soviet Russia. This argument was countered by Baron Hiranuma, the Minister of the Navy Admiral Yonai, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Arita, with the argument that if Japan were allied with Germany and were obliged to go to the help of Germany in the event of a war between that country and France and Great Britain, there would be created one factor which would operate to render inevitable the entry of the United States into that war on the side of Great Britain and France and, therefore, the eventual involvement of Japan with the United States. A compromise was then agreed upon, and a counter-proposal was made to the German Government to the effect that the alliance should become operative only as against the Soviet Union. As the Department is aware, this counter-proposal was rejected by the German Government, which insisted on the alliance being of a general character operative against all third parties. During the last stages of the negotiations, that is to say for a period of several weeks prior to the conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty, the elements within the Japanese Government opposed to an alliance with Germany fell back on the argument that Japan was fully occupied with the conflict against China and would not, therefore, be in any position to fulfill any obligation which she might undertake to go to the help of Germany. A second compromise was then agreed upon within the Japanese Government, and the German Government was informed that Japan would enter into a general alliance with Germany, provided, however, that the right was reserved to Japan to determine when and how she would come to the help of Germany in the event of Germany becoming involved with any third Power. It was precisely at this moment that the announcement was made that Germany and the Soviet Union would enter into a treaty of non-aggression.
First thoughts of the Japanese on these startling developments were decidedly mixed. It was, of course, realized that the concerting of Japan’s foreign policies with those of Germany would have to be a thing of the past, but what provided no little solace was the realization that the Anglo-French proposals to the Soviet Union with regard to an anti-aggression front were also in the discard. This presumed to be compensatory feature of the situation growing out of the German-Soviet rapprochement was quickly forgotten, however, in view of the obvious fact that the establishment of good relations between those countries would bring about precisely that effect which made the proposed anti-aggression front so objectionable to Japan—a strengthening of Russia’s position in the Far East. What we described in our No. 428, August 23, 7 p.m., as “a thinly concealed feeling of betrayal by Germany” swelled to a roar of anger and mortification—mortification because of the clear manner in which Germany had shown its [Page 66] preference for Soviet neutrality over the active support of Japan, and anger because of betrayal by a nation which was believed to be a friendly one. Fidelity to a legal principle or to a legal contract per se is not one of the Japanese virtues, but there is no greater crime in the Japanese moral code than treachery. Feeling that there had been betrayal by Germany of a nation which believed itself to be a friend of Germany’s was fully confirmed when it was learned, through the publication of the text of the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty, that Germany had undertaken not to associate itself with any group of Powers in activities aimed directly or indirectly against the Soviet Union.
The Cabinet met on August 25 after the Prime Minister had individually consulted his colleagues. The decision was taken that, in the view of the Japanese Government, the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty was a violation of the Anti-Comintern Convention, and that the negotiations with Germany with regard to “the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Convention” should be terminated. Instructions in the foregoing sense were despatched that day to the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin. In various other ways the Japanese Government sought to make it clear that Japan had washed its hands of the policy of “going along” with Germany: it was announced that Japan would revert to a “free and independent policy” with regard to European problems, the Army and the Government agreed that there was to be no entanglement in European affairs, and particular pains were taken to see to it that the representative in Japan of the American Government should know that the seductive arguments of the German Ambassador—that Germany is now in a position to procure for Japan the good will of the Soviet Union—had been rejected with scorn.
A brief reference might usefully be made to the activities of the German Ambassador, who was in Karuizawa when the news broke of the German-Soviet treaty. General Ott returned to Tokyo on August 23 and was so ill-advised as to lunch that day at the largest restaurant in the city. I was present when he entered in the company of the Italian Ambassador, and the complete silence which fell upon the room on the entrance of the two Ambassadors was most eloquent of the hostility of the Japanese there present. General Ott then went into complete retirement until Saturday morning, August 25, when he appeared at the funeral of the late Princess Fushimi. He seemed somewhat restrained but he was willing to talk. He told the Dutch Minister and me that the Soviet Government had proposed a non-aggression treaty to the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow. Later that afternoon he called at his request on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I understand that he made an impassioned plea for Japanese [Page 67] support, pointing out the advantages which Germany could now bring to Japan. Within an hour after General Ott’s call at the Foreign Office I was informed of the substance of the conversation. I was told that the Foreign Minister had told General Ott quite plainly that Japan could not, by procuring a non-aggression treaty with Russia or otherwise improving her relations with Russia through the good offices of Germany, afford to place herself at the mercy of the German Government.
The terms of the conversation between Mr. Arita and General Ott will, I believe, serve to explain the announcement issued by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet on August 25 which is quoted in our No. 440, August 26, 2 p.m., to the effect that the Japanese Government will hereafter pursue a “free and independent policy” and that its special relations with Germany had been ended. I need to say little more on that subject at this time, but I would like again to make the observation which appears in one of our telegrams, to the effect that the turn away from Europe should not be interpreted as presaging Japanese hostility towards Germany—that the change in Japan’s policy is essentially a return to the middle of the road. The outbreak of the war in Europe found Japan fairly well prepared, having in mind her involvements in China, to meet the exigencies arising out of the war in Europe. The resignation of the Cabinet which had been in negotiation over a period of months with the German Government with a view to the strengthening of the special relations between the two countries was in many ways a land mark. It provided an outward and visible sign of the complete termination of special relations with one of the belligerents, and it allowed a new Government to come into office and to formulate new foreign policies unhindered by previous commitments. The first important decision reached by the Cabinet was to confirm the pursuit hereafter by Japan of a “free and independent policy”, to underscore the paramount importance to Japan of liquidating the conflict with China as soon as possible, and to affirm the determination of this country to avoid involvement in the war in Europe. These are the essential elements of Japan’s foreign policies and comment and explanation can neither becloud them nor render them more clear.
The question arising out of that policy which is of more immediate interest and concern than any other to diplomatic observers in Tokyo is whether a rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union is probable. I have taken in my telegrams a definite position with regard to that question, as I could not see how an equivocal opinion could be helpful in any way to the Department. A number of logical and tangible reasons can be adduced to support the view that Germany [Page 68] and the Soviet Union, especially in combination, could be extremely helpful to Japan toward settling the conflict with China. The considerations which force on me the belief that Japan would not entertain in the present circumstances a proposal for a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union prevail over the reasons which might be brought forward to support a contrary view. There will immediately occur to mind the basic conflict between the interests of Japan and Russia in the Far East, especially in China, the irreconcilability of militant bolshevism with Japanese imperialism, the paradox in the Japanese insistence on the one hand on maintaining troops in Manchuria in violation of the Portsmouth Treaty and claiming on the other hand fishing rights in Soviet waters and so on. But a more important consideration than all these is the fact that the Soviet Union has, like Germany, given evidence of the ephemeral character of any undertaking given by a nation which is ruled by a dictator. The one great advantage which a non-aggression pact with Russia could be expected to bring would be the relaxation of Russian pressure along the Manchurian border, thus enabling Japan to give greater attention than hitherto to her conflict with China. It is I think unlikely that, if the suggested treaty were concluded, Japan would have sufficient confidence in Soviet good faith to divert to China the substantial forces now being maintained in Manchuria to offset Soviet pressure.
Exaggerated significance has been attached to the reported desire of the new Prime Minister, General Abe, to compose Japan’s differences with Russia. It would be a rational and normal desire on the part of any Japanese to bring about a permanent settlement of the important questions which have recently arisen between the Soviet Union and Japan, such as the Japanese fishing rights in Siberian waters, Japanese oil and coal mining rights in Northern Saghalien, the demarcation of the border between Siberia and Manchuria, and so on. Although it was suggested that the Japanese Ambassador called on the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs on September 3 to propose or discuss some far-reaching political arrangement between the two countries, the authorities in Tokyo were quick to make it clear that the purpose of the call was to resume the long-standing negotiations on disputes of an economic character. I notice with some satisfaction that the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow has made that fact clear to our Embassy.
There appears to be some room for play in Japan’s relations with Great Britain. The Department is, of course, already aware that the British Government, having in mind the requirements of the situation in Europe, has raised the question whether anything can be done in the fairly near future toward improving Japan’s relations with the democratic countries. In a conversation which I had with the British [Page 69] Ambassador on August 25, Sir Robert Craigie showed eagerness to find some way by which that objective might be accomplished, but he subsequently indicated to me that he had come round to my view that we should await the development in Japan of some momentum toward making the modification of Japanese objectives in China necessary if Japan were to resume friendly relations with the United States and Great Britain. However, on September 4 Sir Robert called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that it would be possible to settle outstanding difficulties by friendly discussions between the British and Japanese Governments. Notwithstanding the shock which Sir Robert had on the following day by receiving the identic note of September 5 to the belligerent Powers78 with regard to the withdrawal of their forces from the Japanese-occupied areas in China, he communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 8 a message from the British Foreign Secretary expressing the hope that it might be possible to settle outstanding difficulties by friendly intercourse. It will be noted from the attached copy of a paraphrase of the British Ambassador’s telegram of September 8 to London79 that the reply of the Japanese Foreign Minister at least did not close the door to future discussions looking toward an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations.
Respectfully yours,
- See also vol. iv, pp. 443 ff.↩
- See telegram No. 458, September 5, 7 p.m., from the Chargé in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 9.↩
- Not printed.↩