761.9411/53: Telegram
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 28—12:08 p.m.]
444. Our 438, August 25, 9 p.m.71
1. In a private conversation with the Counselor of the Polish Embassy on August 26, I expressed the opinion that the possibility of Japan’s signing a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union does not exist any longer; that Japan’s joining the Russo-German combination would result, as the Japanese had already pointed out, in Japan placing her head in the German noose and thus being forced to dance to any tune which Germany might choose to play and that in Japanese eyes Russia no less than Germany had committed the unforgivable crime of treachery. I further spoke along the lines of paragraph 3 of our 440, August 26, 2 p.m. The Counselor called on me this morning to say that he had reported my personal views to his Ambassador, that the Ambassador, in the light of conversations which he has had with the Japanese, agreed entirely with those views, [Page 57] and that the Ambassador desired that I should know of the trend of those conversations in so far as they relate to relations between Japan and Poland. The Ambassador had heard that the British Ambassador had discussed with me and the French Ambassador the possibility of profiting by the present situation to bring about restoration of Japan’s relations with the democratic countries and he wished to let me know what he was doing in order that there might be no crossing of wires.
2. The Counselor said that Japanese feelings toward Poland were becoming more pronounced since the Japanese had satisfied themselves of the truth of reports that Poland had refused to permit the passage of Soviet troops through Poland in the event of war with Germany. Their feelings toward Russia and Germany, particularly, of the Japanese military, were expressed precisely along the lines of my analysis, and the Ambassador was satisfied that Japan would not fall for any inducements of a material character which might be held out either by Germany or Russia or both. Nevertheless, the Ambassador was not entirely happy over the possibility of Germany and Russia “playing tricks”, and he was therefore concentrating on the task of helping the Japanese to crystallize their present attitude toward Germany and Russia.
3. I told the Counselor that those Japanese with whom I had talked showed that they had been strongly impressed by the fact that Poland was the only country immediately involved in the European situation which had never been under any delusion as to the good faith of either Germany or Russia. I therefore felt that any information which the Polish Government furnishes the Japanese Government would carry weight. The Counselor said that the latest information given the Japanese is as follows:
- (a)
- The German Ambassador in Warsaw in his despatches to Berlin presented accurately the Polish position and left no doubt that Poland would resist German aggression in whatever form it might be manifested. The German Foreign Secretary has withheld this information from the Chancellor.
- (b)
- The terms of article 4 of the German-Soviet Treaty were loosely drafted at the insistence of the Soviet Government in the hope that by providing for “consultation” the road will be left open for Germany to propose an alliance.
- (c)
- On the question of attitude toward Japan there are 2 camps within the Soviet Government: one advocating non-involvement in the Far East as well as in Europe and the other a strong attitude toward Japan and positive assistance to China. This question is being debated and is to be decided within the next few days.
(The Counselor emphasized the importance of not disclosing that the Polish Government had the foregoing information.)
[Page 58]4. I have described this at some length for the reason that Poland and Japan which have no conflicting interests have one important common concern—Russia, and consequently the Polish Ambassador and Counselor, both outstanding members of the Diplomatic Corps, enjoy to an extraordinary degree the confidence of the Japanese. They agree with me that in the present circumstances there is no likelihood that a Soviet proposal, even if one were made, would be accepted by Japan; they share my view that Japan will for the present avoid any new commitments; and although they admit the risks if we were to proceed too rapidly, they hope that something can be done by the United States and Great Britain to insure that Japan will not tie up with the Soviet Union.
5. As the British Ambassador is to consult with me again shortly, I would appreciate receiving as soon as possible some direct word. The question whether or not some initiative should be taken to prevent Japan from falling into the arms of Germany and Russia might depend on the degree to which such development is likely. The British Ambassador believes that there is no small risk of this happening: I do not as things now stand. My considered view therefore is that the United States should not take any initiative until there should develop in Japan some momentum toward restoring good relations with us with consciousness of the modification of objectives in China which that end would entail.