893.515/1424
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)
The French Ambassador called at his request. The Ambassador said that his Government concurred in the views of the British Government in regard to the currency situation at Tientsin as set forth in the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of July 26 and that the French Government had instructed its Ambassador at Tokyo to inform the Japanese Government that the views of the French Government with regard to the currency situation were in accord with the views of the British Government. The Ambassador said that he thought this action would be useful by way of manifesting to the Japanese that there was solidarity between the British and the French.
The Ambassador asked what our attitude was toward the various questions mentioned in the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of July 26. I told the Ambassador of the instruction which the Department had sent to the Chargé at Tokyo on July 31.
During the course of the conversation the Ambassador said that he felt that it was important to support the British Government, as otherwise the British Government would be likely to go further than desired in making concessions to the Japanese. He said that this was [Page 438] what had happened when it appeared that the British could not count on American support in the currency negotiations; that the British had then agreed to a formula with the Japanese which carried serious implications for all foreign interests in China. The Ambassador said that thereafter the American Government had taken a positive step (he apparently referred to the notice given Japan of intention to terminate the commercial treaty).
I commented to the Ambassador that from the early stages of the Tientsin situation this Government had made it clear that it was interested and concerned in regard to the broader phases of the Tientsin situation. The Ambassador remarked that notwithstanding any action which the American Government had taken toward that end the impression generally held was that the United States had not been prepared to give definite support to the British in the Tientsin situation.
After some further comment of a general character, the conversation terminated.