740.00/1598: Telegram
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, May 26, 1939—8
p.m.
[Received May 26—11:35 a.m.]
[Received May 26—11:35 a.m.]
245. Our 234, May 18, 5 p.m.45
- 1.
- The Ambassador immediately before his departure and I more recently have had conversations with leading Japanese, including members of the Cabinet, which give me the definite impression that, in view of the way in which events in Europe are shaping, there is taking place here an anxious search for a position which would afford Japan security.
- 2.
- In a conversation on May 16 with the Ambassador and me, one well informed person stated that he and those who think as he does, who had sufficient influence to defeat the proposal of an alliance with Germany and Italy, are convinced that the only safe course for Japan to follow is to restore good relations with the democratic states especially [Page 41] the United States and he made a strong plea for some indication by the United States that restoration of good relations with Japan was desired, a step which would greatly support those who were opposing any new anti-Comintern commitment. The Ambassador replied that he could not recommend to his Government that it give such indication unless Japan could first offer evidence of intention to make peace with China on terms which could be expected to meet the Chinese terms and command the approval of the American Government. The informant said that an indication of Japan’s peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs; that he would report the conversation to Arita; and that he would urge Arita to defer any new anti-Comintern commitment until the Ambassador had time to communicate with the Department.
- 3.
- When I talked with Arita on the 17th I found that he was familiar with the conversation of the preceding day. He was, however, excited over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations and was in no mood to talk of anything else. In view of this conversation and of the conversation which the Ambassador had with the Foreign Minister on the following day, as reported in our telegram under reference, the Ambassador felt as I then did that the views expressed by the informant referred to in paragraph 2 should be discounted.
- 4.
- However, in subsequent conversation with the high official46 mentioned in my strictly confidential 242, May 23, 11 p.m.,47 and with one of his personal advisers, I was told that Japan did not want to tie up with Germany and Italy as there are in those countries under surface currents which gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement which Japan might make with them. The thought was subtly conveyed that if war broke out in Europe there would be little security for Japan in seeking to maintain neutrality and that Japan would greatly prefer to be associated on terms of close friendship with the democratic states than with Germany and Italy through an alliance. I might add that there was expressed doubt whether the latter countries could defeat the democratic states.
- 5.
- There is in these and other authenticated evidence that the President’s message to Germany and Italy48 and other signs of probability that the United States would not be indifferent to a war in Europe have awakened some Japanese to the risk of involvement with the United States figuratively by way of Europe if not directly across the Pacific. The high official referred to in paragraph 4 said to me that Japan would be prepared eventually and under certain conditions [Page 42] to moderate its peace terms to China; but this willingness if it exists springs not from any moral regeneration but from realization that Japan’s security can be safeguarded so long as war threatens in Europe only by liquidating the conflict with China. It is impossible at this time to determine whether the more rational views herein reported are those which predominate within the Japanese Government but the standing of those who utter them entitles them to much weight.
Dooman