762.94/385
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)35
Great importance—undue importance, I think—appears to be attached in various quarters to the question of the consummation or non-consummation of a general defensive and offensive alliance between on the one hand Germany and Italy and on the other hand Japan. Solicitude is felt—undue solicitude, I think—lest action by the United States in relations with Japan might strongly influence and possibly determine Japan’s decision in that connection.
Granting that some conspicuously and substantially hostile act on the part of the United States might drive Japan, under the urge of certain shallow-minded and chauvinistically constituted of her military people, to take the plunge and make a hard-and-fast and comprehensive commitment to Germany and Italy, I do not (1) believe that the taking of any moderate steps toward bringing pressure upon Japan such as have been and are under consideration in this country would have such an effect, and I do not (2) believe that, in any event, the world situation would be made substantially worse if the Japanese were to take such a step.
To Germany and Italy it would be advantageous were they able to announce that Japan had entered into such an alliance with them. The advantage would be largely psychological. Those two powers have nothing to lose by the consummation of such an alliance. The accruing psychological advantage would be of value to them. Therefore they, especially Germany, are pressing Japan to take that step.
To Japan, however, no special advantage would accrue from the announcement of such an alliance. The psychological effect upon the Chinese would be either negative or adverse to Japan’s interests. The Chinese already consider that Germany and Italy have betrayed them, and they know that Germany and Italy are already helping Japan; the Chinese would not consider that Japan was materially strengthened by the consummation of the alliance, and they would be all the more convinced that the only chance which they had of retaining their freedom lies along the line of continuing to resist Japan. The psychological effect upon the rest of the world would be adverse to Japanese interests. The Japanese have been told expressly that Great Britain and France and the United States would look with great disfavor and apprehension upon the entry by Japan into such an alliance; and they know that such a step on their part would add to their present unpopularity with other “democratic” countries. The thing on which the Japanese are most intent now, [Page 35] second to their intentness upon the objective of defeating China, is avoidance of bringing to bear upon themselves increased disfavor or a positively hostile attitude on the part of the United States. They will not lightly antagonize the United States simply for the purpose of making themselves more popular with Germany and Italy.
Germany and Italy are not in position to render Japan much more of service than they are already rendering. They might sell Japan more goods than at present, but not on terms conspicuously to Japan’s advantage. In the event of a war in Europe they would probably have to curtail rather than expand the volume of their exports to Japan, especially exports of arms and ammunition. Also, in the event of war, they would not be able to render Japan any assistance in the Far East, and it is now and it would be then in the Far East that Japan’s need of military assistance lies and would lie. There is not much that Germany and Italy can pay or plausibly promise to pay Japan as the price of entry by Japan into an alliance with them.
Moreover, the Japanese know as well as do we that, if war comes in Europe, the chances in the long run are against Germany and Italy. They realize as do we that over the long swing Great Britain and France have much more of the world’s resources to draw upon and much greater chance of reenforcement than have Germany and Italy. They know that were Germany and Italy by chance to win there would be nothing in Europe with which Japan might be rewarded for assistance which Japan might have given. The Japanese have no intention either of being on the possibly losing side or of giving assistance to any side without prospect of definite and substantial profit to and for themselves. They know that if, having entered into such an alliance, they were called upon to give military assistance in Europe they would be placed in an embarrassing position; that they would not wish thus to perform; and that if they refused to perform they would be further branded than now as treaty breakers.
For the Japanese, the logical thing to do is to regulate their relations with Germany and Italy on the basis of constant bargaining, with short-term accounts, constant deliveries back and forth, and frequent balancing of separate accounts. There are a number of steps which the Japanese have in contemplation in the Far East some of which they might take at any time but each and all of which they might take with greater assurance were a war to begin in Europe. In the light of that fact, there is reason for the Japanese to desire that war break out in Europe, and for that reason the Japanese might enter into an alliance with Germany and Italy for the purpose of encouraging Germany and Italy to go to war. It is’ conceivable that the Japanese might consider that the fact of a war having broken in Europe would be of sufficient advantage to them to outweigh the [Page 36] disadvantages to them which would flow from their having entered into an alliance. It therefore cannot be assumed with absolute confidence that the Japanese will be guided by the dictates of logic as regards the long swing. It therefore must be admitted that there is a possibility of Japan’s entering into an alliance. But, within that line of reasoning, Japan’s decision would have been brought about by considerations inherent in the situation in Europe and the situation in the Far East, and not by an impulsion—in the form of a reaction in Japan to a pressure threatened by the United States—from the United States.
Suppose, however, for purposes of discussion, that Japan were, in consequence of no matter what considerations, to enter into the alliance. What would be the general and the particular effects?
The initial psychological effects in Europe would be to the advantage of Germany and Italy. This might possibly increase the likelihood of intensified German aggression. But, in so far as military potentialities are concerned, it would not substantially alter the now existing situation. It would not add to Germany’s and Italy’s military strength or economic resources. The Germans and the Italians know that Japan has her hands full in the Far East, that she has nothing which she can send them, and that, if she had, there is a long gap between promises and performance in such a connection. The only thing which Japan could do which would be to the advantage of Germany and Italy would be to create a diversion which might render Russia ineffective in Europe. But, Germany and Italy have proceeded and are proceeding on the assumption and expectation that Russia will in the event of a war in Europe stand aloof. The mere fact of having Japan as an ally might give them some additional assurance in that connection but it would not add to Germany’s capacity to deal with Great Britain and France. Japan’s entry into the alliance would not decrease Great Britain’s and France’s strength in Europe, for the simple reason that the British and the French have given up all thought of being able, in the event of war, to act in the Far East, and, if attacked by Japan in the Far East, will not attempt to defend their positions there.
With or without being in an alliance with Germany and Italy, Japan will, in the event of a war in Europe, proceed in the Far East in accordance with (a) her capacity and (b) her estimate of what is directly to her own interest and advantage. The fact of being in an alliance would not increase Japan’s capacity in that connection or alter her estimates. It would be to her advantage in one way only: it would give her the assurance that Great Britain and France, already preoccupied in Europe, would continue for some time to be fully occupied there and would not be able for some time—as might be the [Page 37] case were a condition of peace brought about and assured in Europe—to turn their attention to the safeguarding of their interests in the Far East. But, against that advantage, the Japanese would have the disadvantage of increased solicitude on the part of the United States with regard to developments in the Far East and an increased possibility of friction and serious difficulty between the United States and Japan.
There is ample warrant for the view that the Japanese will continue to keep alive the subject of possible entry by them into the alliance, but that they will refrain from making a commitment either “yes” or “no” unless a war in Europe breaks out and until they shall have observed for some time the course of the military operations.
It therefore is believed that, in giving consideration to problems of relations between the United States and Japan, we should not be unduly influenced by the thought of possible influence of our acts upon Japan’s relations with Germany and Italy or unduly apprehensive lest steps which we might take so turn the scales as to lead to Japan’s entering the alliance. If by any chance Japan should enter the alliance, the fact of her having done so would probably not over a several years’ swing substantially alter the effective course of world events.
- Notation by the Secretary of State, May 15: “Thanks. CH”.↩