761.94/1182
Memorandum by Mr. George Atcheson, Jr., of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
The possibility of a Soviet-Japanese rapprochement creates something of a dilemma for the United States because American policy toward Japan in relation to developments in China may tend to increase that possibility. As the hostilities in Europe are causing Japan to become more and more dependent economically upon the United States, economic action against Japan by this country such as the imposition of an embargo might be a determining factor in turning Japan to seek profitable relations with the Soviet Union.14
[Page 320]A dilemma has also been created for Japan in regard to this question because American policy in regard to and American support of China and Soviet support of China are obstacles in the way of Japan’s resolving the conflict in China as speedily as possible in Japan’s favor and because Japan’s present international isolation makes it desirable, if not immediately necessary, to dispose of the “China incident” satisfactorily and without delay. If Japan could conciliate either the United States or Soviet Russia in such a way as to obtain the complaisance of one of those powers toward Japan’s program in China, Japan’s chances of quickly attaining Japanese objectives would be enhanced.
It is believed that, other things being equal, Japan would prefer conciliation with the United States to conciliation with Soviet Russia, as the latter alternative would involve greater risk of compromising Japan’s national security and political idealogy, and as Japan has an inherent distrust of Soviet Russia. On the other hand, if conciliation of the United States could not be brought about except by a radical modification of Japan’s policy in regard to China, then Japan in its present temper would probably prefer to take its chances on endeavoring to buy Russian complaisance at a cheaper price.
Both the principles to which we are committed and practical considerations require that this Government continue its diplomatic defense of its rights and interests in China and not capitulate to Japanese aims in China. Our course in general is already charted and includes the possibility of influencing Japan toward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It would seem, therefore, that the best safeguard against unnecessarily increasing the possibility would be the transferring of emphasis in future discussions with the Japanese from our idealogical opposition to the “new order in East Asia” and the placing of emphasis upon the profits deriving from friendship between this country and Japan.
The simple basis of our argument with Japan along this line would be that: friendship between the United States and Japan is traditional; the United States earnestly desires to maintain and continue that friendship to the mutual benefit of both nations; friendship is, however, a matter of give and take; Japan is destroying American trade in China and is interfering with and curtailing American rights; our friendship cannot continue in such circumstances which are so obviously not give and take when one party (Japan) seeks to profit from us with one hand and with the other to destroy our interests. In so doing we would (a) avoid giving to the Japanese conception of a “new order in East Asia” the direct challenge which would likely involve the “face” of the Japanese military and increase their determination to advance their program and (b) ostensibly concentrate [Page 321] our differences with the Japanese on a practical question which they could more readily understand and in regard to which they would find difficulty in not accepting the reasonableness of our complaints.
- Marginal notation by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck): “Japan is already seeking them.”↩