740.00112 European War 1939/218: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:40 p.m.]
2316. For the President and the Secretary. Daladier46 telephoned me this evening and said that he wished to talk with me immediately [Page 756] about a serious problem. I called on him at once at the Ministry of War.
Daladier said that 4 days ago the German Minister in Belgium had presented a note to the Belgian Government stating that the German Government considered that the acquiescence of Belgium in British blockade measures constituted a participation of Belgium in the British blockade which was intolerable for Germany and that Germany would take the most violent measures against Belgium unless Belgium should take the position that any goods received in Belgium might be sent through without let or hindrance to Germany.
The same day the German Minister in The Hague presented a similar note couched in equally violent language to the Dutch Government and the German Minister in Stockholm presented a similar note to the Swedish Government.
In each case the terms of the note were so bellicose and insulting that the Ministers in question had wished to refuse to receive it but had not dared.
Daladier went on to say that the British Government had been informed by the Dutch, Belgian, and Swedish Governments of these démarches by the German Government and that the conclusion had been reached that Germany was seeking a pretext for an invasion of each of the countries in question.
The British and French Governments had tried to discover what reasons Germany might have for invading Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Aside from the obvious military reasons it had seemed to the British and French Governments and to the Governments of Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands that Germany was probably intensely desirous of acquiring the gold now in each of the countries in question. In the case of Belgium and the Netherlands there were in addition vast stocks of diamonds and in the case of Belgium there was an important stock of wolfram.
Daladier said that 2 days ago the British Government had proposed to the Swedish, Belgian and Dutch Governments that their stocks of gold should be sent to Great Britain for safekeeping and in the case of the Belgian and Dutch Governments that the stocks of diamonds should be placed in security in the same manner and that the Belgian stock of wolfram should be removed to England.
The Swedish, Belgian, and Dutch Governments had replied individually that they would not dare to send their stocks of gold either to France or England since the Germans would insist that such an act was proof that they were cooperating with the British and French Governments and that the German argument with regard to the blockade therefore was justified.
Daladier said that he had been in touch with the British Government today and that it had been decided to ask me if it might not be [Page 757] possible for the Government of the United States to acquire in one way or another for safekeeping the gold stocks of Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium. At the same time he wished to ask if it might not be possible to devise a method by which the diamond stocks of Belgium and the Netherlands might be shipped for safekeeping to the United States and if it might not be possible for the United States to acquire the Belgian stock of wolfram.
I replied that I could not see any legal objection to the purchase of dollars by any of the Governments in question with the gold now in their possession. Since Germany had taken to sinking Swedish and other neutral ships it was obvious that the Swedish Government would be reluctant to place its gold reserves on a ship since that ship might be captured or sunk. The same applied to the Belgian and Dutch Governments. I had no idea whether or not it might be possible for the Government of the United States to acquire the gold in question while it was still on this side of the Atlantic. The questions of the diamonds and the wolfram were very different from the question of the gold and would require special thought and special handling.
Daladier asked me if I would communicate to you at once what he had said to me. I replied I would do so.
I realize that there may be political objections to taking any action whatsoever with regard to this matter. If no political objections exist it occurs to me that the Secretary of the Treasury might inform the Belgian Ambassador and the Ministers of the Netherlands and Sweden individually and separately that the United States Government was aware of the démarche that the German Government had made and that the Government of the United States within the framework of the tripartite monetary agreement47 would be glad to purchase for dollars the gold now held by his country and would be glad, when the gold should have reached the United States, to sell it back to the country in question, after deducting the charges of transportation, insurance, et cetera.
Similarly if no political objections exist it might be possible to make an arrangement for some large American diamond importing house to purchase the diamonds in question with the understanding that they should be repurchased by the Government in question on arrival in New York after deducting charges and duties, et cetera.
I wonder if the wolfram in question could not be acquired by the Government of the United States with a portion of the monies appropriated by Congress for the purchase of rare raw materials useful in war.
[Page 758]Daladier said that he had forgotten the amounts of gold, diamonds, and wolfram involved but that he would send the Minister of Blockade, Georges Pernot, to me tomorrow with the details. I replied that I should prefer not to see the Minister of Blockade until I had some indication from you that my Government was interested in pursuing this matter further.
I think that it might be wise in case you take up this matter—and I hope you will—to stress the fact that we are merely ready as loyal members of the tripartite monetary agreement to attempt to cooperate with our fellow associates, and that we are not pressing them to take any such action.
We have after all no direct indication that any one of these actually wishes to ship the gold, the diamonds, or the wolfram to the United States. On the other hand the small countries of Europe are so terrified at the moment of German attack and are so fearful that all their codes are in the hands of the German Government—which they probably are—that I doubt that any one of them would dare to send a telegram to Washington making any such proposal. They might, however, be exceedingly glad to receive from their representatives in America a telegram from Washington announcing the readiness of the Government of the United States to cooperate with them under such circumstances.
- President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister for National Defense.↩
- Set forth in simultaneous statements by the United States, United Kingdom, and France, September 25, 1936; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1936, Vol. i, p. 560.↩