740.0011 European War 1939/1370: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:25 p.m.]
3063. A member of my staff accompanied Ambassador Phillips on a call on Leger this morning. In the ensuing conversation the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed in great detail the thought reported in my No. 2973, December 14, 2 p.m., that Mussolini is seeking to bring about a premature peace that would preserve the Nazi regime in Germany and thereby protect his own regime in Italy.
Leger is convinced that Mussolini still leans toward Germany because (1) of considerations of regime and (2) because he fears that only with the entire weight of Germany can Italy exercise a real influence in European affairs against France and England. In other words, Leger believes that Mussolini still holds to the underlying principles of his fellowship pact of four [powers. At the same time] Leger feels that the Italian people, fully aware of their contribution to the Christian civilization of Western Europe, are alive to their responsibility to protect that civilization from the danger of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia.
[Page 539]In these circumstances the French Government has considered it the course of universal [wisdom] neither to force Italy nor to attempt to bargain with her to abandon the policy of “non-belligerency”. It is the French hope that by a natural evolution Italy, despite Mussolini’s predispositions, will come to know where her true interests lie. In the meantime France is prepared through the purchase of Italian goods and a lenient enforcement of the blockade to make this non-belligerency as profitable as possible to Italy. Leger said that the French military authorities point out that the free exchange accruing to Italy as a result of this policy serves only to strengthen a potential enemy of France. The military, he said, are also critical of the policy because of the supplies which it is known are reaching Germany through Italy. Leger’s reply to these critics is that no policy vis-à-vis Italy could be elaborated that did not entail risks.
Leger implied that this policy of hopeful benevolence toward Italy would have to be abandoned should Mussolini compromise himself by some “overt peace move” calculated to save Germany from the punishment that is due her. He said that Mussolini has had ample warning that while France would not take umbrage at Italy’s policy of non-belligerency it would react immediately and strenuously to any effort on Italy’s part to save the Nazi regime from the natural consequences of its ruthless acts of aggression and aggrandizement. He ascribed the failure of Italy and of Spain to take part in the German-Russian peace offensive of October-November to the force of these warnings.
In this connection Leger is unable to look upon the strengthening of the ties between the Papacy and the head of the Italian State as foreshadowing only good for Europe. He is fearful that a factor in this movement is Mussolini’s desire to save Germany by a premature peace.
Leger does not rate the perspicacity of diplomats very high. He thinks it likely that many chiefs of mission here and particularly the representatives of some of the small neutral states and the Italian Ambassador have placed too much importance to the possibility of political change within France and to the current of opinion here that would like to turn the fury of French and British feelings on Russia and thereby get out of war with Germany. Leger said that French policy vis-à-vis Italy is concentrated upon the task of making Mussolini understand that France is in this war to the bitter end and that no matter what domestic political changes might occur no Government of France could do other than prosecute the present war to the end that is now sought, namely, the destruction of a German Government inspired by the precedent of Genghis Khan rather than traditions of European Christianity. He said that at the outset of this war France had found herself with her back to the wall, there was no [Page 540] further ground for retreat and that it is of the utmost importance that Mussolini be made to understand that such was and remains the case.
Leger spoke of Mussolini’s declaimer in connection with President Roosevelt’s laudable interest in peace and the appointment of Myron Taylor as the President’s personal representative at the Vatican. He said that he had noted in the press yesterday the implication which he judged had come from the White House that the President does not believe that the next few months would prove opportune for any peace move and that probably circumstances would not be such as to favor such a move before next fall or later. Leger remarked that this was manifestly true, that France and England are determined to build a new Europe on a mature not a premature peace. It is his view that a peace move during the military inactivity of the winter could only complicate matters for France and England and would therefore arouse resentment here.
Leger is most suspicious of Holland with respect to a further inopportune step in favor of peace. He professed the opinion that as between the immediate danger of material loss resulting from warfare on its territory and future subservience to an all powerful Germany, Holland would choose the latter. He said that herein lies the true explanation of Holland’s unwillingness to accept an agreement with Belgium. He said that every effort of Belgium to date looking to such an agreement has been repulsed by Holland.
Unfortunately according to Leger the same supineness obtains in Sweden and Norway. In a preceding conversation Charveriat14 had informed us that the Quai d’Orsay’s first impression of the Swedish and Norwegian reaction to the Franco-British démarche in favor of substantial aid to Finland was not discouraging. Charveriat [said?] it would not have been surprising to the Quai d’Orsay had this démarche met with the immediate reply that the Norwegian and Swedish Governments could not entertain any proposal looking to their participation in substantial aid by France and England for Finland. Charveriat said that instead of such a refusal the two Governments had accepted the démarche without closing the door to examination and study of the problem. Leger on the other hand, who had just come from a long conference with Daladier and who therefore may have had information not available to Charveriat when we talked to him, said that the démarche had been refused by Norway and Sweden. Asked to explain the nature of the refusal, he replied that the two Scandinavian countries had said that they could not cooperate [Page 541] beyond what would be possible and proper under international law and that in any event whatever they did must remain secret from Germany.
Leger said that the Norwegians and the Swedes had been informed that France and England were prepared to go the limit in assisting the Finns; that it had been pointed out that the independence of Norway and Sweden was a matter of vital interest to France and England and that whatever might be the consequences of Norwegian and Swedish cooperation these consequences would be met in a forth-coming manner by France and England with the full might of their power.
Leger’s reaction to what he termed an over-weening material interest on the part of the neutral states and particularly Holland, Norway, and Sweden one of contempt [rather] than of depression. He appears not to entertain the slightest doubt as to the outcome of this war no matter what may be the ultimate role of the small European neutrals or Italy. He was most emphatic on the point that everything possible would be done to further and strengthen non-belligerent or pro-Allied tendencies in Italy but that if Italy should take the lead in a new German peace offensive France would have no alternative but to reconsider her policy toward Rome.
Leger said that France and England have no concern whatsoever about what may be Russia’s reaction to Franco-British policy either in the Scandinavian area or in the Balkans. He explained, however, that the Allies have no intention of taking the initiative in bringing their relations with Russia into line with their contempt and enmity for everything that Soviet Russia stands for. He said that the controlling consideration on this point was that it would be foolish for France and England to take the initiative in bringing about a situation which might worsen matters at this time for their ally, Turkey.
- Emile Charvériat, Director, Political and Economic Affairs, French Foreign Office.↩