740.0011 European War 1939/1162: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:12 p.m.]
2973. I asked Leger this morning if the French Government had any information with regard to a report which had reached me yesterday from a source which I had found in the past to be most reliable to the effect that the Yugoslav Government definitely agreed to permit passage of Italian troops through Yugoslav territory and Hungary in case the Soviet Union should attack Hungary by way of the former Hungarian-Polish frontier.
Leger replied that the French Government had no information on this subject and added that he did not believe the report was true. He thought that the Italian Government itself might have begun to spread such a report as part of the present policy of Mussolini which was to obtain an early peace in Europe that would leave Nazi Germany intact.
I asked Leger to explain this statement about Italian policy and he did so at great length. Since François-Poncet, the French Ambassador in Rome, came to Paris 3 days ago to report to his Government on recent developments in Italy, Leger’s views on this subject presumably are up to date and seem to justify a lengthy résumé.
Leger said that until the 14th of November Mussolini had been confident that Hitler was going to win the war. Mussolini had been informed that the German Army was going to attack Belgium and Holland on the night of the 13th of November and expected the attack to result in a definite German military victory. His views as to the strength of the German Army had been changed by the failure of the German Army to make the attack.
Mussolini attributed the announcement of the [apparent omission] to a lack of confidence on the part of the German Army in its ability to defeat the French and British. Furthermore, Mussolini was impressed by the fact that this adverse judgment by the German Government on the strength of its own army should have been made at a time which was more favorable for Germany than any future time could be. It was obvious that France and England would be much stronger militarily next spring than in the month of November. If Germany therefore could not attack successfully in November Germany certainly could not attack successfully in the future.
[Page 534]Mussolini therefore had come to the conclusion that Germany could not win the war by military means and that, if the war should go on, France and England finally would win it and destroy the totalitarian dictatorship in Germany.
Mussolini still desired to maintain his close contact with Germany and to have peace established in Europe on the basis of a four-power pact containing France, England, Germany and Italy, within the framework of which he could use Germany as a threat to obtain territorial and other concessions from France and England. He had therefore after some reflection in recent weeks embarked on a policy of bringing about a premature peace which would leave the present German Government in power. He was using various means to bring about such a peace in opposition to the creation of a great fear of the spread of Bolshevism in Europe.
The Italians, therefore, had taken the line of hostility to the Soviet Union and were continuing daily to push the idea that Germany must be spared defeat since Germany otherwise would become Bolshevik.
Mussolini had been able to enlist in this campaign for a premature peace that would leave the Nazi Government of Germany intact many neutral states which were most fearful of German or Soviet attack in case the war should continue. His propaganda was being supported also by Germany, and the Germans and the Italians had been able to enlist various well-meaning persons of various nationalities and many frightened persons especially in the Netherlands, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries. The Spanish Government also was assisting the Italian Government in this diplomatic campaign since the Spanish Government did not wish France and England to dominate Germany completely.
Leger went on to say that the French Government had the most indisputable and absolute proof that the action of the Argentine Government in taking such a strong line against the Soviet Union in Geneva9 had been the result of Italian diplomatic action in Buenos Aires. As a result the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, which he believed was now certain, would be the consequence of a most unusual combination of forces. On the one hand would be those states which desired to make the Soviet Union the unique object of detestation and desired to achieve a premature peace which would preserve the Nazi Government of Germany as a “bulwark” against Bolshevism, on the other hand there would be France and England which were convinced that it was necessary to condemn in the strongest manner all aggressors whether German or Russian.
Leger went on to say that the British Government had been doubtful of the expediency of expelling the Soviet Union from the League or of [Page 535] adopting sanctions against the Soviet Union but had taken the strong position it had taken because Daladier had insisted that this position should be taken.
He went on to say ultra confidentially that the French Government was about to ship 30 of the newest French pursuit planes to Finland. In this connection he stated that the German Government had seized all but 3 of the 40 Italian planes which the Italian Government had attempted to send to Finland via Germany.
Ultra confidentially also Leger said that the French and British Governments were now approaching the Norwegian and Swedish Governments with a view to obtaining the active intervention of Norway and Sweden on the side of Finland. He added that the French and British Governments would give every possible support in their power by sea, land and in the air to Norway, Sweden, and Finland if the Swedish and Norwegian Governments should decide to support Finland.
I expressed doubt as to the possibility that Sweden would support Finland actively but Leger insisted that there was a considerable possibility that both the Swedish and Norwegian Governments would give active support to Finland.
Leger went on to say that during the coming 3 months when there could be little fighting on the frontier between France and Germany he expected a great Italian effort to bring about a peace favorable to Germany. The French and British Governments would of course attempt to cut short any such peace offensive but there was said to be considerable danger that the fear of the small neutral states of Europe of German and Soviet aggression, the bogey of a spread of Bolshevism, and the well-meant but ignorant efforts of individual Americans and even the Governments of certain South American neutral states, might create great damage to the cause of democracy in Europe and definitive peace. France and England would not make peace until German imperialism disappeared.