740.0011 European War, 1939/258: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 11—12:32 p.m.]
1578. Personal for the President and Secretary. I spent an hour with the King and Queen alone yesterday and three quarters of an [Page 422] hour with Sir Samuel Hoare34 this morning in my office. From my conversation with the King it became very apparent to me that the one problem he is worried desperately about is that within a comparatively short time, possibly 3 or 4 weeks, Hitler will have cleaned up Poland and will then definitely make a proposition to Great Britain and France to call this war off and come to some agreement. I will discuss this problem later in this [telegram?] as a result of my conversation with Sir Samuel Hoare.
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Sir Samuel Hoare, as I said, called this morning and we had a long talk. He definitely believes that the most serious thing facing the world today will be the proposition he feels will unquestionably come within a month or 6 weeks from Germany to England to give up the struggle. He sizes the situation up in this way: Neither the French nor the Germans can make any appreciable headway against each other. He said that the French advance now is almost like the Lancers—three steps forward and three steps back; that it is extremely unlikely, except at the cost of an incredible massacre, that either side could break through either line. The navy, of course, can patrol the seas but the results of this will not be felt acutely for some time to come. In the meantime then, there is nothing left but air war. He said that at the minute Germany outnumbers in bombers the British two to one, although he feels the British outnumber the Germans in fighters; that it will be a struggle in the air to see whose morale will break first. The British have despatched practically all their bombers to France but are still keeping them under English command. The problem Hoare feels, will arise from a condition something like this: After the French have had a number of casualties they will demand that the British bombers bomb the Ruhr and other places. The minute that starts, women and children are bound to be killed even though British airmen would be under the strictest orders not to do anything of the kind; immediately that would call for reprisals and in spite of all England’s defenses, Germany is in a position to make these reprisals most serious.
The General Staff feel definitely that the only method of countering German attacks is to keep sending their bombers in to attack the Germans and since their number is very limited it is a question whether they will last very long. In the meantime, the Germans will attack the various factories here and even though direct hits are not made, they will so interfere with production by constant air raid attacks that it is extremely unlikely that a number of bombers can be turned out to fill in the terrific losses. This will be the case if they obey [Page 423] France’s suggestion of sending the bombers in. If, believing as they do that the bombers must be saved until they arrive at greater capacity and until they get a greater number, the French become restless and say “why fight any longer to save Great Britain?”
Now, Hoare knows that for any party here to consider any kind of an appointment with Germany would, of necessity at the minute result in having the party thrown out of power and I rather got the impression from Hoare this morning that it is not at all inconceivable that this party may make that an issue. It was not what he said; it was the inference I drew. Lord Trenchard,35 whom they all regard here very highly, feels that if they send English bombers into German territory, the German morale would break quickly and go to pieces much faster than the British. Of course that is a gamble that may have to be taken, but I am of the opinion that the War Cabinet at the moment do not feel justified in taking that risk.
Hoare was responsible for the statement given out on Saturday night that the British regard this as a 3-year war, in order to keep their morale stiffened up and not let any disquieting criticism of the Government’s policy get started too strongly. I could judge from talking with the King on Saturday that this matter is one that is giving the Government an unholy worry. They realize that a continuation of a war or the maintenance of a Government on a war basis means complete economic, financial and social collapse and nothing will be saved after the war is over. On the other hand, calling the war off would give Hitler such increased prestige that it is a question of how far that would carry him. The King and Hoare recognize the very grave danger that the French may feel the British are not making contribution comparable to theirs and may start to get sick of the war even though their courage and determination at the moment is very strong. He told me in passing that he understood Bonnet was going to be thrown out in France.
I thought this information would be very valuable to you in making up your minds as to your course of action. It seems to me that this situation may crystalize to a point where the President can be the savior of the world. The British Government as such certainly cannot accept any agreement with Hitler, but there may be a point when the President himself may work out the plans for world peace. Now this opportunity may never arise, but, as a fairly practical fellow all my life, I believe that it is entirely conceivable that the President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world and I have not thought so up to this minute.
If the war continues and air raids between the two countries continue, it is, of course, conceivable that at that time Italy or Russia [Page 424] or other countries may see fit to get in and then the situation might become hopeless.
I am passing this on because I think that beyond all other questions of importance in the world, this is one that the President should be thinking about to work out in his own mind what might be done at the psychological moment not to increase Hitler’s prestige but possibly to bring the whole world on a peace basis.