741.61/652: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:35 p.m.]
1030. Bonnet informed me this evening that he was convinced that negotiations for an accord between France, England, and the Soviet Union could not now fail. When Seeds and Payart had called on Molotov with the French-British proposal on May 27 Molotov had read it giving every sign that he was familiar in advance with its contents and had said that he must make objection to the clause referring to the League of Nations and to the clause referring to consultation in case of threat of war. (See my 1014, May 25, midnight.96) Molotov expressed himself as personally extremely pleased by the rest of the proposal and said that he would refer it to the Council of Ministers, in other words to Stalin.
Bonnet said that Molotov’s objection to these two points was in his opinion the product of an exaggerated suspicion; but that certainly any change in wording that the Russians might wish would be accepted by the French and British. The Soviet Ambassador was to call on him this evening and he expected an official reply at that time. He hoped that the accord might be in final form for signature within a week.
[Page 265]Rochat97 showed Wilson98 this afternoon the text of the Anglo-French proposal. The proposed agreement consists of seven articles of which the most important are as follows:
[Here follows a summary of the first four articles of the proposed agreement; see telegram No. 745, May 25, 9 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, printed on page 262.] (Rochat explained that the consultation contemplated … under article IV relates merely to an earlier stage in which, because of threatened aggression, consultation would be useful.) Rochat commented that there was a “hole” in the agreement which would at once be obvious to the Soviet Government.
For instance if Latvia or Estonia should be attacked by Germany and should not defend themselves or should refrain from appealing to Russia for assistance, preferring to have Germany overrun their country rather than Soviet Russia, then the pledge of mutual assistance would not come into play. The same situation, however, would of course arise if Belgium, Holland, or Switzerland should be attacked by Germany and should not defend themselves or should fail to appeal to Great Britain and France for assistance. In other words the “holes” were reciprocal just as the obligations were reciprocal. It had not been intended in this three-power agreement to cover every possible point but only the most important points and thus to lay a broad foundation for the anti-aggression front.