760C.62/872: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 19—9:30 a.m.]
1525. Kirk has sent me by hand the following message for immediate transmission to you:
There is sufficient evidence to support a suspicion that in spite of the assurances which have been given and the declarations which have already been made Hitler is not convinced that in the event of the use of force by Germany against Poland or its vital interests England and France will align themselves on the side of Poland regardless of the interpretation which may at the last moment be offered as to the blame for the acts of provocation or aggression as a consequence of which the issue may be precipitated. The isolation in which Hitler is alleged to be enclosed and the influences which are said to surround him are offered as explanations of this suspicion.
I have reason to believe that a project may be under consideration to convey to Hitler immediately possibly in the form of a personal letter signed by the most authoritative spokesmen of the British Government and of the French Government, a solemn statement of the firm position of both Governments and especially that of Great Britain in the face of the existing threat to world peace. In order to reduce the possibility that such a declaration might spur Hitler to immediate action the suggestion has been made that primarily the conveyance [Page 227] thereof and all circumstances connected therewith be maintained in the utmost secrecy, that it be couched in terms devoid of all prejudice and argumentation, that it omit any reference to a settlement of the controversies at issue which might be seized upon by Hitler as a sign of weakening in the British and French positions but that it contain a statement to the effect that the Polish Government is being urged to refrain from any acts which might be regarded in the light of provocation.
Copies of these letters would be delivered simultaneously to Mussolini not only for the purpose of acquainting him with the contents thereof but also in order to furnish an added safeguard against a possible failure of their reaching Hitler.
My own knowledge as to the foregoing is limited. I feel, however, that I would be derelict in my duty if I did not submit a suggestion that the President may wish to weigh the wisdom of such an effort to dispel all possibility of doubt in Hitler’s mind as to the magnitude of the consequences which would ensue from acts of force which he may be contemplating and that if it meets with the President’s favor he may care to take at once such steps [as] may be advisable always without endangering the [secrecy?] with which it is absolutely essential to surround such a message to Hitler in order to convey to the heads of the British and French Governments his views in support thereof.