740.00/2068: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 17—8:59 p.m.]
1183. I understand that the Foreign Office gave out this afternoon to press correspondents a statement which is to be attributed to “Whitehall” to the effect that Great Britain will not participate in any international conference for settlement of existing European difficulties unless Russia and Poland are included. This statement probably owes its inspiration to rumors that a four-power conference is being worked up by the Axis powers and is an indication that the military conversations at Moscow are getting along.
I had a talk this afternoon with Sir Alexander Cadogan on the general European situation. He says that the Government here simply has no information on which to base a calculation as to where the present crisis is heading. They have good reason to believe that Mussolini is making real efforts to bring Hitler to moderation but have no indication as to the effect on Hitler. Best-informed opinion, Cadogan said, believes that if there is to be a war the turning point will be either on the anniversary of the battle of Tannenberg at the end of this month or at the annual Nuremberg Congress on September 3. Whether or not a war results they believe that the crisis will certainly reach its climax at that time. They have no information as to the substance or results of the conversations at Salzburg between Ribbentrop and Ciano nor have they any reliable information which would lend color to speculative reports that Hitler is using the Danzig issue as a feint to conceal intentions for a surprise attack in the direction of Hungary and Rumania. Cadogan said that yesterday he told the Rumanian Minister, who was nervous, that British secret reports of the movements and disposition of German military forces do not indicate that there is any immediate military move contemplated in that direction; however with 2,000,000 Germans under arms it would be folly to proceed on the assumption that they could not be switched to any objective. The Government here is convinced apparently that Mussolini does not want a war and that Hitler probably does not want one, but what worries them is what Hitler can do if he does not go to war as they see no alternative open to him except one of receding from what he has declared to be unalterable objectives. The Under [Page 223] Secretary again emphasized to me what he has several times said before, that the British Government is making no proposals to Hitler and that no unofficial communications are being exchanged.
The position of the service departments is that they are “standing by” in readiness for action on the basis of a war being possible at any moment. Many of the top men are out of London on holiday but in a position to return on a few hours’ notice. Most of the leading political personalities are also away but in constant touch with their offices. The Prime Minister, however, is returning to London on Monday and there will be a Cabinet meeting on Tuesday. The Prime Minister may then resume his holiday, depending on the situation at the time.
As indicated in recent instructions sent to the British Ambassador in Warsaw (my 1172, August 16, 6 p.m.) every effort is being made to keep the Poles in line and the Under Secretary said that they are particularly emphasizing to Colonel Beck the absolute necessity for prior consultation with the British Government before Poland commits herself to any action. He said incidentally that he thought that, considering everything, Beck and the Poles had behaved extremely well.
From my own conversations with British officials, well-informed diplomatic colleagues and others, I am convinced that what Cadogan has said to me represents the consensus of sober and informed opinion. Press correspondents uniformly express the opinion that they are up against a “stone wall.” Many of these men are extremely active and ordinarily well-informed. After reciting the obvious dangers of the present emotional and physical set-up, with nearly 2,000,000 men under arms in Germany, they are unwilling in private conversation to speculate on what is going to happen. This has not, however, prevented the London press in the past fortnight from giving vent to every sort of rumor as to German and Italian intentions. Many of these articles have been wrong on facts and indicate a tendency to speculation which outrides the real opinion of the writers. Cadogan spoke today of press reports that Mussolini and Hitler had made an approach to the Vatican, and said that the British Minister to the Holy See received yesterday a categorical denial from the Vatican itself that any such approach had been made.
In connection with the Salzburg conversations between Ciano and Ribbentrop, I have received in confidence from an entirely reliable non-British and unofficial source the following account of a conversation with a member of the German Embassy here. The German said that he and his colleagues in London were almost as much befogged over the Salzburg talks as the representatives of other nations. They had not been given any precise details of the proceedings in question nor the conclusions reached. All they had here were a few [Page 224] hints over the telephone of the general trend of the conversations. These were roughly to the following effect: Mussolini wants a general negotiation between the Axis and the democracies and wants it quickly, for Italy can get nothing for herself out of either a Danzig agreement or a Danzig row. Hitler also would like a general negotiation but realizes that it might require months, indeed probably a year, to hammer out a general European settlement. The solution of the Danzig question however cannot be held up that long. Hitler, when he meets the Nuremberg Congress, holds that he must be in a position to make an impressive announcement about a Danzig solution in the German sense. This need not involve a detailed agreement but an agreement on main principles. The outstanding principle is that, with whatever practical restrictions in the direction of international guarantees and safeguards for Polish interests and rights, the return of Danzig to German sovereignty must be conceded by Poland; for if Hitler would prefer a solution of the Danzig problem by negotiation to a solution by force, he considers that the negotiation should be with Poland and not with the Western powers, which are not entitled to any say in the matter beyond the good advice they should hand out to the Poles to restrain themselves and to agree.
Whether the ultimate source of this information can be relied upon may be open to question. The statement however seems to me of interest when read in conjunction with the account sent to the British Government by Dr. Burckhardt, the League Commissioner at Danzig, of his conversation with Hitler. The Department will by now doubtless have received from the British Ambassador a copy of a telegram from the Foreign Office giving the gist of Dr. Burckhardt’s report.37 Cadogan mentioned this report and the subsequent telegram of instruction that they had sent to the British Ambassador at Washington likewise repeated to Washington, and said that there was really little of substance that could be added to the statement made in the telegram to Ambassador Kennedy.