770.00/597: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 9—3 p.m.]
443. Daladier50 and the Polish Ambassador lunched with me today and discussed the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. During the conversation the Polish Ambassador stated that the visit of Gafencu51 to Warsaw had resulted in Rumania giving entire approval to the Polish proposal that Ruthenia eventually should be occupied by Polish and Hungarian troops and given to Hungary. The Polish Ambassador added that Beck had agreed with Gafencu that Poland should undertake negotiations immediately for reconciliation between Hungary and Rumania on the basis of a greatly increased liberty for the Hungarians of Transylvania and Rumanian permission for Hungary to take Ruthenia. He said that as soon as this agreement should have been worked out a Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia was to be expected.
The Polish Ambassador reiterated to Daladier what he had said to me previously, to wit: that the only reason Hungary did not today own Ruthenia was because the Hungarian Government under Imredy52 had not dared to act at the crucial moment. He said that [Page 30] in case Poland and Hungary should act in the near future the only thing to be expected from Germany would be a note of protest.
The Polish Ambassador pointed out that resistance to German advance in Central and Eastern Europe since Munich had been provided not by France and England, both of whom had been rather visibly anxious to have Germany turn her hostile intentions towards Russia, but on the contrary by Poland, Hungary and Rumania, all of which states knew that they had everything to lose by German domination. The Polish Ambassador said that relations between Rumania and Poland had never been so close as they were today and added Polish-Hungarian relations had never been closer.
While it would be impossible for Poland to form anything that could be called “a bloc” composed of Poland, Rumania and Hungary in opposition to German expansion to the southward and eastward, in point of fact Poland would do everything possible to strengthen Rumanian and Hungarian resistance to German advance. He stated to Daladier that he believed that this should also be the policy of France. The strengthening of national resistance to the advance of Germany in Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia should be the basis of French policy. Daladier agreed that this sounded sensible.
Both Daladier and the Polish Ambassador were of the opinion that the Soviet Union was to be counted on for nothing. They both felt that it was certain that internal conditions in the Soviet Union would prevent the Red Army from taking any active part in any war anywhere and both agreed that no reliance could be based on any promises of Soviet support in the form of supplies to Poland or Rumania. Both agreed also that if Hitler should be willing it would not take a half hour to form an alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. Stalin was panting for such an agreement.
Daladier stated with the greatest possible emphasis to the Polish Ambassador that there could be no possible question of any French concessions whatsoever to Italy at the present time. He would not give way to blackmail. He had given his final orders this morning for further reenforcement of French troops in Tunisia. If the Italians wanted war they could have it. They would be defeated. He did not propose to discuss any concessions of any kind to Italy.
The Polish Ambassador informed me that Beck now expected to go to London on the second of April and would not visit Paris en route. He said that Beck was extremely angry because the French press had been so delighted by the student demonstrations against Germany while Ciano54 was in Poland. Moreover the French Ambassador in Warsaw, Noel, had apparently taken an attitude toward [Page 31] these demonstrations which had infuriated Beck. Beck therefore had been compelled to be more amiable in his conversations with Ciano than he had wished to be. There had been no agreements. I gathered, however, that Beck had expressed to Ciano Poland’s interest in an eventual general redistribution of colonies.
The Polish Ambassador said that he had received a letter from Beck this morning stating that his impression after his conversations with Ciano was that Italy at the present moment would not dare to risk war with France.