Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, General, Volume I

740.00/1219: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Davies) to the Secretary of State

Brussels, April 29, 1939—5 p.m.
[Received April 29—4:25 p.m.]

61. Foreign Minister yesterday afternoon requested conference this morning relative to Department’s telegram 19, April 20. He stated that:

1. The pressure incident to the reorganization of the Government and to procuring legislative special powers had prevented earlier reply.

2. The Belgian Government had deepest appreciation for the initiative and the great moral stratagem of the President in messages to Hitler and Mussolini and was grateful for the inclusion of Belgium in the list of countries for which assurances of non-aggression were asked.

3. The Belgian Government, however, could not give public expression thereto as Belgium was in a most delicate position and his Government was required to act with the greatest caution.

4. Belgium had received German guarantees in 1937⁵⁴ and any action by the Belgian Government casting doubt upon the validity of that promise in any public statement would be ill-advised and dangerous and might be taken by Germany as evidence of a distrust by Belgium of Germany’s guarantee. He stated further that in his opinion if that guarantee were now kept intact and if in future emergency it were to be violated by Germany as occurred in 1914 such a development would be of great value in serving to mobilize world forces against aggression.

5. Nevertheless, Belgium would vigorously and firmly protect her frontiers and resist aggression even “though Brussels were razed to the ground”; that orders had already been given for automatic self-executing mobilization and defense “if a single enemy soldier were to cross the frontier.”

In response to my reply he stated that:

1. He could appreciate any suggestion that the flight of gold from the smaller countries to London and the United States indicated that the smaller countries actually believed their real safety lay with Western democracies and that there might be danger that the enthusiasm of their real friends might be chilled by their failure to openly support the President’s suggestion and thereby help themselves.

2. That there was force in the suggestion that Hitler’s speech served to still further terrorize the smaller countries and enable him to solidify his position making him stronger for possible future direct action. But he emphasized again the necessity for extreme caution, the manifest delicacy of their situation, and their preparedness and determination to fight to the last man and “not to be another Czechoslovakia.”

Despatch follows.⁵⁵

Davies

54. See memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State, October 13, 1937, Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. i, p. 145.
55. Despatch No. 302, May 2, not printed.