611.4131/1753
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called at his own request. He said that he came in to urge upon me the great importance of immediate agreement in connection with the British-American trade agreement negotiations, emphasizing his views by citing the delicate and dangerous conditions in Europe and other parts of the world. I replied that having almost worn myself out for more than three and one-half years urging the British Government to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with this Government, the Ambassador could well imagine my anxiety for the earliest possible conclusion of these negotiations and a mutually desirable agreement. I then said that with all emphasis I must repeat to the Ambassador that we have been conducting these negotiations on the same identical basis that we conducted the 17 agreements heretofore entered into with other governments; that this meant a mutually profitable trading arrangement based on the principle of equality; that I had called in my experts at the outset and strongly insisted that they strive solely for an equally and mutually desirable and profitable trade arrangement; that I have closely observed developments and that my experts are deeply sincere in their present insistence that the proposed agreement is not yet fairly balanced between our two countries. Even then, I said that I instructed them to omit further presentation of 30 or 40 proposed demands for concessions from the British Government and only to [Page 52] present those which they felt absolutely obliged to insist on as a matter of plain justice to this country; that these comprised lumber, rice—or lard in the alternative, tobacco, and hams. I said that we have been negotiating amidst every sort of difficulty and impediment, but that we are steadily going forward with this program, coupled with the broader program I have been announcing in recent speeches51 since the Buenos Aires Conference; that the withholding of concessions on the four commodities just mentioned would inevitably result in sweeping attacks on the agreement and on the whole policy of reciprocity and peace clear across the country, from the Ohio River to the Pacific Ocean, which area comprises the corn and hog belt and, farther west, the lumber belt; that this Government simply cannot abandon its insistence on some recognition for that vast area in addition to what is offered. When I emphasized the lard proposition, the Ambassador said that there was a terrific controversy in the British Cabinet about reducing the 10% Empire preferential rate to 5%. I replied that that must explain the British indisposition to grant the four final concessions we are asking; that if the great British Cabinet would have a serious controversy about reducing the duty of 10% on lard to 5%, much as free lard would help the British people, I could begin to understand how on some other theory the British Cabinet has been indifferent to our strong claims for concessions on these four commodities mentioned by me. I then said that I must admit my great and growing concern in regard to the failure of the British Government thus far to make a single utterance in support of the broad program of reciprocal trade and peace based on mutually profitable commerce and equality of treatment; that I had been wondering whether there is not a real connection between this lack of support by the British Government, in Europe as well as elsewhere, of the philosophy and the spirit and the letter of this wholesome peace-making program of trade restoration and their apparent indisposition to grant what is to that country the paltry concession on these commodities as requested by this Government. The Ambassador seemed a little surprised and a little at a loss to make any really responsive reply. I reminded him of the British practice relating to clearing agreements, compensation arrangements, quota devices, etc., all based on discrimination rules. Finally, I again emphasized the growing world dangers and the tremendous influence for both peace and economic stability, especially in Europe, which in my judgment, would immediately follow a model trade agreement between our two great nations, and then added that I must make the most earnest possible personal appeal to the British Ambassador to [Page 53] go back to his Government and, if he possibly could do so, urge it to grant these four concessions in order that the trade agreement might be brought to an early and immediate conclusion. I elaborated and emphasized this appeal. The Ambassador made no particular objection but went out leaving the impression that he might decide to take this step.
- For radio address of August 16 on international relations and foreign policy of the United States, see Department of State. Press Releases, August 20, 1938, p. 117.↩