611.4731/339
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)
| Participants: | Sir Earle Page,34 |
| Mr. Hawkins, | |
| Mr. Moffat. |
Sir Earle Page opened the conversation at luncheon by saying: “Let’s get away from generalities and come to the specific question of Australian-American trade relations. Are you genuine in your intention to negotiate a trade agreement with us or are you continuing ‘to string us along’ alleging one reason after another for delay?”
Mr. Moffat replied that we envisaged trade agreement negotiations with Australia just as soon as we found it politically and economically possible, but that for reasons already explained we could not hope to enter into such conversations,—at any rate until after our elections.
“In that case”, he replied, “can you give us a definite commitment that you will negotiate after elections?”
Mr. Moffat said that unfortunately giving an advance commitment to that effect would be the equivalent of negotiating at the present time,—at least as far as political repercussions were concerned. We could not foresee the future with exactness. For instance, the next Congress might be out of hand; the reaction of the public to the British and Canadian trade agreements might be unfavorable. No, we could not give a firm commitment, but Mr. Moffat said he felt extremely hopeful that we could go ahead right after the elections and would be exceedingly disappointed if we could not.
Sir Earle Page then said, “What am I to say when I get back to Australia? The first question I will be asked is ‘what about Ottawa?’ There I have a good answer and can point out that Australia and England laid down the bases of a wider Empire cooperation that may mean the beginning of a new era. The second question I will [Page 153] be asked is ‘what about the trade agreement with America?’ and there the best answer I can give is that they won’t talk to us until after elections.”
Mr. Moffat replied that all hope of going forward with Australia depended upon one other factor that he had not mentioned,—namely,—that nothing should be said in Australia which would complicate our political problem in the two or three months immediately ahead of us.
Sir Earle Page answered that if we thought the Australian Government could remain silent until November we did not know the Australian public. The Australian public knew that Australia had made definite sacrifices in order to bring about a U. K.–U. S. A. trade agreement; that Canada had done the same; that Canada was rewarded with new negotiations and Australia was shut out in the cold. He went on to say that not only had she been shut out in the cold but that we had made a proposal to her six weeks ago that were it made public would so anger the Australian people that negotiations between the two countries would be out of the question for twenty years. In return for a valueless wool concession we had asked to displace many of the principal British and Canadian exports to Australia, at the very moment when we were selling six times as much to Australia as we were buying from her. He then proceeded to present the classical Australian arguments against our trade practices and ended with a statement that if we went on snubbing Australia, she would have to bring down new tariff measures designed to divert American trade.
Mr. Moffat told Sir Earle Page that there was scant value in looking backwards on the mistakes or disagreements of the past. The thing to do was to look forward and the first problem before us was what formula he could devise to prevent any embarrassment coming from Australia during the next three or four months.
At this point luncheon ended and Sir Earle Page continued conversation with Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Officer and Mr. Moffat in the Library. He went over much the same ground in a more dispassionate tone. Mr. Hawkins pointed out the actual benefits which Australia would derive from the woolen fabric concessions we were planning to give Great Britain. Sir Earle Page would not admit that this would materially help the Australian wool grower as he claimed that it would not increase the total consumption of wool. In fact, Australia’s basic problem as he saw it, was to bring about any form of international cooperation which would increase the consumption of agricultural commodities. He cited at some length Australia’s manipulations of butter prices, et cetera, to this end. He then made the claim that the U. S.–U. K. trade agreement was going to be a narrow one which would scarcely enlarge world trade; he was even doubtful of its psychological effects, for he said that the Europeans [Page 154] would argue that if this were the best the two greatest trading nations could do by mutual agreement, they themselves might just as well continue with their autarchical systems. Finally he reverted to the political problem facing the Australian Government and accepted Mr. Hawkins’ assurances that the specialists and technical men in the Department were working now on Australian matters and endeavoring to see what the terms of an agreement should be, including the concessions which might be granted Australia. He evidently accepted as an unwelcome but nonetheless inescapable fact that the only chance Australia could hope to initiate negotiations was the period immediately following our elections. Mr. Hawkins assured him that our studies on all technical phases by that time would be complete and that he would raise the question with the Secretary of making a new approach to Australia.
Sir Earle Page asked if we could give roughly the time table as we envisaged it. Mr. Hawkins replied that if we could go ahead he thought the Australian experts might be welcome for exploratory discussions some time late in December or early January, that after a basis of agreement had been reached, we would announce our intention with the statutory provisions for hearings, briefs, et cetera, and that if all went well it might be time for their Minister to come over and complete negotiations in March or April. He pointed out in this connection that for obvious reasons there could be no definitive negotiations until after our hearings had been completed. Sir Earle Page said that this seemed all right but he had one request to make,—namely,—that if we could not go ahead soon after elections for any political reasons, we tell Australia so honestly and frankly so that they would lose no further time in chasing the will-of-the-wisp, and could get started working on their new tariff schedules designed to divert trade from us to countries that would buy from Australia.
As to the formula, he suggested a statement to the effect that he and other Australians had discussed the general trend of Australian-American trade; that this was so exceedingly complex and raised so many problems that it was requiring especial study; that this study was in process and when completed it would advance our trade relations one stage. He said that the great thing was that such a statement be not contradicted here. Mr. Hawkins said that we should probably give the matter a slightly different emphasis by pointing out that our trade agreement program is a comprehensive one and that we were making similar studies not only affecting Australia, but all other important countries with which we have not yet concluded agreements. Sir Earle Page agreed that this was all right, adding that the Australian public would not care in the slightest what we were doing with other countries!
- Australian Minister of Commerce on mission to the United States.↩