793.94 Conference/128: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:15 p.m.]
674. I had an appointment to meet the Prime Minister and Eden together at 6 o’clock yesterday evening, but the Prime Minister was too ill to be seen, and Eden was indefinitely held up in connection with the Non-Intervention Committee.31 Therefore, I saw Eden this morning and had an hour’s uninterrupted talk with him.
I delivered to him definitely the President’s message,31a according to instructions to me, pointing out primarily the success, (1) of the Montevideo,32 and (2) the complete success of the Buenos Aires negotiations,33 due, as the President felt, to the fact that the participating nations had been led to feel that San Salvador, the smallest, was to be considered as on the same plane not only with the United States, but with the larger South American powers, such as Brazil and Argentina, to which idea the South American and Central American [Page 115] powers had agreed, through preliminary negotiations; that the President felt that the British should not take the lead in the coming Brussels Conference, nor should any effort be made by the British to push the United States in the lead, and that the smaller powers should be made to feel their position and standing and ideas and purposes were as important, and, indeed, on the same plane, as those of the British and the United States Governments.
I further told him the President felt that the attempt which had been made to pin the United States down to a specific statement as to how far it would go, and precisely what the President meant by his Chicago speech, was objectionable and damaging. Eden stated that his Government in no sense and at no time had taken any such position, and anything that had been said on that subject was irresponsible newspaper stuff, to which the British Government had seriously objected, realizing that it was unfair because nobody could tell in advance just what position it would be possible for the United States, or any other power, to take, and that the situation must develop as the Conference progressed.
He agreed entirely and stated specifically that there would be no attempt by the British Government to attempt the lead, and no attempt whatever by the British to push the United States into such a position. He said that while it was impossible to predict in advance what might be accomplished, his Government felt that it was wise and hopeful to make an effort which might, at least, be a step forward, and might lay a foundation for useful and helpful action in the future.
Eden asked me to convey to my Government the determination of his Government to cooperate with us to the fullest extent at the Brussels meeting, and to do it as tactfully and as intelligently as possible. He stated he was going to Brussels a day ahead in order to have time to go over the whole matter fully with Norman Davis and to reach an agreement as to the line his delegation should pursue, in advance of the meeting.
I told him further that for 3 years we had sought to work out a trade agreement with the British,34 that in my opinion the time was short in which such an agreement could be made, and that the failure to do so would have a serious effect on American public opinion, and would make any further cooperation between the British and American Governments very difficult. Now that the Australian election was over, whatever position Australia might take, the fact that an agreement between the British and American Governments could be made with a party to the Ottawa Agreements35 was shown by the fact [Page 116] that we had made a trade agreement with Canada.36 He agreed with me entirely and told me that the entire Cabinet realized this and were determined to make progress on a definite basis as soon as practicable.
I reminded him of the fact that it was reported in the newspapers that about 100 Conservative members of the House of Commons had signed a manifesto opposing any trade concessions. I told him we had been all through this in this case, and while I recognized the necessity imposed upon Great Britain to change its policy of free trade, in view of the fact that it could not hope to remain on a free trade basis with the rest of the world with embargoes, quotas, excessive tariffs and excess nationalism, that still we knew from experience in the United States, the tariff duties to manufacturers were very much like injections of morphine, which proceeded from moderate dosage to increasing quantities, and that our own manufacturers had carried this to the point where they had created a virtual embargo against the rest of the world and had destroyed themselves; that at least some of our tariff beneficiaries had learned this lesson and were supporting the present policy of the United States Government, and that there was still time, but that a short time, in which our Government could carry through such an agreement with Great Britain and when this time was passed, it would probably pass forever. He assured me that the entire Government realized the situation and felt that they could cope with the opposition, and, while he was not in immediate touch with the Board of Trade, through which any action must come, he felt that within a reasonably near future some favorable action would come.
- See vol. i, pp. 215 ff.↩
- For substance, see undated memorandum from the file of President Roosevelt’s secretary, p. 85.↩
- For the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo, December 3–26, 1933, see Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.↩
- For the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires, December 1–23, 1936, see ibid., 1936, vol. v, pp. 3 ff.↩
- For correspondence regarding proposed trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, see vol. ii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Agreements concluded at the Imperial Economic Conference, Ottawa, signed August 20, 1932, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxxv, pp. 161 ff.↩
- Signed November 15, 1935; Executive Agreement Series No. 91, or 49 Stat. 3960.↩