Office of the Historian

793.94/11888: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Hankow, December 29, 1937—10 a.m.
[Received 7:36 p.m.]

117. I concur in following estimate of China military situation prepared by Military Attaché.

  • “1. Without any reliable means of checking and based largely on fragmentary information from varied sources, the following estimate is submitted as an impression of present conditions. The Chinese authorities are loath to make definite statements or more probably are themselves ignorant of conditions. Foreign military observers are not given any opportunity to form a judgment based on observation; even the German advisers may be in the dark. However, certain facts can be accepted which indicate the true state of affairs.
  • 2. The Chinese have had serious losses in planes, guns, tanks, trucks and facilities for their air service and artillery are reduced to a small fraction of their needs. The tank corps was never more than a beginning. The losses in personnel have been large, but the reserve of manpower is enormous; this presents no problem except number of replacements. The force defending Nanking now split and scattered; part is north of the Yangtze, part is in southern Anhui, part is in Chekiang. Cooperation between commanders at best was very poor; it is now worse than ever. What little cohesion existed during the first few months has been shattered. The disintegration of the army has been considerable, and is apparent from the ease of Japanese movements, the inability of the Chinese to establish a front or take any combined action, and the increasing talk of resort to guerilla warfare. Many units are out of hand and simply living on the country.
  • 3. A semblance of control exists which may give orders that issue from the High Command, as for example the designation of commanders for the various fronts, but the mixture of units from neighboring provinces in these several localities makes effective control impossible. The unit commanders do not want replacements supplied by the central authorities; they prefer to recruit their own people. To get order out of this mixture of defeated and depleted units scattered in Kiangsu, Anhui, Chekiang and Kiangsi is probably beyond the power of the Central Government. Instead of attempting to fill up and reorganize the units that have been in action, a new command seems now to be forming new units and concentrating its efforts on the Hankow–Nanchang–Changsha area where they are trying to build up a force while awaiting the developments that events will force on them.
  • 4. I believe the High Command has no other plan beyond further retreat to the west and will most likely in case of attack and that they are pinning their faith on the size of the country, over extension by the Japanese, possible intervention by Russia, possible internal trouble in Japan, and an effective development of the Red campaign [Page 844] against the Japanese communications. It is certain that any offensive by the Chinese is out of the question, and it is very doubtful if a force capable of offering any further serious resistance can be created.”

Please furnish copy to the War Department.

Sent to Peiping.

Johnson