793.94/11841
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 27.]
Sir: In a long conversation my British colleague recently elaborated certain views on the general situation especially as affecting the United States, France, and Great Britain. He feels that the present problems which have arisen in Shanghai have brought about a divergence of views between the Japanese military on the one hand and the civil Government in Tokyo on the other hand. The latter, realizing that good relations with our three countries as well as their financial and economic cooperation will become increasingly important in future, wish to avoid unnecessary antagonisms. The present crisis therefore involves a definite “show down”. If the military succeed in having their way in the customs and other civil problems in China they will interpret as weakness the lack of effective measures on the part of the interested Powers and will become increasingly truculent while the authority of the Foreign Minister and other civil officials in Tokyo will inevitably and commensurately suffer. Craigie believes that the threats of the Japanese military to seize outright the customs in Shanghai is largely bluff and he feels that their bluff should be called. Shanghai’s 1089, December 5, 10 a.m., which I read to him, seemed to him to be another case in point. He knows that General Matsui is markedly anti-British.
[Page 793]Sir Robert Craigie furthermore feels that unless the United States now stands shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain in opposing Japanese depredations on our legitimate interests the results will be two-fold. First, the current cry that England is trying to push the United States out in front will, if we fall behind, temporarily promote America’s reputation in Japan but in the long run it will injure more than benefit us because (a) the Japanese will feel that they can ride rough-shod over our interests with impunity and because (b) injury to British interests in the Far East must automatically injure the interests of the other democratic Anglo-Saxon Power. Second, if the United States fails to cooperate with Great Britain it will tend to drive the latter ultimately into the arms of Germany and Italy which in the long run would inevitably prove disadvantageous to America. He feels that we should both be firm but should never take positions or utter threats which we are unable or unwilling to back up.
I pointed out to Sir Robert that throughout the present Sino-Japanese hostilities we have adopted a common attitude with Great Britain and that in every case where the interests of both our countries were involved we had, so far as I was aware, proceeded very closely if not actually step by step together, at least along parallel lines. I asked him what sort of action he especially had in mind. He then referred to a particularly secret approach recently made to our Government by the British representative in Washington,3 the nature of which I shall not herein mention, and expressed the belief that only drastic action can bring the Japanese military to their senses while at the same time, paradoxical as it may seem, affording moral support to the Foreign Minister, the civil Government and the liberal elements in Japan. I said that I doubted very much if the American Government, Congress, and the public would favor such a step as he had in mind but that I was not specifically informed.
The foregoing conversation is reported because it summarizes many talks along the same lines which Sir Robert Craigie has had with me since his arrival in Japan, and in reporting his views I feel that I should comment on some of the important points on which he dwelt.
- (a)
- We have no evidence that there is a divergence between the Japanese civil and military elements on broad national policy. Some westernized Japanese, with foreign business or cultural associations, privately and secretly express disapproval of the direction which Japanese national policy is taking, but with public expressions of thought effectively under control there is no way of determining whether or not there is any substantial dissentient opinion. We do not believe there is.
- (b)
- I agree with Sir Robert that a great deal of bluffing is being done by the Japanese military with regard to the Chinese customs and other matters of something less than primary importance as we have already had evidence that firm opposition does produce good effects. It is apparent that the Japanese are testing us out to see how far they can safely go in these matters. However, assuming that those in authority in Japan have divided into two camps, as the Ambassador suggests, I believe that the expectation that a threat of coercion by other Powers with regard to the primary problem arising out of Japan’s effort to subjugate China would do anything else but drive the moderates into the other camp would be a complete miscalculation of Japanese psychology. Further, it would have to be realized that if a threat of coercion should not have the effect which Sir Robert so confidently anticipates, the Powers would have either to implement the threat or be prepared to lose completely their prestige in the Far East.
- (c)
- It is obvious, of course, that prior consultation must be postulated if there is to be the common front of the United States and Great Britain which Sir Robert proposes; and whether that would be a practicable proposition the Department alone is in a position to judge. Without prior consultation we would have to share with the British the consequences of British ineptitudes, both of action and of statement, such as those which have contributed their full measure toward the developing of the feeling of exacerbation now prevailing between Great Britain and Japan.
- (d)
- I do not altogether share Sir Robert’s views that a lowering of British prestige and influence in the Far East must necessarily injure American interests. The barometer of the prestige and influence of foreign nations in Japan is constantly fluctuating. Today’s friend may, through some incident or development, become detested tomorrow, and vice versa. I feel that our cooperative action with Great Britain during the Sino-Japanese hostilities has been adequate and that our attitude in this respect has been sound and sane.
Respectfully yours,