793.94/11439: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:37 p.m.]
12. My 11, December 2, 2 p.m. In confidential conversation this morning H. H. Kung72 discredited the theory that the German Ambassador has gone to General Chiang as the messenger or at the instigation of Italy. He said that the recognition of Manchukuo has definitely eliminated Italy from among those nations trusted by China. (There is an apparently reliable report that all Italian aviation advisers are to be dismissed.) Kung thought that Japan selected Germany and not Italy as its present emissary knowing that Italy would be regarded with distrust. I asked Kung what the reaction of the Chinese leaders would be to the proposals conveyed by the German Ambassador. He replied promptly that this would depend on the attitude of the American Government toward the Sino-Japanese conflict and he asked me in turn whether I would advise China to treat with Japan stressing that he wanted my opinion not as a diplomat but as his friend and a friend of China. I said that I did not know what terms Japan was offering and in general had no adequate basis for an opinion. To my relief he did not inform me what terms are being offered. I remarked that Great Britain and France having oriental possessions would naturally be very interested in possible terms of settlement of the present conflict and I inquired what Kung knew concerning their attitude. He admitted that the two nations named would feel a keen interest in the specific terms of settlement but he insisted that the interests of the United States were as closely involved as those of other nations if not more so; he made certain statements which I did not attempt to refute, viz. that the Japanese are by nature and tradition a fighting race, that it is their ambition to utilize the manpower and natural resources of China in furtherance of schemes of military expansion, that a Japanese victory would be a victory of military despotism over peace-loving democracy, that China in this sense was fighting the common [Page 751] battle of international security and morality, that further enhancement of Japanese military power would disturb the equilibrium in the Pacific area and would expose even the United States to danger of incursion in the future, that every victory of imperialism like that of Italy over Ethiopia and Japan in Manchukuo further imperiled the peace of the world and that no nation could isolate itself from the consequences of a rule of predatory militarism. He made the interesting statement that even before the final Japanese victory at Shanghai the Japanese made several tentative approaches to the Chinese for cessation of hostilities and he strongly inferred from the present renewal of these approaches that the Japanese are anxious to terminate their present costly venture. He expressed the conviction that the present moment would be most favorable for some sort of international demonstration of overhauling Japan. He said that a similar favorable moment had occurred during the course of the Nine Power Conference at Brussels but that the lack of any concrete result from the conference had given renewed courage to Japan. I made the remark that from the very beginning it had been beyond the bounds of possibility that the United States would go to war against Japan either alone or in concert with other nations. Kung replied that no Chinese expected the United States to fight their battles but he insisted that it would be sufficient to halt Japan’s scheme of conquest if the leading democratic nations of the world would make some gesture such as issuing preliminary mobilization orders to their fleets or affording China assistance in money or war materials and he urged that such an act at this moment would save the necessity of far greater expenditure at a later date when Japan’s military power had been expanded and enhanced. He said that the United States held the key to the situation because Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union had all signified their readiness to take some step on China’s behalf but refused to do so until they were positive the United States would take similar action, their reason being that without the cooperation of the United States no measures could possibly be effective. He urged that the United States should not abdicate from its position of leadership in support of international justice and democracy. He said that in expressing these views his position with respect to his colleagues in the Government was delicate because foreign affairs did not fall within his province but he had had the great privilege of becoming acquainted with the President and the Secretary of State and he would be grateful if his views might be communicated to them.
My estimate of the situation is that while the Chinese are being subjected to a terriffic strain by the necessity of conducting military operations on a scale for which they were not prepared, nevertheless, [Page 752] they are encouraged to think that the Japanese are doubtful of reaping benefits commensurate with the cost and that this with the possibility, even through it be remote, that the Soviet Union may take advantage of Japan’s preoccupation in China may make Japan’s terms of settlement milder as the conflict is protracted. It seems probable that the Kuangsi leaders and the Communists would refuse to be a party to a surrender.
Repeated to Tokyo, by mail to Peiping.
- Chinese Minister of Finance and Vice President of the Executive Yuan (Vice Premier).↩