Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/11673

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 2670

Tokyo, November 18, 1937.
[Received December 16.]

Sir: I have the honor to supplement herewith my telegrams No. 544 of November 16, 1 p.m.²⁵ and No. 548 of November 18, 10 a.m.²⁶ reporting my conversations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict.

It will be recalled that on August 6 I expressed to Mr. Hirota the hope that he would call on me if he ever saw ways by which I could be helpful in the situation existing between Japan and China. (See my No. 250, August 6, 9 p.m.) I had, of course, been giving constant study to developments, both in Japan and abroad, with a view to seizing an opportunity to remind Mr. Hirota of the statement which I had made to him on August 6. When the Japanese Government expressed its intention to decline the invitation of the Belgian Government to be represented at the Brussels Conference, and when the Japanese Government confirmed in its note dated October 27, 1937, to the Belgian Government, evidences of intention to refrain from cooperating with the Brussels Conference, it became evident to me that, in line with the desire of the American Government, as expressed both to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, to be helpful to the combatants in bringing to an end the current hostilities and finding a mutually satisfactory basis for a lasting peace between the two countries, I should endeavor to ascertain unofficially and cautiously whether the widespread confidence of the Japanese Government and people in the disinterestedness and impartiality of the United States could in some way be profitably employed in the direction of peace.

The Counselor of the Embassy had at various times had several informal conversations with Mr. Yoshizawa, Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, to explore the possibility of a further conversation taking place between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself along the line of the above-mentioned conversation of August 6. They had agreed that circumstances were not favorable. On November 8 Mr. Dooman called, with my knowledge and approval, on Mr. Yoshizawa and suggested to Mr. Yoshizawa that it might be useful to examine the situation in the light of developments then current. Mr. Yoshizawa heartily concurred. It was agreed between them, however, that any conversations which they might have would be entirely unofficial and were not to be a matter of record. However, in view of my recent calls of November 16 and November 18 on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yoshizawa has consented to my reporting to the Department the general substance of the conversations between him and Mr. Dooman which took place on November 8 and on November 16, as hereinafter described.

Mr. Dooman began by describing the circumstances which led to the opening of the way by President Theodore Roosevelt to the peace negotiations between Japan and Russia in 1905, and he related how Mr. Minister Griscom had, on his own initiative, obtained from the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Katsura, an engagement to reveal to President Roosevelt the Japanese peace terms if Russia were also prepared to present simultaneously its peace terms to President Roosevelt. Mr. Dooman stated that the analogy between the situation which existed at that time and the situation existing today could not be pushed too far, but that it seemed important to consider whether the events of 1905 did not suggest some method which might be used today. Mr. Yoshizawa said that it was the policy of the Japanese Government not to permit mediation by any third Power or Powers between Japan and China. The military situation was, Mr. Yoshizawa continued, in process of undergoing a change. The Chinese Government was aware that it would be unwise for the Japanese military forces to penetrate very deeply into China from the north, for the reason that the Japanese army had constantly to bear in mind the possibility of danger to its right flank from the direction of Soviet Russia. The Japanese army was now disposed to accept the challenge of the Chinese army to make Shanghai and the Yangtze region the principal theatre of military operations. Mr. Yoshizawa said that what the Japanese would regard as the perfect solution would be for the Chinese Government, following military reverses in that area, to propose to Japan direct negotiations for peace. The military situation which might lead to some such overture on the part of the Chinese Government had not yet been developed, and even if the Japanese forces inflicted severe reverses upon the Chinese forces, it might take considerable time; and also, notwithstanding such reverses, the Chinese Government might still be determined to continue the hostilities. Mr. Yoshizawa, therefore, thought that until a situation had developed which was calculated to bring about what he had previously described as the “ideal solution”, there would be little likelihood of the Japanese Government giving consideration to any proposed move toward peace involving the United States or any other third Power.

On November 16, at the request of Mr. Yoshizawa, Mr. Dooman called on Mr. Yoshizawa for a further conversation. Mr. Yoshizawa referred to the conversation of November 8, and asked Mr. Dooman whether we understood the attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the part which third party powers are desired by Japan to take in promoting peace negotiations between Japan and China. Mr. Dooman said that it was his understanding that the Japanese Government hoped that the United States and other powers would persuade the Chinese Government to enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese Government. Mr. Yoshizawa replied that that was so, but that the statement did not completely cover the Japanese Government’s position: that position is that Japan would be willing to consult with the United States or with any other power having important interests in the Far East, such consultation to be either with such powers individually or collectively, but that Japan would not participate in any discussion or consultation within the framework of any system of collective security such as the League of Nations or the Brussels Conference. Mr. Yoshizawa then showed Mr. Dooman a telegram from Mr. Saito, the Japanese Ambassador at Washington. Mr. Saito reported that the opinion of well-informed observers in Washington was that the American Government would not permit itself to become involved, apart from the other powers party to the Nine Power Treaty, in any effort to bring about peace between Japan and China; that a suggestion had been advanced to the effect that a useful move would be for Mr. Johnson at Nanking and for me at Tokyo to sound out simultaneously the views of the Chinese and Japanese governments respectively with regard to the prospects of peace. Mr. Saito concurred in the opinion of the observers above-mentioned in respect of the attitude of the American Government and believed that any concerted move by Mr. Johnson and by me along the line above suggested would be extremely hazardous. Mr. Dooman offered the comment that he felt certain that the American Government would view with the greatest distaste any proposition which might be made looking toward the assistance of the American Government in legitimatizing the results of a Japanese military victory in China. He thought that this point should be given consideration at all times by the Japanese Government in connection with any plan for participation by the United States in a move toward peace. Mr. Yoshizawa agreed, and said that he would present the thought to Mr. Hirota.

Mr. Yoshizawa said that reports received by the Foreign Office from Brussels tended to give the impression that the American delegation had been taking a leading role in the proceedings of the Conference. Mr. Kurusu, Japanese Ambassador at Brussels, has excellent contacts among press correspondents covering the Brussels Conference, and it could be surmised that the Italian delegation is keeping the Japanese Ambassador fully informed of developments within the conference. Mr. Kurusu is also receiving information from one or two other delegations. The purport of the information available to Mr. Kurusu is that the American delegation is taking a leading role in the proceedings of the conference. As an illustration of some of the reports current in Brussels, Mr. Yoshizawa said that Mr. Kurusu had heard from a Chinese source that the American delegation had advised the Chinese delegation that continued resistance by China would bring from the United States something more than moral support. Mr. Yoshizawa made the comment that the Foreign Office did not attach much importance to this report, as it had come from a Chinese source. Mr. Yoshizawa said that happily the Japanese people are convinced that, notwithstanding the President’s speech at Chicago on October 5²⁷ and the Department of State’s announcement of October 6,²⁸ the American Government and people have a just appreciation of the causes of the conflict between Japan and China, and that their concern toward the conflict does not arise from material and selfish reasons. On the other hand, it was well known that the Japanese people deeply resented the attitude of the British Government and of the British press, which has been actively encouraging some form of joint action by the Powers against Japan. He was now very much afraid that the impression which generally prevails in Brussels, that the American delegation has assumed a position of leadership in the conference, would become known in Japan, and that the animus of the Japanese people which is now directed at Great Britain would be transferred to the United States. The resolution drafted at the Brussels Conference carried a sting in its tail, and it would be unfortunate from the point of view of maintaining good relations by the United States and Japan if there were given grounds for believing that the American delegation was responsible for the conference’s recommending some form of united action against Japan.

Mr. Dooman agreed that it would be extremely unfortunate if an impression such as that suggested by Mr. Yoshizawa were permitted to arise, and he wondered whether Mr. Yoshizawa had any thoughts as to some step which might be taken to remove the impression, which he was sorry to say was widely prevalent in Tokyo, that the United States had taken the initiative in organizing the Brussels Conference and is now active in directing the proceedings of the Conference. Mr. Yoshizawa said that, in his view, definite assurance from the American Government that it was neither responsible for holding the Conference nor leading the proceedings of the Conference, added to some further assurance that the United States is not actively promoting a plan for “united action”, would be extremely helpful and would effectively dispel any fear of Japan’s resentment being turned against the United States. He had been turning over in his mind the possibility of instructing Mr. Saito to call on the Secretary of State and to make a frank statement of Japan’s position in the hope of eliciting from the Secretary some assurance along the lines just described. Mr. Dooman reminded Mr. Yoshizawa that there exists conclusive evidence that, whoever was responsible for organizing the Brussels Conference, it was not the United States: that fact is clearly demonstrated in the opening sentence of the invitation of the Belgian Government to the Brussels Conference. With regard to suggestions that the American delegation is playing a leading role in the Conference, it seemed entirely likely that an impression to that effect was being deliberately fostered by parties who conceive it to be in their own interest to promote the idea of American leadership. He thought it would be unfortunate if the American Government were requested to confirm the accuracy of the statements of its own officials, such as the statement issued by Mr. Sumner Welles on November 2.²⁹ Further, if the Japanese Government wished, in spite of these considerations, to ascertain the position of the American Government, an approach by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington would excite undesirable conjecture and speculation.

Quite apart from the question of the relations of the American Government with the Brussels Conference, it seemed to Mr. Dooman that there were other circumstances which needed to be considered. It seemed that the rapidly developing military situation around Shanghai required that, if the Japanese Government, as stated by Mr. Yoshizawa, were willing to consult with the United States as a nation having important interests in the Far East, any great delay in initiating any such consultation might result in the loss of an opportunity for opening the way to peace. It seemed highly unlikely that General Chiang Kai-shek would be in any mood to consider peace if the Chinese Government were evicted from Nanking by the Japanese military forces. Mr. Yoshizawa agreed. He said that there was a further danger, and that was the possibility that radical elements in the Nanking Government might be able to assume a position of control, in which event any possibility of peace being negotiated would have to be abandoned. If the Chinese Government were to retreat from Nanking into the remote interior of China, the need for some Chinese authority to assume responsibility for the maintenance of order would bring about the organization of some sort of new regime; and there were several Chinese prepared to organize such regimes. It was obvious, however, that no settlement reached with these regimes or, indeed, with any political figure in China other than Chiang Kai-shek could be regarded as a final settlement; and this view is being held by many important Japanese, including leading military officers.

Mr. Dooman said that he would report to the Ambassador the substance of the conversation which he had just had with Mr. Yoshizawa. It seemed to Mr. Dooman, and he would so inform me, that the moment appeared to have come when I might usefully remind Mr. Hirota that he could confer with me in any situation in which he thought I might be helpful in bringing about the restoration of peace. Mr. Yoshizawa stated that he would, for his part, consult with his superiors, and that he would exchange views with Mr. Dooman the following morning.

Mr. Dooman immediately reported to me the substance of his conversation with Mr. Yoshizawa. He had hardly completed his report when the private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned and requested me to call on Mr. Hirota at the official residence at 9:30 the following morning. I thereupon addressed to the Department my telegram No. 543, November 15, 7 p.m.,³⁰ suggesting that consideration be deferred of any plan to implement the resolution drafted by the Brussels Conference. I called on Mr. Hirota on November 16 at half-past nine in the morning, at the official residence of the Foreign Minister. An extended account of our conversation was cabled to the Department (see my 544, November 16, 1 p.m.).

In accordance with the Department’s instruction No. 300, November 16, 8 p.m.³¹ I called this morning on the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his official residence and precisely carried out the Secretary’s directions. I read to him the text of the final paragraph of the declaration drawn up by the Brussels Conference³² and pointed out that nowhere in the declaration did the phrase “united action” appear. I remarked that the term “common attitude” is quite a different matter and I hoped that this clearing up of an erroneous impression would completely set at rest the fears which he had expressed to me the other day. Mr. Hirota assented.

I then said that in the message from Mr. Hull which he had asked me to communicate directly to Mr. Hirota it was made clear that there was not an atom of truth in any allegation that the initiative in convoking the Brussels Conference was taken by the United States. It is Mr. Hull’s understanding that neither the United States nor any other Power represented at the Conference has gone farther than to assume its share of the common responsibility for an exchange of views concerning the situation in the Far East. I then once again spoke of the originally inaccurate press reports concerning Mr. Eden’s speech in the House of Commons and I also repeated Mr. Welles’s statement to the press definitely correcting the misunderstanding. I said I feared that an effort was being made in various quarters to injure the relations between the United States and Japan by spreading rumors to the effect that the United States had not only taken the initiative in convoking the Conference but is also taking active leadership in the Conference, and I appealed to Mr. Hirota, on behalf of good relations between our countries, to do everything possible to counteract the effect of these rumors and to let the actual facts be known. Mr. Hirota said that he would take definite steps in that direction and that he would also convey to his colleagues what I had said to him.

I then read to Mr. Hirota Mr. Hull’s message concerning their mutual efforts to maintain and develop good relations between our countries and Mr. Hull’s apprehension lest the present situation in the Far East would injure those relations. Mr. Hirota expressed great pleasure at this message and asked me to thank Mr. Hull for it. He asked if he might have the paper on which I had written the message but as the message had come in confidential code and would have to be paraphrased I said to Mr. Hirota that I would write him the message later on the plea that the paper in my hand was not sufficiently neat to leave with him.

Mr. Hirota then referred to our conversation the other day and said that reports are now coming in to him that Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Government are evacuating Nanking. He repeated that he felt this to be most unfortunate because if chaos should result it would mean an indefinite prolongation of the hostilities. He said “we want to talk with Chiang Kai-shek and this will now be very difficult.” I merely inquired once again whether diplomatic channels between the two Governments are not still in existence to which Mr. Hirota smilingly assented but without comment.

I had today an extended conversation with my British colleague (see my 549, November 18, 6 p.m.). It will have been noted that Sir Robert Craigie had suggested that he be authorized to press the Japanese Foreign Office for a reply to certain questions which he had put to Mr. Horinouchi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, calculated to clarify the attitude of the Japanese Government toward any Anglo-American offer of good offices, if made. It seemed to me, in the light of the indications of Japanese attitude given us by Mr. Yoshizawa, that the procedure which Sir Robert was suggesting overlooked the holding of a discussion which the Japanese considered to be an essential preliminary to any official indication by them of departure from the formal Japanese attitude—that third countries could best promote peace by persuading the Chinese Government to enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese Government. It seemed to me, further, that it would be logical to assume that the Japanese would not answer frankly the hypothetical questions put to them by Sir Robert unless and until the British Government (or the American Government) were prepared itself to answer—and to answer in a sense which the Japanese Government would regard as satisfactory—the hypothetical question: Would the offer of good offices be made by the British Government (or the American Government) within the framework of a system of collective security or as independent agents? Sir Robert’s response to those thoughts was that he expected that the Japanese Government would realize the difficulty that the British Government would have in stating, in advance of some Japanese manifestation of a spirit of receptiveness to an offer of good offices, that the offer would be made by the British Government independently of the League of Nations or of the other Powers party to the Nine-Power Treaty. He thought it possible, however, that the Japanese Government might make a point of this question, and he said that he would express to his Government the hope that it would not emphasize the principle of peace by collective action even at the cost of ruling out peace by negotiation outside the Brussels Conference.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

25. Vol. iv, p. 189.
26. Ibid., p. 210.
27. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 379.
28. Ibid., p. 396.
29. See telegram No. 282, November 2, 5 p.m., from the Acting Secretary of State, vol. iv, p. 145.
30. Vol. iv, p. 187.
31. Ibid., p. 196.
32. For text of declaration adopted on November 15, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 410.