Office of the Historian

793.94 Conference/270: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 18, 1937—6 p.m.
[Received November 18—10:40 a.m.]

549. My 544, November 16, 1 p.m.19

1.
My British colleague has just read to me a telegram from his Government reporting a conversation between Eden and Yoshida20 which Lindsay21 is instructed to bring to your attention. Yoshida appears to have informed Eden that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs had told Craigie22 on November 15 that the Japanese Government would be disposed to accept an offer of good offices looking toward peace and that Hirota had made the same suggestion to me “in even more specific terms”.
2.
Craigie received no such definite impression from his talk with Horinouchi. The former had called on the Vice Minister to inquire on his own initiative as to the truth of press reports to the effect that Germany was offering mediation. The Vice Minister replied that the reports were based on a misunderstanding. At the end of the interview Craigie still on his own initiative asked the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs for a personal expression of opinion as to whether supposing the moment came for an offer of good offices the Japanese Government would prefer Germany to act as intermediary rather than the United States or Great Britain. The Vice Minister said he thought not. Craigie then inquired in the same strictly personal manner whether he thought [the Japanese Government] would welcome an offer of Anglo-American good offices at the appropriate moment. The Vice Minister said he would prefer not to answer this question without consulting the Minister for Foreign Affairs. [Page 688] Craigie has still no information as to the view of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on this point.
3.
As to my own talk with Hirota on November 1623 I received no impression that he was soliciting an offer of good offices. However, it seemed to me that he was seeking to prepare the ground for consultation with the United States to explore a possible path to peace and that he went somewhat beyond the statement which he made to me and to the other ambassadors when he handed them copies of Japan’s refusal to go to Brussels, that if our countries wished to help they could best do so by persuading Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate for peace. This appeared to me to be a purely conventional observation which he had made to me and to others on previous occasions. I am aware that the German Ambassador took this seriously and reported it to his Government and that this gave rise to the press reports that Hitler was offering good offices. Nothing came of it.
4.
Craigie has suggested to his Government as a first step that he be authorized to inquire of the Vice Minister: (a) whether he is now in a position to answer Craigie’s question regarding Japanese attitude toward Anglo-American offer of good offices; (b) whether this term “good offices” can be understood to mean joint action by the two countries as intermediaries for the initiation of peace negotiations. As regards (b) Craigie pointed out to his Government that it would be necessary to make it clear to the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government is in no mood as yet to engage in direct negotiations with Japan adding that his conception of the function of intermediaries would be the passing of messages regarding armistice and peace terms from one combatant to the other until a basis has been found for direct negotiations between the parties. It seemed to Craigie that there would be no objection to his method if the American and British Governments were to announce in advance that they assume no responsibility for the terms.
5.
Craigie and I both feel that if Anglo-American good offices are to be offered either by both or one of us our respective Governments should act only as intermediaries and with the approval of both combatants. We believe that the Japanese interpret such good offices as bringing pressure to bear on Chiang Kai-shek to enter negotiations even against his will. It is obviously out of the question that either the United States or Great Britain or both would consent to any such action.
6.
We feel nevertheless that a negotiated peace now would involve far less drastic terms than if long delayed. Hirota said so to me.
7.
Craigie said to me that he would inform his Government that in his view the procedure which he has in mind would not be incompatible with any declaration adopted at Brussels but that even if it were so he would deplore adherence to the principle of peace by collective action to a point where any prospect of peace lying outside the Brussels Conference would be ruled out. I would be greatly interested to learn the Department’s views with regard to this point which I had previously suggested in paragraph 14 of my 544 of November 16, 1 p.m.
8.
Craigie is informing his Government of his talk with Horinouchi and of my talk with Hirota in order to correct the impression conveyed to Eden by Yoshida.
9.
Craigie and I both believe that chances of success would be seriously impaired by premature publicity.
10.
I wish to emphasize that my conversations with Hirota have in no way gone beyond the field indicated in my telegrams.
Grew
  1. Vol. iv, p. 189.↩
  2. Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom.↩
  3. British Ambassador in the United States.↩
  4. British Ambassador in Japan.↩
  5. See also memorandum of November 16, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 413.↩