Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

762.94/184: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State

London, November 9, 1937—6 p.m.
[Received 7:45 p.m.]

704. My 680, October 30, 3 p.m.⁶ In a conversation yesterday at the Foreign Office some further indication was given of British views regarding Italian adherence to the German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact. While there was no attempt to make an authoritative assessment of the implications of the enlarged pact, it was apparent that the general trend of Foreign Office opinion is along these lines set forth in my 680, October 30, 3 p.m. That Germany’s long term objective is directed towards using the pact as the springboard of a European policy rather than as a specifically anti-Russian instrument (and pro-Japanese as far as Far Eastern policy is concerned), would seem to be borne out by information bearing on the difficulties of the German position in the Far East.

According to my informant, there is a sharp cleavage of opinion in German official circles at present as to the proper objective for German policy in the Far East. German banking and business leaders and the command and staff of the army, including Blomberg,⁷ are said to be frankly in sympathy with Chinese aims as they consider that China under a more or less “open door” policy, offers a more fruitful field for expansion of German commercial enterprise than the Japanese Empire or a China under the heel of Japan. The Nazi party leaders on the other hand, who at the moment have a preponderating influence in German foreign policy, are quite prepared to throw German commercial interests in China overboard in order to establish political solidarity with Japan. Which of these two views will finally prevail may still be in doubt. Some indication as to their relative strength may shortly be shown by the result of the present conflict of opinion in Berlin on the withdrawal of German military advisers from China. According to my informant, there are with the Chinese military forces 58 German officers of the highest professional reputation and great experience, some 8 or 10 of them being general officers. They have done what is said to be a very effective job with the Chinese Army and some have even passed beyond the status of advisers and have been commanding military operations. The Nazi influence in Germany desires the immediate withdrawal of these officers as a placating gesture towards Japan. To this the German Army and the conservative industrial and business leaders are opposed. Even if the official Nazi views prevail and the officers are ordered back, there is, of course, no assurance how many if any of them would be prepared to obey the order and return to Germany where no future awaits them. The Foreign Office considers the presence of these highly trained and experienced German officers in China as a factor of considerable importance in the Sino-Japanese conflict. As of interest in this connection, it may be mentioned that, according to Foreign Office information, there were secret military clauses to the German-Japanese pact of a year ago⁸ and the existence and purport of these clauses were withheld by the Germans and the Japanese from the Italians in the negotiation of the Italian adherence. Further, according to the Foreign Office, the Germans carefully safeguarded themselves by those secret clauses against being attached to any Japanese kite in the Far East. Such safeguarding provisions in the secret clauses if they exist would indicate that the Nazi political leaders did not have an entirely free hand in negotiating the original pact with Japan.

Concurrently with announcement of the Italian adherence to the Anti-Communist Pact have come rumors that Hitler might be asked by Japan to mediate in the present Chinese conflict. The Foreign Office professes to have no authoritative information regarding this rumor. The presence, however, of the German military advisers in China and the uncertain result of the conflict of opinion in Germany as to their withdrawal would seem in themselves sufficient reasons to exclude Germany as a mediator.

If it be true that far-seeing elements in Germany are reluctant to jeopardize the existence of important commercial interests in China and the prospect of their expansion in the future by supporting the Japanese program and if there is a chance that this view will prevail, there would be further reasons to look for a European focus for the Nazi-made Anti-Communist Pact. It would moreover be difficult to escape the conclusion that it is really directed against Great Britain, not perhaps in any immediate sense but as an instrument of long term policy. If Germany is able to build up a bloc of states subservient to her leadership and whose larger interests she can make appear in some degree identical with her own and opposed to those of the far-flung British Empire, so much greater will be her strategical position in exacting from Great Britain, and secondarily France, concessions along all the lines of her ambition. Commentators have not failed to see the implications of this pact with respect to German claims for colonial expansion which are gathering increased momentum. That the British are aware of these trends may be taken for granted and there is some indication that the Foreign Office is moving to the view that the now strengthened Berlin-Rome axis must be attacked at Berlin as well as at Rome if an effective result is to be achieved. What is causing the anxiety now is how this attack at Berlin may be made.

Press comment on the Anti-Communist Pact while speculative in character and somewhat consciously playing down its immediate importance, nevertheless carries an undertone of anxiety and doubt as to the real aims of the three signatories. On the surface Italy’s adherence might seem to be an innocuous endorsement of the policy expressed in the German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact, but informed commentators are nevertheless aware that other factors have come into play within the last year which justify more serious significance being attached to Italy’s adherence. The published terms of the document signed in Rome are substantially the same as those conditions of the German-Japanese agreement but the circumstances in which it was signed have changed in at least two important respects as pointed out in the following brief excerpts from the leading editorial in the Times today which express with substantial accuracy the reaction of all sections of the press:

“A year ago the Rome–Berlin Axis wore an aspect less imposing outwardly than it wears today; and a year ago Japan was not strenuously engaged in a large scale invasion of China. There has accordingly been no little speculation whether the new pact has a more effective scope and more portentous implications than its predecessor.…⁹ The difficulties of interpretation which have been apparent in newspaper comment not only in countries outside the pact but also in the three capitals principally concerned are evident. Whether the pact will mean much or little depends on what force and value the signatories may feel from time to time impelled to give it.…⁹ The truth perhaps is that the pact coming at this moment is a diplomatic demonstration which may be presumed to have an immediate value as a reassurance for Japan and for Italy, in particular, for their commitments in China and Spain respectively. Its future will be what events make it, that is to say the sympathies it implies did not in existing circumstances require a pact to create them”.

Repeated to American delegation, Brussels.

Bingham

6. Vol. i, p. 609.
7. Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, German Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
8. For text of secret additional agreement, signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, see German Documents, 1918–1945, ser. D, vol. i, p. 734, footnote 2a.
9. Omission indicated in the original telegram.
9. Omission indicated in the original telegram.