Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1937, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/11008: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 6, 1937—6 p.m.
[Received November 6—2:35 p.m.]

524. Department’s 288, November 5, 1 [2] p.m.

1. Byas sent us last night a copy of his despatch of the day before to the New York Times in which there was included the suggestion that Japan might welcome American mediation. His analysis of the significance of the Imperial Headquarters project, the Italian pact,⁹⁹ and of other factors is an able piece of writing from the point of view of press reporting, but we believe that the situation is still obscure and that we cannot at this time make any sure evaluation except with the greatest reserve.

2. The Naval and Military Attachés have endeavored to procure further information on the trend of most recent discussions on the headquarters project. The statements of officials of the War and Navy Departments were carefully couched but the conclusion is reached that,

(a) the establishment of Imperial Headquarters is still under consideration and has not been decided upon for the reason that,

(b) although the view is favored that Imperial Headquarters should be purely an organ to formulate and coordinate military and naval functions and should not be vested with any powers in the political economic and fiscal fields,

(c) nevertheless, no decision has been reached on the question whether or not establishment of Imperial Headquarters will inevitably involve from both legal and practical viewpoints the issuing of a declaration of war.

3. There apparently has been no serious divergence of opinion with regard to the need for Imperial Headquarters as we and other foreign observers uniformly believe that the Japanese military now expect that the hostilities in China are to be of long duration. (There is a difference of opinion among foreign observers as to the range of further implications in the project which would involve action whether positive or negative against countries other than China. This last point is hereinafter discussed.) We have had indications during the past 3 weeks of a division of thought in the army with regard to future conduct of military operations in China. One school of thought advocates the limiting of military objectives to an advance to the Yellow River because further extension would greatly expose the Japanese west flank to Russia, create difficult problems of supply, impose undue hardship on the troops, and generally require the payment of a disproportionately high price for relatively inconsequential tactical successes. The other school argues that nothing short of complete destruction of the Chinese Army can fully liquidate situation. It is therefore not unlikely that friction between these two elements has developed to a point where resort has become necessary to the device of having plans of operations issued by the Emperor.

4. With regard to point (b) above the Navy Department states that Imperial Headquarters if established will be organized only as an instrument of the armed services. The War Department affirms that this question has not been decided. Indications from other sources are however that the Navy viewpoint will prevail.

5. With regard to point (c) the theory is being advanced that as the conflict has been officially recognized by Parliament as a “national emergency” Imperial Headquarters can be established without doing violence to the provisions of its organic ordinance. We do not attach much importance to legalistic discussions of this kind. In our view the determining factor in any declaration of war will be whether supplies of arms and munitions to China continue. According to a statement made to the Naval Attaché at the Navy Department war supplies continue to be sent in to China through Hong Kong, Indo-China and Soviet Russia, 40 planes and several hundred trucks from the latter having arrived. If it has been found that the present China blockade has not effectively reduced the flow of such supplies into China the establishing of Imperial Headquarters would offer an opportunity to declare war and lay down an effective naval blockade.

6. Our thought at this moment is in view of the foregoing, that the Imperial Headquarters project is probably being determined almost entirely by considerations associated with the completion of the hostilities against China.

7. Byas’ suggestion that Japanese agitation against Great Britain has been artificially stimulated to make the Italian pact more palatable to the Japanese people is in our opinion of doubtful accuracy. As we have already reported on several occasions the resentment against Great Britain rests on the ground that Great Britain has taken the lead in endeavoring to form a common front against Japan. It cannot be denied that a pact at this time with Italy is an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual force animating three strong powers now aligned against the democratic powers. As there is a press ban on the pact we have no means of knowing how public opinion reacts to the pact but we venture the prediction that it will when announced be strongly approved as having lifted Japan out of its isolated international position.

8. The increase of Japanese forces in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia has probably been brought about by the reported Chinese proposal to Soviet Russia that the recent treaty with Outer Mongolia¹ be abrogated. (See Nanking’s 871, November 1, 9 a.m.) A report to this effect was published in the Japanese papers about 3 weeks ago. As stated in paragraph 3 above the extension of the Japanese military lines from North China is increasing the vulnerability of the Japanese right flank to attack from the direction of Outer Mongolia. Although there is a minatory significance for Russia’s notice in the movement of Japanese troops to the north and northwest, the probability is that it is dictated more by military expediency than by objectives of Japanese diplomacy.

9. In our 321, August 27, 4 p.m., we anticipated that there might arise a situation in which the American Government could with reasonable prospects of success offer its services to the two combatants to bring the hostilities to an end. Byas suggests that the thought is forming in Japan that it might be acceptable for the United States to open the way for peace discussions. We hope that our Government will not suppose that the time is ripe for any such move.

10. With regard to the Department’s specific inquiry whether in the event of a declaration of war foreign rights and interests in China will be respected: No indications are available as yet of the attitude which may be taken by Japan on this point. We have the feeling that in view of the emphasis placed abroad on observance of international law Japan will not be disposed to abandon in principle any rights which she may have as a belligerent and that the consideration she may give to foreign rights and interests would be influenced by her relations with each nation concerned.

11. We realize that the present telegram is in part speculative in character but we must emphasize that almost complete silence is being maintained as to Japan’s objectives and that our estimates must be formulated largely by weighing imponderables which change from day to day.

To Nanking by mail.

Grew

99. Protocol concluded by Italy, Germany, and Japan at Rome on November 6, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 159.
1. Protocol for mutual assistance, signed March 12, 1936; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. iv, pp. 92 ff.