793.94111/84: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 4 p.m.]
1496–1500. For the Acting Secretary. My 1488, October 22, 9 a.m.
Last evening I asked Delbos for an explanation of the French action in forbidding the shipment of munitions through French Indo-China to China.
Delbos said that yesterday afternoon there had been another discussion of this question in a small gathering of the most important members of the Government. Certain members of the Government had desired to lift the ban altogether but he had insisted that it should be maintained until the meeting of the Brussels Conference. His reasons were that the Japanese had threatened not only to destroy the portion within China of the railroad leading from French Indo-China to China but also had threatened to seize the Chinese island of Hainan in the Gulf of Tonkin and also the Paracel Islands. He said that these islands had long been in dispute between China and [Page 635] France. Japan now was claiming that the Paracel Islands were Chinese territory and that Japan therefore had a perfect right to seize them.
Delbos went on to say that if all the nations represented in the Brussels Conference should decide to supply China via their territories with munitions, France would be disposed to collaborate and permit shipments via Indo-China on condition that if Japan should attack French Indo-China France would receive physical support from the other members of the Brussels Conference in protecting Indo-China. He added that he was not at all sure that if the matter should come to actual conflict Siam would not cooperate with Japan. Both Japan and Italy had great influence at the moment with the Siamese Government.
Delbos added that he feared that Indo-China soon would be the only route of supply open to China and that therefore Japan would act against Indo-China. He believed the Soviet Union had supplied a few airplanes to China but was virtually certain that no other supplies had been sent by the Soviet Union to China. His information indicated that it was almost impossible for the Soviet Union to make any shipments of importance to China by any land route. He also felt certain that the Soviet Union had no intention whatever of intervening in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.
I asked Delbos what he believed might be accomplished by the Brussels Conference. He replied that he could not see that the Conference could accomplish anything but, on the spot, it might be possible to invent something. The position of the United States would be decisive. He would attend the opening meeting of the Conference and Eden, who had been reluctant to go, had been persuaded by him to attend at least for the opening of the Conference.
After talking with Delbos I dined alone with Blum59 who threw further light on the decision of the French to prohibit shipments of munitions to China through French Indo-China. Blum said that he had brought up this question again yesterday afternoon at the small meeting of the leading members of the Government to which Delbos had referred. He had suggested that at least until the meeting of the Brussels Conference, shipments through Indo-China should continue to be permitted. There had been objection that both the Chinese and Japanese Governments had been informed that the French Government had decided to forbid these shipments. Blum said that he had insisted, and finally it had been agreed that without any further statements to the Chinese and Japanese Governments all shipments now enroute would be allowed to pass through French Indo-China to China.
[Page 636]Blum went on to say that it was obvious that if the war in China should be prolonged French Indo-China would be the one route by which China could receive munitions. This would almost certainly lead Japan to destroy the railroad within Chinese territory and might lead to a Japanese attack on French Indo-China. He also referred to the possibility that Siam might cooperate with Japan.
Blum went on to say that this would leave France in a most exposed position and that if the Brussels Conference should decide that all the nations represented should supply China with munitions according to their ability and should encourage France to keep open the route via Indo-China it would be essential that at the same time they should promise France not to leave France alone to defend Indo-China in case of Japanese attack. He added that he believed that if England, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States should take a strong line unitedly there would be no danger whatever of Japan attacking any one of them. He said, however, that he was extremely skeptical with regard to the position of the Soviet Union. He had had many discussions with Litvinov60 in Geneva recently. Litvinov had talked to him frankly as an old friend. Litvinov had said that he and the Soviet Union were perfectly delighted that Japan had attacked China. He believed that Japan would be so weakened financially and economically and would have such enormous difficulty in digesting a conquered China that the Soviet Union was now completely assured of peace in the Far East for many years to come. Litvinov had added that the Soviet Union hoped that war between China and Japan would continue just as long as possible and would result in an attempt by the Japanese to swallow just as much of China as possible. This would leave the Soviet Union free for operations in Europe.
Blum said that he had argued with Litvinov that it was a vital interest of the Soviet Union to prevent the conquest of China by Japan since Japan’s ultimate object was to capture Vladivostok and to establish the Japanese frontier at Lake Baikal.
Litvinov had laughed at this, proving that no matter how long the war in China might endure and no matter how much of China Japan might conquer, the Soviet Union would remain passive. Litvinov had said that whereas before the Japanese attack on China, Japan had been most hostile and aggravating, today the Japanese were all politeness and butter in their relations with the Soviet Government.
The present ironclad position seems to be that while the Government has informed both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that France has forbidden shipments through French Indo-China to China; in reality, these shipments will continue to go through until the question has been discussed at the Brussels Conference.
[Page 637]I asked Blum what he thought might be accomplished by the Brussels Conference. After a long silence he said that he thought the Conference could accomplish nothing unless the United States should be prepared to guarantee with force French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.
If the Department desires me to take any definite line with regard to the question of transit through Indo-China I should be obliged for instructions. I have limited myself strictly to questions and have expressed no opinions.