793.94/9732: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 27—1:35 p.m.]
321. 1. Recent despatches from London state that following a conference between the British Prime Minister Eden and Halifax on August 23 the British Government will renew efforts to persuade the American Government to participate in a “joint declaration” on the [Page 486] situation in the Far East. There is extensive speculation over the character of such proposed declaration but it is generally anticipated that it is to be vigorous. On the basis of extensive experience in Japan on the part of several of my advisers and myself I venture respectfully to submit certain of our more fundamental views concerning the present Sino-Japanese conflict in hope that they may be found helpful in formulating future policy and action.
2. Divergent opinions exist as to the question of premeditation and the immediate responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict but these points have probably not yet been established. In our opinion they are not now of great practical importance.
3. The important consideration is that the seeds for the present conflict were sown long ago and regardless of dates or provocative acts the conflict was eventually inevitable. While it is believed that the Japanese at first hoped to settle the Marco Polo Bridge affair as a local episode it was soon found that regardless of the wishes of Nanking or Tokyo the situation had rapidly developed out of hand and that the settlement of Japan’s anomalous position in North China had now become unavoidable by either side.
4. The present hostilities are an inevitable corollary of the Manchurian conflict which left Japan with an eventual choice of two alternatives: either to establish complete control in North China or to be prepared for an eventual retreat from Manchuria. There could never have been any doubt whatever as to the choice of alternatives. Japan’s effort during the past 4 years to obtain its objective gradually and by political maneuvers rather than by open force miscarried. Eventual conflict then became inevitable. There then remained only the question as to how far the conflict could be localized. There is every reason to believe that Japan would have welcomed localization but whether through Japan’s own inept tactics (in Shanghai and elsewhere) or through uncontrollable circumstances any such hope was soon shattered. General warfare was unloosed and there can be no question but that the Japanese Government solidly supported by the public is determined to see it through.
5. Predictions as to the final outcome are of course premature. Japanese confidence in overwhelming military victory within a few months appears to be complete. They believe that their mechanized army and air forces can attain their objectives. They seem incapable of pausing to consider that after repeated victories in battle and the possible virtual destruction of the Chinese armies as organized units the real war may only then begin. We doubt if they stop to think of the possible effects of almost endless guerilla warfare, of the wiping out of Japan’s commercial and industrial stake in China and of the immense financial appropriations and other drains which may progressively [Page 487] deplete the Japanese exchequer. We hold that they have no real conception of these risks and are unable to visualize or appraise the long range outlook as opposed to the more immediate prospective. Herein in our opinion lies the considerable risk that Japan may conceivably emerge from such a campaign shorn of much of her prestige and power.
6. We agree with Mr. Johnson’s thesis (Nanking’s 410, August 12, 6 p.m.) that China could not afford to refuse to meet Japan’s challenge and we are in complete accord with his opposition to any American step which might be considered as urging China to purchase peace with the loss of sovereign rights. We are equally of the opinion that any attempt by the United States to thwart by manifestation of disapprobation on legal or moral grounds the development of Japan’s China policy would have no beneficial effect and if persisted in would tend to obliterate the elements of friendship on the part of Japan towards the United States which have been and are daily being developed by our government’s tactics, methods and manner of procedure in the present conflict.
7. We feel that the fundamental objectives of the United States in the present situation should be: (1) to avoid involvement; (2) to protect to the utmost the lives, property and rights of American citizens; and (3) while reserving complete neutrality to maintain our traditional friendship with both combatants. The last point will need the making of special endeavor toward solidifying our relations with Japan. In a day and age when national egotism is rampant we believe that the Japanese are capable of gratitude in large measure for manifestations of good will and that by encouraging confidence in our impartiality between and friendship toward both contestants we can accomplish more than by any other method. They still constantly remember and speak of our friendship at the time of the great earthquake in 1923.74 They likewise constantly remember the Exclusion Act75 and our methods at the time of the Manchurian affair. Today as a result of the policy and methods now being pursued by the present Administration in Washington they are already exhibiting marked signs of appreciation. Similar appreciation is not being manifested towards Great Britain. Looking at these considerations from a purely material point of view we believe that they constitute a practical asset to American interests and that the importance of this asset will increase in direct ratio to our continuance of the policy and methods which we are now following. We have before us an important opportunity which should not be missed. If and when the time comes for the United States to act toward terminating hostilities [Page 488] Japan will be more disposed to heed our counsel if she has confidence in our good will and impartiality than if her attitude toward us be one of suspicion and resentment.
8. It is far from our intention to advocate the development of friendship with Japan at the expense of friendship with China. We merely wish to emphasize the importance of having constantly in mind the considerations brought about in this telegram in connection with every action taken by our Government. We feel that much may be accomplished by appealing either alone or in concert with other powers for restraining or circumscribing warfare in specific localities where foreigners and foreign property are in danger but we also feel that until there has occurred a stalemate or until military victory by one of the contestants has been achieved moral intervention by the powers which could be interpreted as partial to either contestant would have no good effect.
9. The Military and Naval Attachés and my entire staff concur in the foregoing.76
- See Foreign Relations, 1923, vol. ii, pp. 465 ff.↩
- See ibid., 1924, vol. ii, pp. 333 ff.↩
- In telegram No. 324, August 28, 11 a.m., the Ambassador asked that the Commercial Attaché be included (793.94/9751). In telegram No. 176, August 28, 3 p.m., the Secretary cabled his appreciation of the Ambassador’s No. 321 (793.94/9732).↩